GHSA-9WG5-MJ3P-V49Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 15:57 – Updated: 2026-11-10 15:57Summary
When verifying a certificate, node-forge chose the RSA padding scheme (PKCS#1 v1.5 or RSASSA-PSS) and PSS parameters from the issuer certificate's own signature algorithm instead of the certificate being verified. A certificate labeled as signed with RSASSA-PSS could pass verifyCertificateChain() with a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1.
Details
certificate.verify(child) in lib/x509.js hashes the child's TBSCertificate with the digest of the child's signature algorithm, then calls _verifySignature() with the issuer certificate. _verifySignature() selected the padding scheme from that certificate's signatureOid and signatureParameters, so the child was verified with the issuer's own scheme rather than the one the child declares.
As a result, a child certificate whose signature algorithm says RSASSA-PSS was accepted with a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature when the issuer itself was signed with PKCS#1 v1.5. The outer signatureAlgorithm field of a certificate is not covered by the signature, so an existing PKCS#1 v1.5 (SHA-256) certificate can be relabeled as RSASSA-PSS and still pass verification. The signature itself must still be made with the issuer's private key over the certificate's contents; no certificate can be forged.
The same cause made correctly signed chains fail: a PKCS#1 v1.5 certificate issued by an RSASSA-PSS-signed certificate, or the reverse, was rejected.
The fix verifies with the child certificate's signature scheme and parameters and the issuer's public key.
Patches
Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1. Certificate signatures are verified with the scheme of the certificate's own signature algorithm.
Workarounds
Applications that make decisions based on a certificate's signature algorithm can verify the signature themselves with that algorithm's scheme and the issuer's public key.
References
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4055#section-3 (RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm in certificates)
- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-4.1.1.2 (Certificate signatureAlgorithm)
- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html (CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature)
Severity
CVSS 3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N (3.7, Low) CVSS 4.0 (informational): CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (6.3) CVSS 4.0 rates this Moderate because its integrity weighting is higher; the severity rating follows CVSS 3.1.
Credits
Reported by Brian Lee (@hibrian827, Georgia Tech SSLab, Team Atlanta), who also suggested the fix.
Proof of concept
Create a CA certificate signed with sha256WithRSAEncryption, and a leaf certificate whose signature algorithm fields (outer and in the TBSCertificate) are RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256/MGF1-SHA-256/salt 32, but sign the leaf's TBSCertificate with the CA key using PKCS#1 v1.5 (caKey.sign(sha256)).
On 1.4.0, forge.pki.verifyCertificateChain(forge.pki.createCaStore([ca]), [leaf]) returns true, although verifying the leaf's signature with RSASSA-PSS fails. On 1.4.1 it throws "Certificate signature is invalid.".
No private key is needed for the same result: take any certificate signed by the CA with sha256WithRSAEncryption and replace only its outer signatureAlgorithm (outside the signed TBSCertificate) with the RSASSA-PSS identifier above. On 1.4.0 it still verifies and reports signatureOid as RSASSA-PSS; on 1.4.1 it is rejected.
Regression tests are in tests/unit/x509.js ("signature scheme of the child certificate").
