GHSA-FJ74-QXJ7-R3VC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-26 18:12 – Updated: 2026-03-27 21:40Summary
In objects/like.php, the getLike() method constructs a SQL query using a prepared statement placeholder (?) for users_id but directly concatenates $this->videos_id into the query string without parameterization. An attacker who can control the videos_id value (via a crafted request) can inject arbitrary SQL, bypassing the partial prepared-statement protection.
Details
File: objects/like.php
Vulnerable code:
$sql = "SELECT * FROM likes WHERE users_id = ? AND videos_id = ".$this->videos_id." LIMIT 1;";
$res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, "i", [$this->users_id]);
The query mixes a parameterized placeholder for users_id with raw string concatenation for videos_id. The $this->videos_id value originates from user-supplied request input (typically a POST/GET parameter identifying the video being liked/disliked) and is not cast to integer or validated before being embedded in the SQL string.
All other queries in the same file correctly use ? placeholders for both columns:
// Correct pattern used elsewhere:
$sql = "SELECT count(*) as total FROM likes WHERE videos_id = ? AND like = 1";
The inconsistency means any attacker who can submit a like/dislike action with a crafted videos_id can inject SQL. Since like/dislike actions are typically available to any authenticated user, the attack surface is broad.
PoC
An attacker sends a like request with an injected videos_id:
POST /objects/likeAjax.json.php
videos_id=1 UNION SELECT user,password,3,4,5,6,7,8 FROM users-- -
This causes the backend to execute:
SELECT * FROM likes WHERE users_id = 1 AND videos_id = 1 UNION SELECT user,password,3,4,5,6,7,8 FROM users-- - LIMIT 1;
Result: full database read — user credentials, emails, private content, and any other data accessible to the MySQL user.
Impact
- Severity: High
- Authentication required: Yes (must be logged in to like a video), but all registered users qualify
- Impact: Full database read via UNION-based injection; potential for data modification or deletion depending on DB user privileges
- Fix: Replace the concatenation with a second
?placeholder and pass$this->videos_idas a bound integer parameter
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33767"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-26T18:12:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T17:16:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nIn `objects/like.php`, the `getLike()` method constructs a SQL query using a prepared statement placeholder (`?`) for `users_id` but directly concatenates `$this-\u003evideos_id` into the query string without parameterization. An attacker who can control the `videos_id` value (via a crafted request) can inject arbitrary SQL, bypassing the partial prepared-statement protection.\n\n### Details\n\n**File:** `objects/like.php`\n\n**Vulnerable code:**\n```php\n$sql = \"SELECT * FROM likes WHERE users_id = ? AND videos_id = \".$this-\u003evideos_id.\" LIMIT 1;\";\n$res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, \"i\", [$this-\u003eusers_id]);\n```\n\nThe query mixes a parameterized placeholder for `users_id` with raw string concatenation for `videos_id`. The `$this-\u003evideos_id` value originates from user-supplied request input (typically a POST/GET parameter identifying the video being liked/disliked) and is not cast to integer or validated before being embedded in the SQL string.\n\nAll other queries in the same file correctly use `?` placeholders for both columns:\n```php\n// Correct pattern used elsewhere:\n$sql = \"SELECT count(*) as total FROM likes WHERE videos_id = ? AND like = 1\";\n```\n\nThe inconsistency means any attacker who can submit a like/dislike action with a crafted `videos_id` can inject SQL. Since like/dislike actions are typically available to any authenticated user, the attack surface is broad.\n\n### PoC\n\nAn attacker sends a like request with an injected `videos_id`:\n```\nPOST /objects/likeAjax.json.php\nvideos_id=1 UNION SELECT user,password,3,4,5,6,7,8 FROM users-- -\n```\n\nThis causes the backend to execute:\n```sql\nSELECT * FROM likes WHERE users_id = 1 AND videos_id = 1 UNION SELECT user,password,3,4,5,6,7,8 FROM users-- - LIMIT 1;\n```\n\nResult: full database read \u2014 user credentials, emails, private content, and any other data accessible to the MySQL user.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Severity:** High\n- **Authentication required:** Yes (must be logged in to like a video), but all registered users qualify\n- **Impact:** Full database read via UNION-based injection; potential for data modification or deletion depending on DB user privileges\n- **Fix:** Replace the concatenation with a second `?` placeholder and pass `$this-\u003evideos_id` as a bound integer parameter",
"id": "GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc",
"modified": "2026-03-27T21:40:35Z",
"published": "2026-03-26T18:12:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-fj74-qxj7-r3vc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33767"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/0215d3c4f1ee748b8880254967b51784b8ac4080"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "AVideo has SQL Injection via Partial Prepared Statement \u2014 videos_id Concatenated Directly into Query"
}
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