GHSA-6QV6-Q77G-7QM6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-31 22:29 – Updated: 2022-09-08 14:26Impact
NVFLARE contains a vulnerability where deserialization of Untrusted Data due to Pickle usage may allow an unprivileged network attacker to cause Remote Code Execution, Denial Of Service, and Impact to both Confidentiality and Integrity.
All versions before 2.1.4 are affected.
CVSS Score = 9.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Patches
The patch is included in nvflare==2.1.4 This new version uses MessagePack instead of Pickle to do serialization and deserialization.
Some object serializations supported by Pickle are not supported by MessagePack. We have provided out of box support for some built-in NVFLARE objects. For object serializations unsupported by MessagePack, the user will need to convert the objects to numpy or bytes before sending over to remote machines. The list of supported object types are listed in https://github.com/NVIDIA/NVFlare/blob/2.1/nvflare/fuel/utils/fobs/README.rst
Workarounds
No workarounds available.
Additional information
Issue Found by: Oliver Sellwood (Nintorac) and Elias Hohl
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nvflare"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-34668"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-08-31T22:29:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-29T03:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\nNVFLARE contains a vulnerability where deserialization of Untrusted Data due to Pickle usage may allow an unprivileged network attacker to cause Remote Code Execution, Denial Of Service, and Impact to both Confidentiality and Integrity. \n\nAll versions before 2.1.4 are affected. \n\nCVSS Score = 9.8 \n \n[AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/cvss/v3-calculator?vector=AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) \n\n\n### Patches\n \nThe patch is included in nvflare==2.1.4 \nThis new version uses MessagePack instead of Pickle to do serialization and deserialization. \n\nSome object serializations supported by Pickle are not supported by MessagePack. We have provided out of box support for some built-in NVFLARE objects. For object serializations unsupported by MessagePack, the user will need to convert the objects to numpy or bytes before sending over to remote machines. The list of supported object types are listed in https://github.com/NVIDIA/NVFlare/blob/2.1/nvflare/fuel/utils/fobs/README.rst \n\n \n### Workarounds\n\nNo workarounds available. \n \n### Additional information \nIssue Found by: Oliver Sellwood (Nintorac) and Elias Hohl\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-6qv6-q77g-7qm6",
"modified": "2022-09-08T14:26:34Z",
"published": "2022-08-31T22:29:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NVIDIA/NVFlare/security/advisories/GHSA-6qv6-q77g-7qm6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34668"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/NVIDIA/NVFlare/commit/6cde16f3f4711583ae4d896dfcc125d25c7d5b0d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/NVIDIA/NVFlare"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nvflare/PYSEC-2022-257.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/171483/NVFLARE-Unsafe-Deserialization.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "NVFLARE unsafe deserialization due to Pickle"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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