GHSA-5X67-J5XG-C5GJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-05 21:45 – Updated: 2026-06-12 19:24
VLAI
Summary
Bugsink: DOS using large numbers of event tags
Details

Summary

In affected versions, Bugsink stores every tag supplied with an incoming event. An event with an unusually large number of custom (i.e. supplied by an attacker) tags can therefore make ingestion spend more time than intended writing tag rows.

Bugsink uses a single-writer database architecture. That keeps the implementation simple, but it also means one expensive write transaction can delay other event digestion while it is running. In this case, it makes ingestion of other events wait until the transaction that writes the tags finishes, which effectively causes a temporary denial of service for other events.

Impact

Submitting such an event requires a valid project DSN. DSNs are sometimes visible in client-side applications, so they should not be treated as a strong security boundary, but the issue is still limited to ingestion for a Bugsink instance that accepts the event.

The impact is availability-only. The issue does not expose stored data, modify existing events, or allow code execution.

Mitigation

Update to version 2.2.2, which caps the number of tags stored for a single event. The default cap is 100 tags and can be changed with MAX_EVENT_TAGS.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.2.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "bugsink"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53954"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-05T21:45:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nIn affected versions, Bugsink stores every tag supplied with an incoming event. An event with an unusually large number\nof custom (i.e. supplied by an attacker) tags can therefore make ingestion spend more time than intended writing tag rows.\n\nBugsink uses a single-writer database architecture. That keeps the implementation simple, but it also means one\nexpensive write transaction can delay other event digestion while it is running. In this case, it makes ingestion of\nother events wait until the transaction that writes the tags finishes, which effectively causes a temporary denial of\nservice for other events.\n\n### Impact\n\nSubmitting such an event requires a valid project DSN. DSNs are sometimes visible in client-side applications, so they\nshould not be treated as a strong security boundary, but the issue is still limited to ingestion for a Bugsink instance\nthat accepts the event.\n\nThe impact is availability-only. The issue does not expose stored data, modify existing events, or allow code execution.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nUpdate to version 2.2.2, which caps the number of tags stored for a single event. The default cap is 100 tags and can\nbe changed with `MAX_EVENT_TAGS`.",
  "id": "GHSA-5x67-j5xg-c5gj",
  "modified": "2026-06-12T19:24:20Z",
  "published": "2026-06-05T21:45:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bugsink/bugsink/security/advisories/GHSA-5x67-j5xg-c5gj"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/bugsink/bugsink"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bugsink/bugsink/releases/tag/2.2.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Bugsink: DOS using large numbers of event tags"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.