GHSA-7232-97C6-J525
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-02 21:20 – Updated: 2025-11-05 22:04Impact
In LXD's devLXD server, the source container identification process uses process cmdline (command line) information, allowing attackers to impersonate other containers by spoofing process names.
The core issue lies in the findContainerForPID function in lxd/api_devlxd.go.
This function identifies senders through two steps as shown below:
- cmdline-based identification: Check while tracing back through parent processes, and if it starts with
[lxc monitor], extract the project name and container name from that process name in the format projectName_containerName. - PID namespace-based identification: If not found in Step 1, check against all containers' PID namespaces.
https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/api_devlxd.go#L166-L276
Attackers can exploit Step 1 processing to impersonate arbitrary containers across projects by spoofing process names.
Reproduction Steps
- Access devLXD server from a normal container (e.g., EEEE):
root@EEEE:~# curl --unix-socket /dev/lxd/sock http://lxd-host/1.0/meta-data
instance-id: 9f928574-2561-4eff-af82-a68e57d3c68b
local-hostname: EEEE
- Use exec -a to spoof process name and impersonate another container (DDDD):
root@EEEE:~# bash -c "exec -a '[lxc monitor]' curl --unix-socket /dev/lxd/sock http://lxd-host/1.0/meta-data -x 'test-project_DDDD'"
instance-id: 1bb2f1c3-3ad2-4cd6-9965-67b14c3582cc
local-hostname: DDDD
This attack successfully obtains metadata (instance-id, local-hostname) of another container DDDD from within container EEEE.
Risk
This vulnerability allows attackers to perform the following actions:
-
Theft of other containers' metadata information Obtaining other containers' information via devLXD API's /1.0/meta-data endpoint: https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L295-L304
-
Obtaining other containers' configuration information via devLXD API's /1.0/config and /1.0/config/{key} endpoints: https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L175-L221 https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L228-L267
-
Obtaining other containers' device information via devLXD API's /1.0/devices endpoint: https://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L377-L395 Particularly in environments where multiple projects run containers on the same LXD host, inter-project information leakage may occur. The attack prerequisite is root privileges within any container.
Countermeasures
While containers basically run in separate PID namespaces, based on investigation, the [lxc monitor] process runs in the same PID namespace as the LXD execution process. Therefore, the problem can be resolved by modifying the implementation to use cmdline information only when the PID namespace of the target process matches the PID namespace of the process running LXD.
Patches
| LXD Series | Status |
|---|---|
| 6 | Fixed in LXD 6.5 |
| 5.21 | Fixed in LXD 5.21.4 |
| 5.0 | Ignored - Not critical |
| 4.0 | Ignored - EOL and not critical |
References
Reported by GMO Flatt Security Inc.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/canonical/lxd"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.21.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/canonical/lxd"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/canonical/lxd"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.0.0-20200331193331-03aab09f5b5c"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20250827065555-0494f5d47e41"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-54288"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-02T21:20:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-02T10:15:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nIn LXD\u0027s devLXD server, the source container identification process uses process cmdline (command line) information, allowing attackers to impersonate other containers by spoofing process names.\n\nThe core issue lies in the findContainerForPID function in `lxd/api_devlxd.go`. \nThis function identifies senders through two steps as shown below:\n\n1. cmdline-based identification: Check while tracing back through parent processes, and if it starts with `[lxc monitor]`, extract the project name and container name from that process name in the format projectName_containerName.\n2. PID namespace-based identification: If not found in Step 1, check against all containers\u0027 PID namespaces.\n\nhttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/api_devlxd.go#L166-L276\n\nAttackers can exploit Step 1 processing to impersonate arbitrary containers across projects by spoofing process names.\n\n### Reproduction Steps\n1. Access devLXD server from a normal container (e.g., EEEE):\n\n```\nroot@EEEE:~# curl --unix-socket /dev/lxd/sock http://lxd-host/1.0/meta-data\ninstance-id: 9f928574-2561-4eff-af82-a68e57d3c68b\nlocal-hostname: EEEE\n```\n\n2. Use exec -a to spoof process name and impersonate another container (DDDD):\n\n```\nroot@EEEE:~# bash -c \"exec -a \u0027[lxc monitor]\u0027 curl --unix-socket /dev/lxd/sock http://lxd-host/1.0/meta-data -x \u0027test-project_DDDD\u0027\"\ninstance-id: 1bb2f1c3-3ad2-4cd6-9965-67b14c3582cc\nlocal-hostname: DDDD\n```\n\nThis attack successfully obtains metadata (instance-id, local-hostname) of another container\nDDDD from within container EEEE.\n\n### Risk\nThis vulnerability allows attackers to perform the following actions:\n\n1. Theft of other containers\u0027 metadata information\nObtaining other containers\u0027 information via devLXD API\u0027s /1.0/meta-data endpoint:\nhttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L295-L304\n\n2. Obtaining other containers\u0027 configuration information via devLXD API\u0027s /1.0/config and /1.0/config/{key} endpoints:\nhttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L175-L221\nhttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L228-L267\n\n4. Obtaining other containers\u0027 device information via devLXD API\u0027s /1.0/devices endpoint:\nhttps://github.com/canonical/lxd/blob/43d5189564d27f6161b430ed258c8b56603c2759/lxd/devlxd.go#L377-L395\nParticularly in environments where multiple projects run containers on the same LXD host,\ninter-project information leakage may occur. The attack prerequisite is root privileges within\nany container.\n\n### Countermeasures\nWhile containers basically run in separate PID namespaces, based on investigation, the `[lxc monitor]` process runs in the same PID namespace as the LXD execution process. Therefore, the problem can be resolved by modifying the implementation to use cmdline information only when the PID namespace of the target process matches the PID namespace of the process running LXD.\n\n### Patches\n\n| LXD Series | Status |\n| ------------- | ------------- |\n| 6 | Fixed in LXD 6.5 |\n| 5.21 | Fixed in LXD 5.21.4 |\n| 5.0 | Ignored - Not critical |\n| 4.0 | Ignored - EOL and not critical |\n\n### References\nReported by GMO Flatt Security Inc.",
"id": "GHSA-7232-97c6-j525",
"modified": "2025-11-05T22:04:46Z",
"published": "2025-10-02T21:20:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/security/advisories/GHSA-7232-97c6-j525"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-54288"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-4001"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Canonical LXD Source Container Identification Vulnerability via cmdline Spoofing in devLXD Server"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.