GHSA-95FV-5GFJ-2R84
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-08 16:25 – Updated: 2025-12-29 19:43Withdrawn Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it incorrectly listed MediaBrowser.Server.Core as vulnerable. CVE-2025-64113 affects Emby Server versions 4.9.1.80 and prior, and Emby Server Beta versions 4.9.2.6 and prior.
Original Description
Impact
This vulnerability affects all Emby Server versions - beta and stable up to the specified versions. It allows an attacker to gain full administrative access to an Emby Server (for Emby Server administration, not at the OS level,). Other than network access, no specific preconditions need to be fulfilled for a server to be vulnerable.
Patches
Quick Fix
A quick fix will be rolled out via an update to one of the default-included Emby Server plugins. This way is chosen because many users are updating their servers manually while plugin updates are typically configured to be applied automatically. This allows to get a patch deployed to a large amount of servers within a single day.
Server Patches
Patched versions for both, Emby Server stable and Emby Server beta are available now.
All Emby Server owners are strongly encouraged to apply those updates as soon as possible.
Workarounds
[!NOTE] These workarounds are OBSOLETE now. Please update Emby Server instead!
As and immediate remedy, it is possible to set restricted file system permissions on the passwordreset.txt file in the configuration folder of Emby Server. If it doesn't exist, users can create the file themselves or just call the ForgotPassword API once, which will create the file.
On Windows, users can set DENY permissions for "Authenticated users" and on Linux, permissions can be set via sudo chmod 444 passwordreset.txt.
This will make the API request fail, which completely eliminates the vulnerability.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.9.1.80"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "NuGet",
"name": "MediaBrowser.Server.Core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.9.1.81"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-64113"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-640"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-08T16:25:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T20:15:54Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Withdrawn Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it incorrectly listed [MediaBrowser.Server.Core](https://www.nuget.org/packages/MediaBrowser.Server.Core) as vulnerable. CVE-2025-64113 affects Emby Server versions 4.9.1.80 and prior, and Emby Server Beta versions 4.9.2.6 and prior.\n\n### Original Description\n### Impact\n\nThis vulnerability affects all Emby Server versions - beta and stable up to the specified versions.\nIt allows an attacker to gain full administrative access to an Emby Server (for Emby Server administration, **not at the OS level**,).\nOther than network access, no specific preconditions need to be fulfilled for a server to be vulnerable.\n\n### Patches\n\n#### Quick Fix\n\nA quick fix will be rolled out via an update to one of the default-included Emby Server plugins.\nThis way is chosen because many users are updating their servers manually while plugin updates are typically configured to be applied automatically. This allows to get a patch deployed to a large amount of servers within a single day.\n\n#### Server Patches\n\nPatched versions for both, Emby Server stable and Emby Server beta are available now.\n\n**All Emby Server owners are strongly encouraged to apply those updates as soon as possible.**\n\n\n### Workarounds\n\n\u003e [!NOTE]\n\u003e These workarounds are OBSOLETE now. Please update Emby Server instead!\n\nAs and immediate remedy, it is possible to set restricted file system permissions on the `passwordreset.txt` file in the configuration folder of Emby Server. If it doesn\u0027t exist, users can create the file themselves or just call the ForgotPassword API once, which will create the file.\n\nOn Windows, users can set DENY permissions for \"Authenticated users\" and on Linux, permissions can be set via `sudo chmod 444 passwordreset.txt`.\nThis will make the API request fail, which completely eliminates the vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-95fv-5gfj-2r84",
"modified": "2025-12-29T19:43:24Z",
"published": "2025-12-08T16:25:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/EmbySupport/Emby.Security/security/advisories/GHSA-95fv-5gfj-2r84"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-64113"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/EmbySupport/Emby.Security"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Withdrawn Advisory: Emby Server API Vulnerability allowing to gain administrative access without precondition",
"withdrawn": "2025-12-29T19:43:24Z"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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