GHSA-6F6R-M9PV-67JW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-26 21:20 – Updated: 2025-06-26 21:20Command Injection in MCP Server
The MCP Server at https://github.com/joshuayoes/ios-simulator-mcp/ is written in a way that is vulnerable to command injection vulnerability attacks as part of some of its MCP Server tool definition and implementation.
Vulnerable tool
The MCP Server exposes the tool ui_tap which relies on Node.js child process API exec which is an unsafe and vulnerable API if concatenated with untrusted user input.
LLM exposed user input for duration, udid, and x and y args can be replaced with shell meta-characters like ; or && or others to change the behavior from running the expected command idb to another command.
Vulnerable line of code: https://github.com/joshuayoes/ios-simulator-mcp/blob/main/src/index.ts#L166-L207
server.tool(
"ui_tap",
"Tap on the screen in the iOS Simulator",
{
duration: z.string().optional().describe("Press duration"),
udid: z
.string()
.optional()
.describe("Udid of target, can also be set with the IDB_UDID env var"),
x: z.number().describe("The x-coordinate"),
y: z.number().describe("The x-coordinate"),
},
async ({ duration, udid, x, y }) => {
try {
const actualUdid = await getBootedDeviceId(udid);
const durationArg = duration ? `--duration ${duration}` : "";
const { stderr } = await execAsync(
`idb ui tap --udid ${actualUdid} ${durationArg} ${x} ${y} --json`
);
Exploitation
When LLMs are tricked through prompt injection (and other techniques and attack vectors) to call the tool with input that uses special shell characters such as ; rm -rf /tmp;# and other payload variations, the full command-line text will be interepted by the shell and result in other commands except of ps executing on the host running the MCP Server.
Reference example from prior security research on this topic:
Impact
User initiated and remote command injection on a running MCP Server.
References and Prior work
- Exploiting MCP Servers Vulnerable to Command Injection
- Liran's Node.js Secure Coding: Defending Against Command Injection Vulnerabilities
Disclosed by Liran Tal
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "ios-simulator-mcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.3.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-52573"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-26T21:20:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-26T14:15:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# Command Injection in MCP Server\n\nThe MCP Server at https://github.com/joshuayoes/ios-simulator-mcp/ is written in a way that is vulnerable to command injection vulnerability attacks as part of some of its MCP Server tool definition and implementation.\n\n## Vulnerable tool\n\nThe MCP Server exposes the tool `ui_tap` which relies on Node.js child process API `exec` which is an unsafe and vulnerable API if concatenated with untrusted user input.\n\nLLM exposed user input for `duration`, `udid`, and `x` and `y` args can be replaced with shell meta-characters like `;` or `\u0026\u0026` or others to change the behavior from running the expected command `idb` to another command.\n\nVulnerable line of code: https://github.com/joshuayoes/ios-simulator-mcp/blob/main/src/index.ts#L166-L207\n\n```js\n server.tool(\n \"ui_tap\",\n \"Tap on the screen in the iOS Simulator\",\n {\n duration: z.string().optional().describe(\"Press duration\"),\n udid: z\n .string()\n .optional()\n .describe(\"Udid of target, can also be set with the IDB_UDID env var\"),\n x: z.number().describe(\"The x-coordinate\"),\n y: z.number().describe(\"The x-coordinate\"),\n },\n async ({ duration, udid, x, y }) =\u003e {\n try {\n const actualUdid = await getBootedDeviceId(udid);\n const durationArg = duration ? `--duration ${duration}` : \"\";\n const { stderr } = await execAsync(\n `idb ui tap --udid ${actualUdid} ${durationArg} ${x} ${y} --json`\n );\n\n```\n\n## Exploitation\n\nWhen LLMs are tricked through prompt injection (and other techniques and attack vectors) to call the tool with input that uses special shell characters such as `; rm -rf /tmp;#` and other payload variations, the full command-line text will be interepted by the shell and result in other commands except of `ps` executing on the host running the MCP Server.\n\nReference example from prior security research on this topic:\n\n\n\n## Impact\n\nUser initiated and remote command injection on a running MCP Server.\n\n## References and Prior work\n\n1. [Exploiting MCP Servers Vulnerable to Command Injection](https://snyk.io/articles/exploiting-mcp-servers-vulnerable-to-command-injection/)\n2. Liran\u0027s [Node.js Secure Coding: Defending Against Command Injection Vulnerabilities](https://www.nodejs-security.com/book/command-injection)\n\n##\n\nDisclosed by [Liran Tal](https://lirantal.com)",
"id": "GHSA-6f6r-m9pv-67jw",
"modified": "2025-06-26T21:20:37Z",
"published": "2025-06-26T21:20:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/joshuayoes/ios-simulator-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-6f6r-m9pv-67jw"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-52573"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/joshuayoes/ios-simulator-mcp/commit/eb53a4f2cc8bbeb13e8d6d930f00167befcdb809"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/joshuayoes/ios-simulator-mcp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/joshuayoes/ios-simulator-mcp/blob/main/src/index.ts#L166-L207"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/joshuayoes/ios-simulator-mcp/releases/tag/v1.3.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "iOS Simulator MCP Command Injection allowed via exec API"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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