GHSA-8639-QX56-R428

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-01 20:26 – Updated: 2022-06-01 20:26
VLAI
Summary
CSRF allows attacker to finalize/unfinalize order adjustments in solidus_backend
Details

Impact

CSRF vulnerability allowing attackers to change the state of an order's adjustments if they hold its number, and the execution happens on a store administrator's computer.

Reproduction steps: - Take an order's number. - Log in as an administrator. - Visit that order's adjustments section (Orders -> {Click on number} -> Adjustments) and check that its adjustments are finalized (closed padlock under the State column). - On another tab, visit {your_site_url}/admin/orders/{order_number}/adjustments/unfinalize. - Notice how the adjustments are unfinalized (open padlock), even if the previous was a GET request which could have been linked from any other site. - Visit {your_site_url}/admin/orders/{order_number}/adjustments/finalize. - Notice how the adjustments are again finalized.

That happened because both routes were handled as GET requests, which are skipped by Rails anti-forgery protection.

Patches

Users should upgrade to solidus_backend v3.1.6, v3.0.6, or v2.11.16, depending on the major and minor versions in use.

References

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Severity
2.3 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "solidus_backend"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.11.16"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "solidus_backend"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "solidus_backend"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-31000"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-06-01T20:26:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-06-01T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nCSRF vulnerability allowing attackers to change the state of an order\u0027s adjustments if they hold its number, and the execution happens on a store administrator\u0027s computer.\n\nReproduction steps:\n- Take an order\u0027s number.\n- Log in as an administrator.\n- Visit that order\u0027s adjustments section (_Orders -\u003e {Click on number} -\u003e Adjustments_) and check that its adjustments are finalized (closed padlock under the **State** column).\n- On another tab, visit `{your_site_url}/admin/orders/{order_number}/adjustments/unfinalize`.\n- Notice how the adjustments are unfinalized (open padlock), even if the previous was a `GET` request which could have been linked from any other site.\n- Visit `{your_site_url}/admin/orders/{order_number}/adjustments/finalize`.\n- Notice how the adjustments are again finalized.\n\nThat happened because both routes were handled as `GET` requests, which are skipped by Rails anti-forgery protection.\n\n### Patches\nUsers should upgrade to solidus_backend v3.1.6, v3.0.6, or v2.11.16, depending on the major and minor versions in use.\n\n### References\n- [Rails CSRF protection](https://api.rubyonrails.org/classes/ActionController/RequestForgeryProtection.html).\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n- Open an [issue](https://github.com/solidusio/solidus/issues) or a [discussion](https://github.com/solidusio/solidus/discussions) in Solidus.\n- Email us at [security@solidus.io](mailto:security@soliidus.io)\n- Contact the core team on [Slack](http://slack.solidus.io/)\n",
  "id": "GHSA-8639-qx56-r428",
  "modified": "2022-06-01T20:26:37Z",
  "published": "2022-06-01T20:26:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/solidusio/solidus/security/advisories/GHSA-8639-qx56-r428"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31000"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/solidusio/solidus/commit/de796a2e0be7f154cae48b46e267501559d9716c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/solidus_backend/CVE-2022-31000.yml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/solidusio/solidus"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "CSRF allows attacker to finalize/unfinalize order adjustments in solidus_backend"
}



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