GHSA-QJ86-P74R-7WP5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-16 00:40 – Updated: 2023-12-16 00:40Impact
Anyone who can edit an arbitrary wiki page in an XWiki installation can gain programming right through several cases of missing escaping in the code for displaying sections in the administration interface. This impacts the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation. Normally, all users are allowed to edit their own user profile so this should be exploitable by all users of the XWiki instance.
The easiest way to reproduce this is to edit any document with the object editor and add an object of type XWiki.ConfigurableClass ("Custom configurable sections"). Set "Display in section" and "Display in Category" to "other", set scope to "Wiki and all spaces" and "Heading" to {{async}}{{groovy}}services.logging.getLogger("attacker").error("Attack from Heading succeeded!"); println("Hello from Groovy!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}}. Click "Save". Open <xwiki-host>/xwiki/bin/view/Main/?sheet=XWiki.AdminSheet&viewer=content&editor=globaladmin§ion=other where <xwiki-host> is the URL of your XWiki installation. If this displays just "Hello from Groovy!" in a heading and generates an error message with content "Attack from Heading succeeded!" in XWiki's log, the attack succeeded. Similar attacks are also possible by creating this kind of object on a document with a specially crafted name, see the referenced Jira issues for more reproduction steps.
Patches
This has been fixed in XWiki 14.10.15, 15.5.2 and 15.7RC1
Workarounds
It is possible to manually apply the fixes for the vulnerability by editing two pages in the wiki. This patch needs to be applied to the page XWiki.ConfigurableClassMacros. Further, the following patches need to be applied to the page XWiki.ConfigurableClass:
- https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/749f6aee1bfbcf191c3734ea0aa9eba3aa63240e#diff-bf419a99140f3c12fd78ea30f855b63cfb74c1c976ff4436898266d9b37ad3ce
- https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/1157c1ecea395aac7f64cd8a6f484b1225416dc7#diff-bf419a99140f3c12fd78ea30f855b63cfb74c1c976ff4436898266d9b37ad3ce
- https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/0f367aaae4e0696f61cf5a67a75edd27d1d16db6
Note that also the page XWiki.ConfigurableClass needs to be changed to xwiki/2.1 syntax for the escaping to work properly but the security vulnerability is fixed also without changing the syntax.
References
- https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/bd82be936c21b65dee367d558e3050b9b6995713
- https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/749f6aee1bfbcf191c3734ea0aa9eba3aa63240e
- https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/1157c1ecea395aac7f64cd8a6f484b1225416dc7
- https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/0f367aaae4e0696f61cf5a67a75edd27d1d16db6
- https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21122
- https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21121
- https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21194
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-administration-ui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.3"
},
{
"fixed": "14.10.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-administration-ui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "15.0-rc-1"
},
{
"fixed": "15.5.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.xwiki.platform:xwiki-platform-administration-ui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "15.6-rc-1"
},
{
"fixed": "15.7-rc-1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-50723"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94",
"CWE-95"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-12-16T00:40:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-15T19:15:10Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nAnyone who can edit an arbitrary wiki page in an XWiki installation can gain programming right through several cases of missing escaping in the code for displaying sections in the administration interface. This impacts the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation. Normally, all users are allowed to edit their own user profile so this should be exploitable by all users of the XWiki instance.\n\nThe easiest way to reproduce this is to edit any document with the object editor and add an object of type `XWiki.ConfigurableClass` (\"Custom configurable sections\"). Set \"Display in section\" and \"Display in Category\" to \"other\", set scope to \"Wiki and all spaces\" and \"Heading\" to `{{async}}{{groovy}}services.logging.getLogger(\"attacker\").error(\"Attack from Heading succeeded!\"); println(\"Hello from Groovy!\"){{/groovy}}{{/async}}`. Click \"Save\". Open `\u003cxwiki-host\u003e/xwiki/bin/view/Main/?sheet=XWiki.AdminSheet\u0026viewer=content\u0026editor=globaladmin\u0026section=other` where `\u003cxwiki-host\u003e` is the URL of your XWiki installation. If this displays just \"Hello from Groovy!\" in a heading and generates an error message with content \"Attack from Heading succeeded!\" in XWiki\u0027s log, the attack succeeded. Similar attacks are also possible by creating this kind of object on a document with a specially crafted name, see the referenced Jira issues for more reproduction steps.\n\n### Patches\nThis has been fixed in XWiki 14.10.15, 15.5.2 and 15.7RC1\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIt is possible to manually apply the fixes for the vulnerability by editing two pages in the wiki. [This patch](https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/bd82be936c21b65dee367d558e3050b9b6995713#diff-0c8db1bc71d4e1508c0667050741827551ba130f324b3213352bc4a67645f648) needs to be applied to the page `XWiki.ConfigurableClassMacros`. Further, the following patches need to be applied to the page `XWiki.ConfigurableClass`:\n\n* https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/749f6aee1bfbcf191c3734ea0aa9eba3aa63240e#diff-bf419a99140f3c12fd78ea30f855b63cfb74c1c976ff4436898266d9b37ad3ce\n* https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/1157c1ecea395aac7f64cd8a6f484b1225416dc7#diff-bf419a99140f3c12fd78ea30f855b63cfb74c1c976ff4436898266d9b37ad3ce\n* https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/0f367aaae4e0696f61cf5a67a75edd27d1d16db6\n\nNote that also the page `XWiki.ConfigurableClass` needs to be changed to `xwiki/2.1` syntax for the escaping to work properly but the security vulnerability is fixed also without changing the syntax.\n\n### References\n\n* https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/bd82be936c21b65dee367d558e3050b9b6995713\n* https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/749f6aee1bfbcf191c3734ea0aa9eba3aa63240e\n* https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/1157c1ecea395aac7f64cd8a6f484b1225416dc7\n* https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/0f367aaae4e0696f61cf5a67a75edd27d1d16db6\n* https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21122\n* https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21121\n* https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21194",
"id": "GHSA-qj86-p74r-7wp5",
"modified": "2023-12-16T00:40:04Z",
"published": "2023-12-16T00:40:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/security/advisories/GHSA-qj86-p74r-7wp5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-50723"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/0f367aaae4e0696f61cf5a67a75edd27d1d16db6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/1157c1ecea395aac7f64cd8a6f484b1225416dc7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/749f6aee1bfbcf191c3734ea0aa9eba3aa63240e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/bd82be936c21b65dee367d558e3050b9b6995713"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21121"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21122"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21194"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Remote code execution/programming rights with configuration section from any user account"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.