GHSA-C37P-4QQG-3P76

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 00:54 – Updated: 2026-03-06 01:03
VLAI
Summary
OpenClaw Twilio voice-call webhook auth bypass when ngrok loopback compatibility is enabled
Details

Summary

A Twilio webhook signature-verification bypass in the voice-call extension could allow unauthenticated webhook requests when a specific ngrok free-tier compatibility option is enabled.

Impact

This issue is limited to configurations that explicitly enable and expose the voice-call webhook endpoint.

Not affected by default: - The voice-call extension is optional and disabled by default. - The bypass only applied when tunnel.allowNgrokFreeTierLoopbackBypass was explicitly enabled. - Exploitation required the webhook to be reachable (typically via a public ngrok URL during development).

Worst case (when exposed and the option was enabled): - An external attacker could send forged requests to the publicly reachable webhook endpoint that would be accepted without a valid X-Twilio-Signature. - This could result in unauthorized webhook event handling (integrity) and request flooding (availability).

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.2.13 (latest published as of 2026-02-14)
  • Patched versions: >= 2026.2.14 (planned next release; pending publish)

Fix

allowNgrokFreeTierLoopbackBypass no longer bypasses signature verification. It only enables trusting forwarded headers on loopback so the public ngrok URL can be reconstructed for correct signature validation.

Fix commit(s): - ff11d8793b90c52f8d84dae3fbb99307da51b5c9

Thanks @p80n-sec for reporting.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-29606"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-18T00:54:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:23Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA Twilio webhook signature-verification bypass in the voice-call extension could allow unauthenticated webhook requests when a specific ngrok free-tier compatibility option is enabled.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis issue is limited to configurations that explicitly enable and expose the voice-call webhook endpoint.\n\nNot affected by default:\n- The voice-call extension is optional and disabled by default.\n- The bypass only applied when `tunnel.allowNgrokFreeTierLoopbackBypass` was explicitly enabled.\n- Exploitation required the webhook to be reachable (typically via a public ngrok URL during development).\n\nWorst case (when exposed and the option was enabled):\n- An external attacker could send forged requests to the publicly reachable webhook endpoint that would be accepted without a valid `X-Twilio-Signature`.\n- This could result in unauthorized webhook event handling (integrity) and request flooding (availability).\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.13` (latest published as of 2026-02-14)\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.2.14` (planned next release; pending publish)\n\n## Fix\n\n`allowNgrokFreeTierLoopbackBypass` no longer bypasses signature verification. It only enables trusting forwarded headers on loopback so the public ngrok URL can be reconstructed for correct signature validation.\n\nFix commit(s):\n- ff11d8793b90c52f8d84dae3fbb99307da51b5c9\n\nThanks @p80n-sec for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-c37p-4qqg-3p76",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T01:03:39Z",
  "published": "2026-02-18T00:54:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-c37p-4qqg-3p76"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29606"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/ff11d8793b90c52f8d84dae3fbb99307da51b5c9"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.14"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-webhook-signature-verification-bypass-via-ngrok-loopback-compatibility"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw Twilio voice-call webhook auth bypass when ngrok loopback compatibility is enabled"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.