GHSA-964W-F6GJ-5236

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-28 22:26 – Updated: 2026-07-28 22:26
VLAI
Summary
goshs has ACL Bypass & Path Traversal
Details

Summary

sendFile derives the served filename from the raw request path while opening the file from the cleaned path, so appending a trailing slash empties the derived name and defeats both the never-serve rule for the ACL file and the block list.

Finding (Medium): trailing-slash ACL and hidden-file bypass

httpserver/handler.go, sendFile (lines 789-801) takes the filename from the RAW req.URL.Path while the file itself is opened from the filepath.Clean-ed path. The two disagree, and a trailing slash makes the derived name the empty string. Both protections key on that derived name, so both are defeated: the rule that never serves the .goshs ACL file, and the acl.Block list.

Measured, with negative controls:

GET /blocked/secret.txt    -> 404          (control, correctly blocked)
GET /blocked/secret.txt/   -> 200 + contents
GET /blocked/.goshs/       -> 200, returns the ACL file itself,
                              including the admin:$2a$... bcrypt hash

Unauthenticated when the ACL is configured block-only (common usage). Stated precisely: AUTHENTICATION IS NOT BYPASSED. An unauthenticated request against a directory protected by authentication still returns 401 under the same trick; I tested that. The claim is specifically that the block list and the ACL-file protection are bypassed. In-tree evidence that sendFile is the defect: the sibling handlers doDir and bulkDownload both derive the name correctly; sendFile is the lone outlier.

Suggested fixes

  1. Derive the served filename from the same cleaned path used to open the file, so the authorization decision and the file access cannot disagree.

Tooling

AI assistance was used while investigating. The finding was reproduced against a running server on loopback with negative controls, including the 404-versus-200 pair and the authenticated-directory control that shows authentication is not affected.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.1.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/patrickhener/goshs/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.5-0.20260727065949-f3ef599e4091"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.1.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "goshs.de/goshs/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.5-0.20260727065949-f3ef599e4091"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/patrickhener/goshs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "goshs.de/goshs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-66064"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-41",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-28T22:26:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`sendFile` derives the served filename from the raw request path while opening the file from the cleaned path, so appending a trailing slash empties the derived name and defeats both the never-serve rule for the ACL file and the block list. \n\n## Finding (Medium): trailing-slash ACL and hidden-file bypass\n\nhttpserver/handler.go, sendFile (lines 789-801) takes the filename from the RAW req.URL.Path while the file itself is opened from the filepath.Clean-ed path. The two disagree, and a trailing slash makes the derived name the empty string. Both protections key on that derived name, so both are defeated: the rule that never serves the .goshs ACL file, and the acl.Block list.\n\nMeasured, with negative controls:\n\n```\nGET /blocked/secret.txt    -\u003e 404          (control, correctly blocked)\nGET /blocked/secret.txt/   -\u003e 200 + contents\nGET /blocked/.goshs/       -\u003e 200, returns the ACL file itself,\n                              including the admin:$2a$... bcrypt hash\n```\n\nUnauthenticated when the ACL is configured block-only (common usage). Stated precisely: AUTHENTICATION IS NOT BYPASSED. An unauthenticated request against a directory protected by authentication still returns 401 under the same trick; I tested that. The claim is specifically that the block list and the ACL-file protection are bypassed. In-tree evidence that sendFile is the defect: the sibling handlers doDir and bulkDownload both derive the name correctly; sendFile is the lone outlier.\n\n## Suggested fixes\n\n1. Derive the served filename from the same cleaned path used to open the file, so the authorization decision and the file access cannot disagree.\n\n## Tooling\n\nAI assistance was used while investigating. The finding was reproduced against a running server on loopback with negative controls, including the 404-versus-200 pair and the authenticated-directory control that shows authentication is not affected.",
  "id": "GHSA-964w-f6gj-5236",
  "modified": "2026-07-28T22:26:28Z",
  "published": "2026-07-28T22:26:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/goshs-labs/goshs/security/advisories/GHSA-964w-f6gj-5236"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/goshs-labs/goshs/pull/222"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/goshs-labs/goshs/commit/f3ef599e409151d1380866e47de8b1afb0bb54fa"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/goshs-labs/goshs"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "goshs has ACL Bypass \u0026 Path Traversal"
}



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