GHSA-7FCJ-PQ9J-WH2R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-01-16 22:18 – Updated: 2024-10-23 15:54Impact
Local Privilege Escalation in all Windows software frozen by PyInstaller in "onefile" mode.
The vulnerability is present only on Windows and in this particular case: If a software frozen by PyInstaller in "onefile" mode is launched by a (privileged) user who has his/her "TempPath" resolving to a world writable directory. This is the case e.g. if the software is launched as a service or as a scheduled task using a system account (in which case TempPath will default to C:\Windows\Temp).
In order to be exploitable the software has to be (re)started after the attacker has launched the exploit program. So for a service launched at startup, a service restart is needed (e.g. after a crash or an upgrade).
While PyInstaller itself was not vulnerable, all Windows software frozen by PyInstaller in "onefile" mode is vulnerable.
CVSSv3 score 7.0 (High) CVSSv3 vector CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Affected - all Windows software frozen by PyInstaller in "onefile" mode
No affected - PyInstaller itself (except if frozen by PyInstaller in "onefile" mode on Windows) - software frozen in "onedir" mode - other platforms (GNU/Linux, OS X, BSD, etc.)
Patches
The problem is patched in commits 42a67148b3bdf9211fda8499fdc5b63acdd7e6cc (fixed code) and be948cf0954707671aa499da17b10c86b6fa5e5c (recompiled bootloaders). Users should upgrade to PyInstaller version 3.6 and rebuild their software.
Workarounds
There is no known workaround. Users using PyInstaller to freeze their Windows software using "onefile" mode should upgrade PyInstaller and rebuild their software.
Credits
This vulnerability was discovered and reported by Farid AYOUJIL (@faridtsl), David HA, Florent LE NIGER and Yann GASCUEL (@lnv42) from Alter Solutions (@AlterSolutions) and fixed in collaboration with Hartmut Goebel (@htgoebel, maintainer of PyInstaller).
Funding Development
PyInstaller is in urgent need of funding to make future security fixes happen, see https://github.com/pyinstaller/pyinstaller/issues/4404 for details.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "PyInstaller"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-16784"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-250"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-01-14T20:09:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nLocal Privilege Escalation in all Windows software frozen by PyInstaller in \"onefile\" mode.\n\nThe vulnerability is present only on Windows and in this particular case: If a **software frozen by PyInstaller in \"onefile\" mode** is launched by a (privileged) user who has **his/her \"TempPath\" resolving to a world writable directory**. This is the case e.g. if the software is launched as a service or as a scheduled task using a system account (in which case TempPath will default to C:\\Windows\\Temp).\n\nIn order to be exploitable the software has to be (re)started after the attacker has launched the exploit program. So for a service launched at startup, a service restart is needed (e.g. after a crash or an upgrade).\n\nWhile PyInstaller itself was not vulnerable, all Windows software frozen by PyInstaller in \"onefile\" mode is vulnerable.\n\nCVSSv3 score 7.0 (High)\nCVSSv3 vector CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n\nAffected\n- all Windows software frozen by PyInstaller in \"onefile\" mode\n\nNo affected\n- PyInstaller itself (except if frozen by PyInstaller in \"onefile\" mode on Windows)\n- software frozen in \"one*dir*\" mode\n- other platforms (GNU/Linux, OS X, BSD, etc.)\n\n### Patches\nThe problem is patched in commits 42a67148b3bdf9211fda8499fdc5b63acdd7e6cc (fixed code) and be948cf0954707671aa499da17b10c86b6fa5e5c (recompiled bootloaders). Users should upgrade to PyInstaller version 3.6 and rebuild their software.\n\n### Workarounds\nThere is no known workaround. Users using PyInstaller to freeze their Windows software using \"onefile\" mode should upgrade PyInstaller and rebuild their software.\n\n### Credits\nThis vulnerability was discovered and reported by Farid AYOUJIL (@faridtsl), David HA, Florent LE NIGER and Yann GASCUEL (@lnv42) from Alter Solutions (@AlterSolutions) and fixed in collaboration with\nHartmut Goebel (@htgoebel, maintainer of PyInstaller).\n\n### Funding Development\n\nPyInstaller is in urgent need of funding to make future security fixes happen, see \u003chttps://github.com/pyinstaller/pyinstaller/issues/4404\u003e for details.",
"id": "GHSA-7fcj-pq9j-wh2r",
"modified": "2024-10-23T15:54:56Z",
"published": "2020-01-16T22:18:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyinstaller/pyinstaller/security/advisories/GHSA-7fcj-pq9j-wh2r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-16784"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyinstaller/pyinstaller/commit/42a67148b3bdf9211fda8499fdc5b63acdd7e6cc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyinstaller/pyinstaller/commit/be948cf0954707671aa499da17b10c86b6fa5e5c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pyinstaller/pyinstaller"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/pyinstaller/PYSEC-2020-175.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Local Privilege Escalation in PyInstaller"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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