Impact
Applications that rely on a certificate's declared signature algorithm, for example a policy that only accepts RSASSA-PSS-signed certificates, can be given a certificate labeled RSASSA-PSS whose signature was verified as PKCS#1 v1.5. The certificate must still have been signed by the trusted issuer's key, so the identity it certifies cannot be forged. There is no confidentiality or availability impact.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "node-forge"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-118774"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T15:57:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-29T19:17:19Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nWhen verifying a certificate, node-forge chose the RSA padding scheme (PKCS#1 v1.5 or RSASSA-PSS) and PSS parameters from the issuer certificate\u0027s own signature algorithm instead of the certificate being verified. A certificate labeled as signed with RSASSA-PSS could pass `verifyCertificateChain()` with a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature. Fixed in node-forge 1.4.1.\n\n### Details\n\n`certificate.verify(child)` in `lib/x509.js` hashes the child\u0027s TBSCertificate with the digest of the child\u0027s signature algorithm, then calls `_verifySignature()` with the issuer certificate. `_verifySignature()` selected the padding scheme from that certificate\u0027s `signatureOid` and `signatureParameters`, so the child was verified with the issuer\u0027s own scheme rather than the one the child declares.\n\nAs a result, a child certificate whose signature algorithm says RSASSA-PSS was accepted with a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature when the issuer itself was signed with PKCS#1 v1.5. The outer `signatureAlgorithm` field of a certificate is not covered by the signature, so an existing PKCS#1 v1.5 (SHA-256) certificate can be relabeled as RSASSA-PSS and still pass verification. The signature itself must still be made with the issuer\u0027s private key over the certificate\u0027s contents; no certificate can be forged.\n\nThe same cause made correctly signed chains fail: a PKCS#1 v1.5 certificate issued by an RSASSA-PSS-signed certificate, or the reverse, was rejected.\n\nThe fix verifies with the child certificate\u0027s signature scheme and parameters and the issuer\u0027s public key.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in node-forge 1.4.1. Certificate signatures are verified with the scheme of the certificate\u0027s own signature algorithm.\n\n### Workarounds\nApplications that make decisions based on a certificate\u0027s signature algorithm can verify the signature themselves with that algorithm\u0027s scheme and the issuer\u0027s public key.\n\n### References\n- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4055#section-3 (RSASSA-PSS signature algorithm in certificates)\n- https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280#section-4.1.1.2 (Certificate signatureAlgorithm)\n- https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/347.html (CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature)\n\n### Severity\nCVSS 3.1: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N (3.7, Low)\nCVSS 4.0 (informational): CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N (6.3)\nCVSS 4.0 rates this Moderate because its integrity weighting is higher; the severity rating follows CVSS 3.1.\n\n### Credits\nReported by Brian Lee (@hibrian827, Georgia Tech SSLab, Team Atlanta), who also suggested the fix.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nCreate a CA certificate signed with sha256WithRSAEncryption, and a leaf certificate whose signature algorithm fields (outer and in the TBSCertificate) are RSASSA-PSS with SHA-256/MGF1-SHA-256/salt 32, but sign the leaf\u0027s TBSCertificate with the CA key using PKCS#1 v1.5 (`caKey.sign(sha256)`).\n\nOn 1.4.0, `forge.pki.verifyCertificateChain(forge.pki.createCaStore([ca]), [leaf])` returns `true`, although verifying the leaf\u0027s signature with RSASSA-PSS fails. On 1.4.1 it throws \"Certificate signature is invalid.\".\n\nNo private key is needed for the same result: take any certificate signed by the CA with sha256WithRSAEncryption and replace only its outer signatureAlgorithm (outside the signed TBSCertificate) with the RSASSA-PSS identifier above. On 1.4.0 it still verifies and reports `signatureOid` as RSASSA-PSS; on 1.4.1 it is rejected.\n\nRegression tests are in tests/unit/x509.js (\"signature scheme of the child certificate\").\n\n### Impact\n\nApplications that rely on a certificate\u0027s declared signature algorithm, for example a policy that only accepts RSASSA-PSS-signed certificates, can be given a certificate labeled RSASSA-PSS whose signature was verified as PKCS#1 v1.5. The certificate must still have been signed by the trusted issuer\u0027s key, so the identity it certifies cannot be forged. There is no confidentiality or availability impact.",
"id": "GHSA-9wg5-mj3p-v49q",
"modified": "2026-11-10T15:57:48Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T15:57:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/security/advisories/GHSA-9wg5-mj3p-v49q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118774"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/commit/c7f42614d5166a77ddf11ce174b2601b14f6956b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/digitalbazaar/forge/releases/tag/v1.4.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Forge: Certificate signature verified with the issuer\u0027s RSA signature scheme"
}
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