GHSA-72C7-4G63-HPW5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-15 20:12 – Updated: 2025-10-16 14:43Impact
This vulnerability only affects users of the AWS attestor.
Users of the AWS attestor could have unknowingly received a forged identity document. While this may seem unlikely, AWS recently issued a security bulletin about IMDS (Instance Metadata Service) impersonation.[^1]
There are multiple locations where the verification of the identity document will mistakenly report a successful verification.
-
If a signature is not present or is empty https://github.com/in-toto/go-witness/blob/0c8bb30c143951d88b1d4b32f260c5f67d30137b/attestation/aws-iid/aws-iid.go#L161-L163
-
If the RSA verification of the document fails for any reason https://github.com/in-toto/go-witness/blob/0c8bb30c143951d88b1d4b32f260c5f67d30137b/attestation/aws-iid/aws-iid.go#L192-L196
Workarounds
The contents of the AWS attestation contain the identity document, signature, and public key that was used to verify the document. These attestations and their could be identity documents could be manually verified with the openssl command line as documented in the below reference from AWS.[^2]
However, the certificate containing the public key was hard-coded into the attestor. https://github.com/in-toto/go-witness/blob/0c8bb30c143951d88b1d4b32f260c5f67d30137b/attestation/aws-iid/aws-iid.go#L46-L66
Since the original authoring of the attestor, AWS has moved to region specific public certificates. The currently valid certificates were issued around April of 2024, making the identification of attestations with forged content difficult without additional trusted data proving the AWS region in which the attestation was created.
Patches
This vulnerability is addressed in go-witness 0.9.1 and witness 0.10.1.
Resources
[^1]: AWS Security Bulletin on IMDS Impersonation [^2]: Verification of instance identity documents
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/in-toto/go-witness"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-62375"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-295"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-15T20:12:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-15T20:15:36Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThis vulnerability only affects users of the AWS attestor.\n\nUsers of the AWS attestor could have unknowingly received a forged identity document. While this may seem unlikely, AWS recently issued a security bulletin about IMDS (Instance Metadata Service) impersonation.[^1]\n\nThere are multiple locations where the verification of the identity document will mistakenly report a successful verification.\n\n- If a signature is not present or is empty\nhttps://github.com/in-toto/go-witness/blob/0c8bb30c143951d88b1d4b32f260c5f67d30137b/attestation/aws-iid/aws-iid.go#L161-L163\n\n- If the RSA verification of the document fails for any reason\nhttps://github.com/in-toto/go-witness/blob/0c8bb30c143951d88b1d4b32f260c5f67d30137b/attestation/aws-iid/aws-iid.go#L192-L196\n\n### Workarounds\nThe contents of the AWS attestation contain the identity document, signature, and public key that was used to verify the document. These attestations and their could be identity documents could be manually verified with the `openssl` command line as documented in the below reference from AWS.[^2]\n\nHowever, the certificate containing the public key was hard-coded into the attestor. \nhttps://github.com/in-toto/go-witness/blob/0c8bb30c143951d88b1d4b32f260c5f67d30137b/attestation/aws-iid/aws-iid.go#L46-L66\n\nSince the original authoring of the attestor, AWS has moved to region specific public certificates. The currently valid certificates were issued around April of 2024, making the identification of attestations with forged content difficult without additional trusted data proving the AWS region in which the attestation was created.\n\n### Patches\nThis vulnerability is addressed in `go-witness` 0.9.1 and `witness` 0.10.1.\n\n### Resources\n[^1]: [AWS Security Bulletin on IMDS Impersonation](https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/rss/aws-2025-021/)\n[^2]: [Verification of instance identity documents](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/UserGuide/verify-iid.html#verify-signature)",
"id": "GHSA-72c7-4g63-hpw5",
"modified": "2025-10-16T14:43:47Z",
"published": "2025-10-15T20:12:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/in-toto/go-witness/security/advisories/GHSA-72c7-4g63-hpw5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62375"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/in-toto/go-witness/commit/04ff20b600e28ce8fd1aa287534dd383a1cfefb9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/in-toto/go-witness"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "go-witness is Vulnerable to Improper Verification of AWS EC2 Identity Documents"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.