GHSA-8WHX-V8QQ-PQ64
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-04 20:58 – Updated: 2026-03-06 21:57A reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in the /rss/tag/ endpoint of changedetection.io. The tag_uuid path parameter is reflected directly in the HTTP response body without HTML escaping. Since Flask returns text/html by default for plain string responses, the browser parses and executes injected JavaScript.
This vulnerability persists in version 0.54.1, which patched the related XSS in /rss/watch/ (CVE-2026-27645 / GHSA-mw8m-398g-h89w) but did not address the identical pattern in the tag RSS endpoint.
Package
- Ecosystem: pip
- Package: changedetection.io
- Affected versions: <= 0.54.1
- Patched versions: (none yet)
Severity
Moderate - CVSS 6.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Details
File: changedetectionio/blueprint/rss/tag.py Line: 36 Source: tag.py @ 1d72716
The tag_uuid parameter from the URL path is interpolated into the response body using an f-string with no escaping:
tag = datastore.data['settings']['application'].get('tags', {}).get(tag_uuid)
if not tag:
return f"Tag with UUID {tag_uuid} not found", 404 # ← No escaping, Content-Type: text/html
Flask's default Content-Type for plain string responses is text/html; charset=utf-8, so any HTML/JavaScript injected via {tag_uuid} is rendered and executed by the browser.
Relationship to CVE-2026-27645
CVE-2026-27645 (GHSA-mw8m-398g-h89w) addressed the identical vulnerability pattern in /rss/watch/ (single_watch.py). The fix applied in v0.54.1 patched that endpoint but did not fix the same pattern in /rss/tag/ (tag.py). Testing confirms:
/rss/watch/on v0.54.1 — Returns generic 404 page, XSS no longer triggers ✅/rss/tag/on v0.54.1 — XSS payload still fires, vulnerability confirmed ❌
Attack Vector
The attack requires a valid RSS access token, which is a 32-character hex string exposed in the <link> HTML tag on the homepage without authentication:
- Attacker visits the target's homepage (if unauthenticated) and extracts the RSS token from the
<link>tag -
Crafts a malicious URL:
``` http://target:5000/rss/tag/
?token=EXTRACTED_TOKEN
```
-
Sends the link to a victim who has an active session on the changedetection.io instance
-
When the victim clicks the link, the server responds with:
``` Tag with UUID
not found
```
-
The browser renders the
<img>tag, theonerrorfires, and JavaScript executes in the victim's session context
Proof of Concept
Request
GET /rss/tag/%3Cimg%20src%3Dx%20onerror%3Dalert(document.domain)%3E?token=60b83b06df98b24c66367bc3d233105b HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:5000
Response
HTTP/1.1 404 NOT FOUND
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Tag with UUID <img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)> not found
The XSS payload is reflected unescaped in an HTML response. The browser executes alert(document.domain) and displays "localhost", confirming JavaScript execution.
Tested on: changedetection.io v0.54.1 (Docker, localhost, Feb 25, 2026)
https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6db07f6a-6df8-48a7-a597-9f39dfa1bb29
Impact
- Session cookie theft via
document.cookieexfiltration - Account takeover if session cookies lack the
HttpOnlyflag - Phishing via crafted links that appear to originate from a trusted changedetection.io instance
- Low exploitation barrier - the RSS token is obtainable without authentication from the homepage
<link>tag - Widespread exposure - prior scanning of internet-facing instances (during CVE-2026-27645 research) identified 500+ publicly accessible deployments
Suggested Fix
Escape the tag_uuid parameter before reflecting it in the response, or set the Content-Type to text/plain:
Option A: HTML Escape (Recommended)
from markupsafe import escape
if not tag:
return f"Tag with UUID {escape(tag_uuid)} not found", 404
Option B: Set Content-Type to text/plain
from flask import make_response
if not tag:
resp = make_response(f"Tag with UUID {tag_uuid} not found", 404)
resp.headers['Content-Type'] = 'text/plain; charset=utf-8'
return resp
Credits
- Roberto Nunes (@Akokonunes) - Reporter
- neo-ai-engineer (@neo-ai-engineer) - Reporter
References
- Related advisory: GHSA-mw8m-398g-h89w (CVE-2026-27645)
- Vulnerable source: tag.py @ 1d72716
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "changedetection.io"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.54.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-29038"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T20:58:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-06T07:16:01Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in the `/rss/tag/` endpoint of changedetection.io. The `tag_uuid` path parameter is reflected directly in the HTTP response body without HTML escaping. Since Flask returns `text/html` by default for plain string responses, the browser parses and executes injected JavaScript.\n\nThis vulnerability persists in version **0.54.1**, which patched the related XSS in `/rss/watch/` (CVE-2026-27645 / GHSA-mw8m-398g-h89w) but did not address the identical pattern in the tag RSS endpoint.