GHSA-88CV-MJ24-8W3Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-21 17:00 – Updated: 2022-09-21 17:00Impact
Arbitrary shell execution is possible when using RPM::File#files and RPM::File#extract if the RPM contains a malicious "payload compressor" field.
This vulnerability impacts the extract and files methods of the RPM::File class in the affected versions of this library.
Patches
Version 0.0.12 is available with a fix for these issues.
Workarounds
When using an affected version of this library (arr-pm), ensure any RPMs being processed contain valid/known payload compressor values. Such values include: gzip, bzip2, xz, zstd, and lzma.
You can check the payload compressor field in an rpm by using the rpm command line tool. For example:
% rpm -qp example-1.0-1.x86_64.rpm --qf "%{PAYLOADCOMPRESSOR}\n"
gzip
Impact on known dependent projects
This library is used by fpm. The vulnerability may impact fpm only when using the flag -s rpm or --input-type rpm to convert a malicious rpm to another format. It does not impact creating rpms.
References
- https://github.com/jordansissel/ruby-arr-pm/pull/14
- https://github.com/jordansissel/ruby-arr-pm/pull/15
Credit
Thanks to @joernchen for reporting this problem and contributing to the resolution :)
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in the arr-pm issue tracker
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "arr-pm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-39224"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-09-21T17:00:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-21T23:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nArbitrary shell execution is possible when using RPM::File#files and RPM::File#extract if the RPM contains a malicious \"payload compressor\" field.\n\nThis vulnerability impacts the `extract` and `files` methods of the `RPM::File` class in the affected versions of this library.\n\n### Patches\n\nVersion 0.0.12 is available with a fix for these issues.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nWhen using an affected version of this library (arr-pm), ensure any RPMs being processed contain valid/known payload compressor values. Such values include: gzip, bzip2, xz, zstd, and lzma.\n\nYou can check the payload compressor field in an rpm by using the rpm command line tool. For example:\n\n```\n% rpm -qp example-1.0-1.x86_64.rpm --qf \"%{PAYLOADCOMPRESSOR}\\n\"\ngzip\n```\n\n### Impact on known dependent projects\n\nThis library is used by [fpm](https://github.com/jordansissel/fpm). The vulnerability may impact fpm only when using the flag `-s rpm` or `--input-type rpm` to convert a malicious rpm to another format. It does not impact creating rpms.\n\n### References\n\n* https://github.com/jordansissel/ruby-arr-pm/pull/14\n* https://github.com/jordansissel/ruby-arr-pm/pull/15\n\n### Credit\n\nThanks to @joernchen for reporting this problem and contributing to the resolution :)\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [the arr-pm issue tracker](https://github.com/jordansissel/ruby-arr-pm/)\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-88cv-mj24-8w3q",
"modified": "2022-09-21T17:00:12Z",
"published": "2022-09-21T17:00:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jordansissel/ruby-arr-pm/security/advisories/GHSA-88cv-mj24-8w3q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-39224"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jordansissel/ruby-arr-pm/pull/14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jordansissel/ruby-arr-pm/pull/15"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jordansissel/ruby-arr-pm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/arr-pm/CVE-2022-39224.yml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "arr-pm vulnerable to arbitrary shell execution when extracting or listing files contained in a malicious rpm."
}
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Nomenclature
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