GHSA-875V-7M49-8X88

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 00:07 – Updated: 2026-04-14 00:07
VLAI
Summary
Craft Commerce has a SQL Injection can lead to Remote Code Execution via TotalRevenue Widget
Details

Summary

A SQL injection in the Commerce TotalRevenue widget can lead to remote code execution through a chain of four vulnerabilities:

  • SQL Injection -- The TotalRevenue stat interpolates unsanitized widget settings directly into a sprintf-based SQL Expression. Any control panel user can create any widget type without permission checks.

  • PDO Multi-Statement Queries -- PHP PDO MySQL enables CLIENT_MULTI_STATEMENTS by default. Neither Yii2 nor Craft CMS disables it. This allows stacking an INSERT statement after the injected SELECT , writing a maliciously serialized PHP object into the queue table.

  • Unrestricted unserialize() -- The yii2-queue PhpSerializer calls unserialize() with no allowed_classes restriction on every queue job. When the queue consumer processes the injected job, it instantiates the attacker-controlled object.

  • Gadget Chain (FileCookieJar) -- GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar (a standard Guzzle dependency) has an unguarded __destruct() method that calls file_put_contents(). The attacker’s serialized payload writes a PHP webshell to the server’s webroot. PHP tags survive json_encode() because Guzzle uses options=0 (no JSON_HEX_TAG).

The complete chain requires 3 HTTP requests and achieves arbitrary command execution as the PHP process user. Queue processing is triggered via GET /actions/queue/run, an endpoint that requires no authentication ($allowAnonymous = ['run']).

RCE Exploitation Steps

  • Authenticate as any control panel user
  • POST to /admin/actions/dashboard/create-widget with stacked SQL injection:
  • settings[type] contains the stacked INSERT with the serialized gadget chain
  • Response: HTTP 500 (expected -- INSERT already committed)
  • Trigger queue processing: GET /actions/queue/run
  • Queue consumer deserializes the gadget chain
  • FileCookieJar::__destruct() writes webshell to webroot
  • Access the webshell: GET /poc_rce.php?c=id
  • Response: uid=1000(home) gid=1000(home) groups=1000(home)
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.10.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "craftcms/commerce"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.10.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.5.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "craftcms/commerce"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.5.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32271"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T00:07:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-13T21:16:24Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nA SQL injection in the Commerce TotalRevenue widget can lead to remote code execution through a chain of four vulnerabilities:\n\n* SQL Injection -- The TotalRevenue stat interpolates unsanitized widget settings directly into a sprintf-based SQL Expression.  Any control panel user can create any widget type without permission checks.\n\n* PDO Multi-Statement Queries -- PHP `PDO MySQL` enables `CLIENT_MULTI_STATEMENTS` by default. Neither Yii2 nor Craft CMS disables it. This allows stacking an INSERT statement after the injected SELECT , writing a maliciously serialized PHP object into the queue table.\n\n* Unrestricted `unserialize()` -- The yii2-queue PhpSerializer calls `unserialize()` with no allowed_classes restriction on every queue job. When the queue consumer processes the injected job, it instantiates the attacker-controlled object.\n\n* Gadget Chain (FileCookieJar) -- `GuzzleHttp\\Cookie\\FileCookieJar` (a standard Guzzle dependency) has an unguarded `__destruct()` method that calls `file_put_contents()`. The attacker\u2019s serialized payload writes a PHP webshell to the server\u2019s webroot. PHP tags survive `json_encode()` because Guzzle uses `options=0` (no `JSON_HEX_TAG`).\n\nThe complete chain requires 3 HTTP requests and achieves arbitrary command execution as the PHP process user. Queue processing is triggered via GET `/actions/queue/run`, an endpoint that requires no authentication (`$allowAnonymous = [\u0027run\u0027]`).\n\n## RCE Exploitation Steps\n\n* Authenticate as any control panel user\n* POST to `/admin/actions/dashboard/create-widget` with stacked SQL injection:\n* `settings[type]` contains the stacked INSERT with the serialized gadget chain\n* Response: HTTP 500 (expected -- INSERT already committed)\n* Trigger queue processing: `GET /actions/queue/run`\n* Queue consumer deserializes the gadget chain\n* `FileCookieJar::__destruct()` writes webshell to webroot\n* Access the webshell: `GET /poc_rce.php?c=id`\n* Response: `uid=1000(home) gid=1000(home) groups=1000(home)`",
  "id": "GHSA-875v-7m49-8x88",
  "modified": "2026-04-14T00:07:34Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T00:07:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/craftcms/commerce/security/advisories/GHSA-875v-7m49-8x88"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32271"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/craftcms/commerce/commit/6d2d24b3a2b0c06593856d05446f82bd8af92d72"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/craftcms/commerce"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Craft Commerce has a SQL Injection can lead to Remote Code Execution via TotalRevenue Widget"
}



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