GHSA-H8H6-7752-G28C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-03 19:55 – Updated: 2025-03-04 22:23
VLAI
Summary
Manifest Uses a One-Way Hash without a Salt
Details

Summary

Manifest employs a weak password hashing implementation that uses SHA3 without a salt. This exposes user passwords to a higher risk of being cracked if an attacker gains access to the database. Without the use of a salt, identical passwords across multiple users will result in the same hash, making it easier for attackers to identify and exploit patterns, thereby accelerating the cracking process.

Details

Analysis of the application source code reveals that user passwords are hashed using the SHA3 algorithm without implementing a unique salt per user.

const newUser: AuthenticableEntity = entityRepository.create(signupUserDto)
newUser.password = SHA3(newUser.password).toString()

This approach results in deterministic password hashes, which can be identified by comparing the hashes for users with matching credentials.

password without salt

PoC

  1. Create two users with the same password (it could be admin or any other authenticatable entity)
  2. Extract their password hashes from the database
  3. Verify that both hashes are identical, confirming the absence of unique salts

Impact

This is a cryptographic weakness vulnerability that affects all users of the system. The lack of a unique salt when hashing passwords reduces protection against database breaches, as attackers who gain access to the database can more efficiently crack user passwords. Since identical passwords result in identical hashes, attackers can use precomputed hash databases (e.g., Rainbow Tables) or offline brute-force attacks to reverse the hashes and obtain user passwords, increasing the risk of compromised accounts and further system exploitation.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "manifest"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.9.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-27408"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-759"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-03T19:55:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-28T18:15:28Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nManifest employs a weak password hashing implementation that uses SHA3 without a salt. This exposes user passwords to a higher risk of being cracked if an attacker gains access to the database. Without the use of a salt, identical passwords across multiple users will result in the same hash, making it easier for attackers to identify and exploit patterns, thereby accelerating the cracking process.\n\n### Details\nAnalysis of the application source code reveals that user passwords are hashed using the SHA3 algorithm without implementing a unique salt per user.\n```\nconst newUser: AuthenticableEntity = entityRepository.create(signupUserDto)\nnewUser.password = SHA3(newUser.password).toString()\n```\nThis approach results in deterministic password hashes, which can be identified by comparing the hashes for users with matching credentials.\n\n![password without salt](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8ce816ab-0351-44d4-9aa3-717266441d6e)\n\n\n### PoC\n1. Create two users with the same password (it could be admin or any other authenticatable entity)\n2. Extract their password hashes from the database\n3. Verify that both hashes are identical, confirming the absence of unique salts\n\n### Impact\nThis is a cryptographic weakness vulnerability that affects all users of the system. The lack of a unique salt when hashing passwords reduces protection against database breaches, as attackers who gain access to the database can more efficiently crack user passwords. Since identical passwords result in identical hashes, attackers can use precomputed hash databases (e.g., Rainbow Tables) or offline brute-force attacks to reverse the hashes and obtain user passwords, increasing the risk of compromised accounts and further system exploitation.",
  "id": "GHSA-h8h6-7752-g28c",
  "modified": "2025-03-04T22:23:26Z",
  "published": "2025-03-03T19:55:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mnfst/manifest/security/advisories/GHSA-h8h6-7752-g28c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27408"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mnfst/manifest/commit/3ed6f1324e96ad469ad929d470dcd0cc386c6c69"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mnfst/manifest"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Manifest Uses a One-Way Hash without a Salt"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.