GHSA-G353-MGV3-8PCJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-13 20:55 – Updated: 2026-04-06 22:32Summary
Feishu webhook mode allowed deployments that configured only verificationToken without encryptKey. In that state, forged inbound events could be accepted because the weaker configuration did not provide the required cryptographic verification boundary.
Impact
An unauthenticated network attacker who could reach the webhook endpoint could inject forged Feishu events, impersonate senders, and potentially trigger downstream tool execution subject to the local agent policy.
Affected versions
openclaw <= 2026.3.11
Patch
Fixed in openclaw 2026.3.12. Feishu webhook mode now fails closed unless encryptKey is configured, and the webhook transport rejects missing or invalid signatures before dispatch. Update to 2026.3.12 or later and configure encryptKey for webhook deployments.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.11"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.3.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32974"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-13T20:55:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nFeishu webhook mode allowed deployments that configured only `verificationToken` without `encryptKey`. In that state, forged inbound events could be accepted because the weaker configuration did not provide the required cryptographic verification boundary.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated network attacker who could reach the webhook endpoint could inject forged Feishu events, impersonate senders, and potentially trigger downstream tool execution subject to the local agent policy.\n\n### Affected versions\n\n`openclaw` `\u003c= 2026.3.11`\n\n### Patch\n\nFixed in `openclaw` `2026.3.12`. Feishu webhook mode now fails closed unless `encryptKey` is configured, and the webhook transport rejects missing or invalid signatures before dispatch. Update to `2026.3.12` or later and configure `encryptKey` for webhook deployments.",
"id": "GHSA-g353-mgv3-8pcj",
"modified": "2026-04-06T22:32:29Z",
"published": "2026-03-13T20:55:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-g353-mgv3-8pcj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32974"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/44087"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/7844bc89a1612800810617c823eb0c76ef945804"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-forged-event-injection-via-feishu-webhook-verification-token"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: Feishu webhook mode accepted forged events when only `verificationToken` was configured"
}
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