GHSA-RH67-4C8J-HJJH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-10 20:36 – Updated: 2025-06-10 20:36Impact
Files uploaded by users to Nautobot's MEDIA_ROOT directory, including DeviceType image attachments as well as images attached to a Location, Device, or Rack, are served to users via a URL endpoint that was not enforcing user authentication. As a consequence, such files can be retrieved by anonymous users who know or can guess the correct URL for a given file.
For DeviceType image attachments, a mitigating factor is that no URL endpoint exists for listing the contents of the devicetype-images/ subdirectory, and the file names are as specified by the uploading user, so any given DeviceType image attachment can only be retrieved by correctly guessing its file name.
Similarly, for all other image attachments, while the images can be listed by accessing the /api/extras/image-attachments/ endpoint as an authenticated user only, absent that authenticated access, accessing the files would again require guessing file names correctly.
Patches
Nautobot v2.4.10 and v1.6.32 will address this issue by adding enforcement of Nautobot user authentication to this endpoint.
Workarounds
No workaround other than applying the patch given in https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/pull/6672 (2.x) or https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/pull/6703 (1.6)
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
- https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/9c892dc300429948a4714f743c9c2879d8987340
- https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/d99a53b065129cff3a0fa9abe7355a9ef1ad4c95
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nautobot"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.32"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nautobot"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-49143"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-10T20:36:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-10T16:15:42Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nFiles uploaded by users to Nautobot\u0027s `MEDIA_ROOT` directory, including DeviceType image attachments as well as images attached to a Location, Device, or Rack, are served to users via a URL endpoint that was not enforcing user authentication. As a consequence, such files can be retrieved by anonymous users who know or can guess the correct URL for a given file.\n\nFor DeviceType image attachments, a mitigating factor is that no URL endpoint exists for listing the contents of the `devicetype-images/` subdirectory, and the file names are as specified by the uploading user, so any given DeviceType image attachment can only be retrieved by correctly guessing its file name.\n\nSimilarly, for all other image attachments, while the images *can* be listed by accessing the `/api/extras/image-attachments/` endpoint *as an authenticated user only*, absent that authenticated access, accessing the files would again require guessing file names correctly.\n\n### Patches\n\nNautobot v2.4.10 and v1.6.32 will address this issue by adding enforcement of Nautobot user authentication to this endpoint.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workaround other than applying the patch given in https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/pull/6672 (2.x) or https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/pull/6703 (1.6)\n\n### References\n_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_\n\n- https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/9c892dc300429948a4714f743c9c2879d8987340\n- https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/d99a53b065129cff3a0fa9abe7355a9ef1ad4c95",
"id": "GHSA-rh67-4c8j-hjjh",
"modified": "2025-06-10T20:36:11Z",
"published": "2025-06-10T20:36:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/security/advisories/GHSA-rh67-4c8j-hjjh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49143"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/pull/6672"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/pull/6703"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/9c892dc300429948a4714f743c9c2879d8987340"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/d99a53b065129cff3a0fa9abe7355a9ef1ad4c95"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Nautobot may allows uploaded media files to be accessible without authentication"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.