GHSA-VPJ2-QQ7W-5QQ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-31 23:48 – Updated: 2026-03-31 23:48Impact
An attacker can bypass Cloud Function validator access controls by appending .prototype.constructor to the function name in the URL. When a Cloud Function handler is declared using the function keyword and its validator is a plain object or arrow function, the trigger store traversal resolves the handler through its own prototype chain while the validator store fails to mirror this traversal, causing all access control enforcement to be skipped.
This allows unauthenticated callers to invoke Cloud Functions that are meant to be protected by validators such as requireUser, requireMaster, or custom validation logic.
Patches
The trigger store traversal now verifies that each intermediate node is a legitimate store object before continuing traversal. If the traversal encounters a non-store value such as a function handler, it stops and returns an empty store, preventing prototype chain escape.
Workarounds
Use arrow functions instead of the function keyword for Cloud Function handlers. Arrow functions do not have a prototype property and are not affected by this vulnerability.
Resources
- GitHub security advisory: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vpj2-qq7w-5qq6
- Fix Parse Server 9: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10342
- Fix Parse Server 8: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10343
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "parse-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.7.0-alpha.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "parse-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.6.67"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34532"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-31T23:48:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T15:16:20Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nAn attacker can bypass Cloud Function validator access controls by appending `.prototype.constructor` to the function name in the URL. When a Cloud Function handler is declared using the `function` keyword and its validator is a plain object or arrow function, the trigger store traversal resolves the handler through its own prototype chain while the validator store fails to mirror this traversal, causing all access control enforcement to be skipped.\n\nThis allows unauthenticated callers to invoke Cloud Functions that are meant to be protected by validators such as `requireUser`, `requireMaster`, or custom validation logic.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe trigger store traversal now verifies that each intermediate node is a legitimate store object before continuing traversal. If the traversal encounters a non-store value such as a function handler, it stops and returns an empty store, preventing prototype chain escape.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUse arrow functions instead of the `function` keyword for Cloud Function handlers. Arrow functions do not have a `prototype` property and are not affected by this vulnerability.\n\n### Resources\n\n- GitHub security advisory: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vpj2-qq7w-5qq6\n- Fix Parse Server 9: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10342\n- Fix Parse Server 8: https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10343",
"id": "GHSA-vpj2-qq7w-5qq6",
"modified": "2026-03-31T23:48:38Z",
"published": "2026-03-31T23:48:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/security/advisories/GHSA-vpj2-qq7w-5qq6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34532"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10342"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/pull/10343"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/4fc48cf28f22eea200d74d883505f485234a48d7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server/commit/dc59e272665644083c5b7f6862d88ce1ef0b2674"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/parse-community/parse-server"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "parse-server has cloud function validator bypass via prototype chain traversal"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.