GHSA-MJMJ-J48Q-9WG2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-12 21:19 – Updated: 2025-06-18 17:45Summary
SnakeYaml's Constructor class, which inherits from SafeConstructor, allows
any type be deserialized given the following line:
new Yaml(new Constructor(TestDataClass.class)).load(yamlContent);
Types do not have to match the types of properties in the
target class. A ConstructorException is thrown, but only after a malicious
payload is deserialized.
Severity
High, lack of type checks during deserialization allows remote code execution.
Proof of Concept
Execute bash run.sh. The PoC uses Constructor to deserialize a payload
for RCE. RCE is demonstrated by using a payload which performs a http request to
http://127.0.0.1:8000.
Example output of successful run of proof of concept:
$ bash run.sh
[+] Downloading snakeyaml if needed
[+] Starting mock HTTP server on 127.0.0.1:8000 to demonstrate RCE
nc: no process found
[+] Compiling and running Proof of Concept, which a payload that sends a HTTP request to mock web server.
[+] An exception is expected.
Exception:
Cannot create property=payload for JavaBean=Main$TestDataClass@3cbbc1e0
in 'string', line 1, column 1:
payload: !!javax.script.ScriptEn ...
^
Can not set java.lang.String field Main$TestDataClass.payload to javax.script.ScriptEngineManager
in 'string', line 1, column 10:
payload: !!javax.script.ScriptEngineManag ...
^
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructMapping.constructJavaBean2ndStep(Constructor.java:291)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructMapping.construct(Constructor.java:172)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructYamlObject.construct(Constructor.java:332)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.constructObjectNoCheck(BaseConstructor.java:230)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.constructObject(BaseConstructor.java:220)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.constructDocument(BaseConstructor.java:174)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.getSingleData(BaseConstructor.java:158)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.Yaml.loadFromReader(Yaml.java:491)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.Yaml.load(Yaml.java:416)
at Main.main(Main.java:37)
Caused by: java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Can not set java.lang.String field Main$TestDataClass.payload to javax.script.ScriptEngineManager
at java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.throwSetIllegalArgumentException(UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.java:167)
at java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.throwSetIllegalArgumentException(UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.java:171)
at java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.UnsafeObjectFieldAccessorImpl.set(UnsafeObjectFieldAccessorImpl.java:81)
at java.base/java.lang.reflect.Field.set(Field.java:780)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.introspector.FieldProperty.set(FieldProperty.java:44)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructMapping.constructJavaBean2ndStep(Constructor.java:286)
... 9 more
[+] Dumping Received HTTP Request. Will not be empty if PoC worked
GET /proof-of-concept HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Java/11.0.14
Host: localhost:8000
Accept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg, *; q=.2, */*; q=.2
Connection: keep-alive
Further Analysis
Potential mitigations include, leveraging SnakeYaml's SafeConstructor while parsing untrusted content.
See https://bitbucket.org/snakeyaml/snakeyaml/issues/561/cve-2022-1471-vulnerability-in#comment-64581479 for discussion on the subject.
Timeline
Date reported: 4/11/2022 Date fixed: 30/12/2022 Date disclosed: 10/13/2022
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.33"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.yaml:snakeyaml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-1471"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-12-12T21:19:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-01T11:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nSnakeYaml\u0027s `Constructor` class, which inherits from `SafeConstructor`, allows\nany type be deserialized given the following line:\n\nnew Yaml(new Constructor(TestDataClass.class)).load(yamlContent);\n\nTypes do not have to match the types of properties in the\ntarget class. A `ConstructorException` is thrown, but only after a malicious\npayload is deserialized.\n\n### Severity\nHigh, lack of type checks during deserialization allows remote code execution.\n\n### Proof of Concept\nExecute `bash run.sh`. The PoC uses Constructor to deserialize a payload\nfor RCE. RCE is demonstrated by using a payload which performs a http request to\nhttp://127.0.0.1:8000.\n\nExample output of successful run of proof of concept:\n\n```\n$ bash run.sh\n\n[+] Downloading snakeyaml if needed\n[+] Starting mock HTTP server on 127.0.0.1:8000 to demonstrate RCE\nnc: no process found\n[+] Compiling and running Proof of Concept, which a payload that sends a HTTP request to mock web server.\n[+] An exception is expected.