GHSA-6MGF-V5J7-45CR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-09 19:54 – Updated: 2026-03-30 13:31OpenClaw's fetchWithSsrFGuard(...) followed cross-origin redirects while preserving arbitrary caller-supplied headers except for a narrow denylist (Authorization, Proxy-Authorization, Cookie, Cookie2). This allowed custom authorization headers such as X-Api-Key, Private-Token, and similar sensitive headers to be forwarded to a different origin after a redirect.
The fix switches cross-origin redirect handling from a narrow sensitive-header denylist to a safe-header allowlist, so only benign headers such as content negotiation and cache validators survive an origin change.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
<= 2026.3.2 - Patched version:
2026.3.7 - Latest published npm version at patch time:
2026.3.2
Impact
A remote service that could trigger a redirect across origins could receive custom authorization credentials attached by OpenClaw callers. This can expose API keys, bearer-style custom headers, or private token headers intended only for the original destination.
Fix Commit(s)
46715371b0612a6f9114dffd1466941ac476cef5
Verification
pnpm checkpassedpnpm test:fastpassed- Focused redirect regression tests passed
pnpm exec vitest run --config vitest.gateway.config.tsstill has unrelated current-mainfailures insrc/gateway/server-channels.test.tsandsrc/gateway/server-methods/agents-mutate.test.ts
Release Process Note
npm 2026.3.7 was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.
Thanks @Rickidevs for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.3.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.3.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32913"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-116",
"CWE-184",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-09T19:54:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T22:16:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "OpenClaw\u0027s `fetchWithSsrFGuard(...)` followed cross-origin redirects while preserving arbitrary caller-supplied headers except for a narrow denylist (`Authorization`, `Proxy-Authorization`, `Cookie`, `Cookie2`). This allowed custom authorization headers such as `X-Api-Key`, `Private-Token`, and similar sensitive headers to be forwarded to a different origin after a redirect.\n\nThe fix switches cross-origin redirect handling from a narrow sensitive-header denylist to a safe-header allowlist, so only benign headers such as content negotiation and cache validators survive an origin change.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c= 2026.3.2`\n- Patched version: `2026.3.7`\n- Latest published npm version at patch time: `2026.3.2`\n\n## Impact\n\nA remote service that could trigger a redirect across origins could receive custom authorization credentials attached by OpenClaw callers. This can expose API keys, bearer-style custom headers, or private token headers intended only for the original destination.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `46715371b0612a6f9114dffd1466941ac476cef5`\n\n## Verification\n\n- `pnpm check` passed\n- `pnpm test:fast` passed\n- Focused redirect regression tests passed\n- `pnpm exec vitest run --config vitest.gateway.config.ts` still has unrelated current-`main` failures in `src/gateway/server-channels.test.ts` and `src/gateway/server-methods/agents-mutate.test.ts`\n\n## Release Process Note\n\nnpm `2026.3.7` was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.\n\nThanks @Rickidevs for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-6mgf-v5j7-45cr",
"modified": "2026-03-30T13:31:55Z",
"published": "2026-03-09T19:54:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-6mgf-v5j7-45cr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32913"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/46715371b0612a6f9114dffd1466941ac476cef5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.3.7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-mar-custom-authorization-header-leakage-via-cross-origin-redirects"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: fetch-guard forwards custom authorization headers across cross-origin redirects"
}
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