GHSA-6R8Q-PFPV-7CGJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-12 20:21 – Updated: 2024-11-19 16:32Impact
Due to missing overflow check for loop variables, by assigning the iterator of a loop to a variable, it is possible to overflow the type of the latter.
In the following example, calling test returns 354, meaning that the variable a did store 354 a value out of bound for the type uint8.
@external
def test() -> uint16:
x:uint8 = 255
a:uint8 = 0
for i in range(x, x+100):
a = i
return convert(a,uint16)
The issue seems to happen only in loops of type for i in range(a, a + N) as in loops of type for i in range(start, stop) and for i in range(stop), the compiler is able to raise a TypeMismatch when trying to overflow the variable.
thanks to @trocher for reporting
Patches
patched in 3de1415ee77a9244eb04bdb695e249d3ec9ed868
Workarounds
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "vyper"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-32058"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-190"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-05-12T20:21:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-11T21:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nDue to missing overflow check for loop variables, by assigning the iterator of a loop to a variable, it is possible to overflow the type of the latter.\n\nIn the following example, calling `test` returns `354`, meaning that the variable `a` did store `354` a value out of bound for the type `uint8`.\n\n```Vyper\n@external\ndef test() -\u003e uint16:\n x:uint8 = 255\n a:uint8 = 0\n for i in range(x, x+100):\n a = i\n return convert(a,uint16)\n```\n\nThe issue seems to happen only in loops of type `for i in range(a, a + N)` as in loops of type `for i in range(start, stop)` and `for i in range(stop)`, the compiler is able to raise a `TypeMismatch` when trying to overflow the variable.\n\nthanks to @trocher for reporting\n\n### Patches\n\npatched in 3de1415ee77a9244eb04bdb695e249d3ec9ed868\n\n### Workarounds\n\n ",
"id": "GHSA-6r8q-pfpv-7cgj",
"modified": "2024-11-19T16:32:38Z",
"published": "2023-05-12T20:21:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/security/advisories/GHSA-6r8q-pfpv-7cgj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-32058"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper/commit/3de1415ee77a9244eb04bdb695e249d3ec9ed868"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/vyper/PYSEC-2023-78.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/vyperlang/vyper"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Vyper vulnerable to integer overflow in loop"
}
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