\n\n## Package\n\n- **Ecosystem:** pip\n- **Package:** changedetection.io\n- **Affected versions:** \u003c= 0.54.1\n- **Patched versions:** _(none yet)_\n\n\n## Severity\n**Moderate - CVSS 6.1**\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N`\n\n\n## Details\n**File:** `changedetectionio/blueprint/rss/tag.py` **Line:** 36 **Source:** [tag.py @ 1d72716](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/1d72716c6988a4f6796bb85a5d42872800cd7a70/changedetectionio/blueprint/rss/tag.py)\n\nThe `tag_uuid` parameter from the URL path is interpolated into the response body using an f-string with no escaping:\n\n```python\ntag = datastore.data[\u0027settings\u0027][\u0027application\u0027].get(\u0027tags\u0027, {}).get(tag_uuid)\nif not tag:\n return f\"Tag with UUID {tag_uuid} not found\", 404 # \u2190 No escaping, Content-Type: text/html\n\n```\n\nFlask\u0027s default `Content-Type` for plain string responses is `text/html; charset=utf-8`, so any HTML/JavaScript injected via `{tag_uuid}` is rendered and executed by the browser.\n\n### Relationship to CVE-2026-27645\n\nCVE-2026-27645 (GHSA-mw8m-398g-h89w) addressed the identical vulnerability pattern in `/rss/watch/` (`single_watch.py`). The fix applied in v0.54.1 patched that endpoint but **did not** fix the same pattern in `/rss/tag/` (`tag.py`). Testing confirms:\n\n- **`/rss/watch/` on v0.54.1** \u2014 Returns generic 404 page, XSS no longer triggers \u2705\n- **`/rss/tag/` on v0.54.1** \u2014 XSS payload still fires, vulnerability confirmed \u274c\n\n## Attack Vector\n\nThe attack requires a valid RSS access token, which is a 32-character hex string exposed in the `\u003clink\u003e` HTML tag on the homepage without authentication:\n\n1. Attacker visits the target\u0027s homepage (if unauthenticated) and extracts the RSS token from the `\u003clink\u003e` tag\n2. Crafts a malicious URL:\n \n ```\n http://target:5000/rss/tag/\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)\u003e?token=EXTRACTED_TOKEN\n \n ```\n \n3. Sends the link to a victim who has an active session on the changedetection.io instance\n4. When the victim clicks the link, the server responds with:\n \n ```\n Tag with UUID \u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)\u003e not found\n \n ```\n \n5. The browser renders the `\u003cimg\u003e` tag, the `onerror` fires, and JavaScript executes in the victim\u0027s session context\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Request\n\n```http\nGET /rss/tag/%3Cimg%20src%3Dx%20onerror%3Dalert(document.domain)%3E?token=60b83b06df98b24c66367bc3d233105b HTTP/1.1\nHost: localhost:5000\n\n```\n\n### Response\n\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 404 NOT FOUND\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\n\nTag with UUID \u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)\u003e not found\n\n```\n\nThe XSS payload is reflected unescaped in an HTML response. The browser executes `alert(document.domain)` and displays \"localhost\", confirming JavaScript execution.\n\n**Tested on:** changedetection.io v0.54.1 (Docker, localhost, Feb 25, 2026)\n\n\nhttps://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6db07f6a-6df8-48a7-a597-9f39dfa1bb29\n\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Session cookie theft** via `document.cookie` exfiltration\n- **Account takeover** if session cookies lack the `HttpOnly` flag\n- **Phishing** via crafted links that appear to originate from a trusted changedetection.io instance\n- **Low exploitation barrier** - the RSS token is obtainable without authentication from the homepage `\u003clink\u003e` tag\n- **Widespread exposure** - prior scanning of internet-facing instances (during CVE-2026-27645 research) identified 500+ publicly accessible deployments\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nEscape the `tag_uuid` parameter before reflecting it in the response, or set the `Content-Type` to `text/plain`:\n\n### Option A: HTML Escape (Recommended)\n\n```python\nfrom markupsafe import escape\n\nif not tag:\n return f\"Tag with UUID {escape(tag_uuid)} not found\", 404\n\n```\n\n### Option B: Set Content-Type to text/plain\n\n```python\nfrom flask import make_response\n\nif not tag:\n resp = make_response(f\"Tag with UUID {tag_uuid} not found\", 404)\n resp.headers[\u0027Content-Type\u0027] = \u0027text/plain; charset=utf-8\u0027\n return resp\n\n```\n## Credits\n\n- **Roberto Nunes** ([@Akokonunes](https://github.com/Akokonunes)) - Reporter\n- **neo-ai-engineer** ([@neo-ai-engineer](https://github.com/neo-ai-engineer)) - Reporter\n\n## References\n- Related advisory: [GHSA-mw8m-398g-h89w](https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/security/advisories/GHSA-mw8m-398g-h89w) (CVE-2026-27645)\n- Vulnerable source: [tag.py @ 1d72716](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/1d72716c6988a4f6796bb85a5d42872800cd7a70/changedetectionio/blueprint/rss/tag.py)",
"id": "GHSA-8whx-v8qq-pq64",
"modified": "2026-03-06T21:57:09Z",
"published": "2026-03-04T20:58:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/security/advisories/GHSA-8whx-v8qq-pq64"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/security/advisories/GHSA-mw8m-398g-h89w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29038"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/commit/ec7d56f85d1e9690fca7cb4711c1fb20dffec780"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/dgtlmoon/changedetection.io/releases/tag/0.54.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "changedetection.io has Reflected XSS in its RSS Tag Error Response"
}
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