\nException:\nCannot create property=payload for JavaBean=Main$TestDataClass@3cbbc1e0\n in \u0027string\u0027, line 1, column 1:\n payload: !!javax.script.ScriptEn ... \n ^\nCan not set java.lang.String field Main$TestDataClass.payload to javax.script.ScriptEngineManager\n in \u0027string\u0027, line 1, column 10:\n payload: !!javax.script.ScriptEngineManag ... \n ^\n\n\tat org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructMapping.constructJavaBean2ndStep(Constructor.java:291)\n\tat org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructMapping.construct(Constructor.java:172)\n\tat org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructYamlObject.construct(Constructor.java:332)\n\tat org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.constructObjectNoCheck(BaseConstructor.java:230)\n\tat org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.constructObject(BaseConstructor.java:220)\n\tat org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.constructDocument(BaseConstructor.java:174)\n\tat org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.getSingleData(BaseConstructor.java:158)\n\tat org.yaml.snakeyaml.Yaml.loadFromReader(Yaml.java:491)\n\tat org.yaml.snakeyaml.Yaml.load(Yaml.java:416)\n\tat Main.main(Main.java:37)\nCaused by: java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Can not set java.lang.String field Main$TestDataClass.payload to javax.script.ScriptEngineManager\n\tat java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.throwSetIllegalArgumentException(UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.java:167)\n\tat java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.throwSetIllegalArgumentException(UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.java:171)\n\tat java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.UnsafeObjectFieldAccessorImpl.set(UnsafeObjectFieldAccessorImpl.java:81)\n\tat java.base/java.lang.reflect.Field.set(Field.java:780)\n\tat org.yaml.snakeyaml.introspector.FieldProperty.set(FieldProperty.java:44)\n\tat org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructMapping.constructJavaBean2ndStep(Constructor.java:286)\n\t... 9 more\n[+] Dumping Received HTTP Request. Will not be empty if PoC worked\nGET /proof-of-concept HTTP/1.1\nUser-Agent: Java/11.0.14\nHost: localhost:8000\nAccept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg, *; q=.2, */*; q=.2\nConnection: keep-alive\n```\n\n### Further Analysis\nPotential mitigations include, leveraging SnakeYaml\u0027s SafeConstructor while parsing untrusted content.\n\nSee https://bitbucket.org/snakeyaml/snakeyaml/issues/561/cve-2022-1471-vulnerability-in#comment-64581479 for discussion on the subject.\n\n### Timeline\n**Date reported**: 4/11/2022\n**Date fixed**: [30/12/2022](https://bitbucket.org/snakeyaml/snakeyaml/pull-requests/44)\n**Date disclosed**: 10/13/2022",
"id": "GHSA-mjmj-j48q-9wg2",
"modified": "2025-06-18T17:45:18Z",
"published": "2022-12-12T21:19:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-mjmj-j48q-9wg2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1471"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.github.com/mbechler/marshalsec/blob/master/marshalsec.pdf?raw=true"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/blog/unsafe-deserialization-snakeyaml-java-cve-2022-1471"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240621-0006"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20230818-0015"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://infosecwriteups.com/%EF%B8%8F-inside-the-160-comment-fight-to-fix-snakeyamls-rce-default-1a20c5ca4d4c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://groups.google.com/g/kubernetes-security-announce/c/mwrakFaEdnc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mbechler/marshalsec"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://confluence.atlassian.com/security/cve-2022-1471-snakeyaml-library-rce-vulnerability-in-multiple-products-1296171009.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bitbucket.org/snakeyaml/snakeyaml/wiki/CVE-2022-1471"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bitbucket.org/snakeyaml/snakeyaml/issues/561/cve-2022-1471-vulnerability-in#comment-64876314"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bitbucket.org/snakeyaml/snakeyaml/issues/561/cve-2022-1471-vulnerability-in#comment-64634374"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bitbucket.org/snakeyaml/snakeyaml/issues/561/cve-2022-1471-vulnerability-in#comment-64581479"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bitbucket.org/snakeyaml/snakeyaml/commits/acc44099f5f4af26ff86b4e4e4cc1c874e2dc5c4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bitbucket.org/snakeyaml/snakeyaml/commits/5014df1a36f50aca54405bb8433bc99a8847f758"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://bitbucket.org/snakeyaml/snakeyaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/175095/PyTorch-Model-Server-Registration-Deserialization-Remote-Code-Execution.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2023/11/19/1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SnakeYaml Constructor Deserialization Remote Code Execution"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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