GHSA-F6H3-846H-2R8W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-04 18:58 – Updated: 2026-03-04 18:58Summary
In certain elevated-mode configurations, tools.elevated.allowFrom accepted broader identity signals than intended. The fix tightens matching to sender-scoped identity by default and makes mutable metadata matching explicit.
Context
OpenClaw is commonly used in 1:1 chats or trusted group chats. In that intended model, this issue is best treated as authorization hardening / defense-in-depth for elevated sender approval.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Latest published npm version at triage:
2026.2.21-2 - Affected versions:
<= 2026.2.21-2 - Planned patched version (pre-set for publish-ready advisory):
2026.2.22
Details
Elevated sender authorization now matches sender-scoped identity values only by default (SenderId, From, SenderE164) and no longer considers recipient routing fields such as ctx.To.
Mutable sender metadata (SenderName, SenderUsername, SenderTag) now requires explicit allowlist prefixes (name:, username:, tag:). Explicit identity prefixes are also supported (id:, from:, e164:).
Fix Commit(s)
6817c0ec7b4fa830123d4f5c340f075a4bd04ee2
Release Process Note
The advisory patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.22). Once npm openclaw@2026.2.22 is published, this advisory can be published without additional content edits.
OpenClaw thanks @jiseoung for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T18:58:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nIn certain elevated-mode configurations, `tools.elevated.allowFrom` accepted broader identity signals than intended. The fix tightens matching to sender-scoped identity by default and makes mutable metadata matching explicit.\n\n### Context\nOpenClaw is commonly used in 1:1 chats or trusted group chats. In that intended model, this issue is best treated as authorization hardening / defense-in-depth for elevated sender approval.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Latest published npm version at triage: `2026.2.21-2`\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.2.21-2`\n- Planned patched version (pre-set for publish-ready advisory): `2026.2.22`\n\n### Details\nElevated sender authorization now matches sender-scoped identity values only by default (`SenderId`, `From`, `SenderE164`) and no longer considers recipient routing fields such as `ctx.To`.\n\nMutable sender metadata (`SenderName`, `SenderUsername`, `SenderTag`) now requires explicit allowlist prefixes (`name:`, `username:`, `tag:`). Explicit identity prefixes are also supported (`id:`, `from:`, `e164:`).\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `6817c0ec7b4fa830123d4f5c340f075a4bd04ee2`\n\n### Release Process Note\nThe advisory `patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next release (`2026.2.22`). Once npm `openclaw@2026.2.22` is published, this advisory can be published without additional content edits.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @jiseoung for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-f6h3-846h-2r8w",
"modified": "2026-03-04T18:58:07Z",
"published": "2026-03-04T18:58:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-f6h3-846h-2r8w"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/6817c0ec7b4fa830123d4f5c340f075a4bd04ee2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s elevated allowFrom accepted broader identity signals than specified within sender-scoped authorization"
}
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