GHSA-5VJQ-5JMG-39XQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 01:34 – Updated: 2026-04-16 01:34
VLAI
Summary
Renovate affected by remote code execution was possible using the bazel-module or bazelisk managers, when using lockFileMaintenance
Details

When using lockFileMaintenance using the bazel-module or bazelisk managers between Renovate 43.65.0 (2026-03-12) and 43.102.11 (2026-04-02), there was the opportunity for remote code execution from a malicious dependency, if the Bazel module executes code that relies on a dependency.

As this is an "unsafe" execution path, we have disabled this by default, and self-hosted administrators must add it to the allowedUnsafeExecutions allowlist.

It is recommended to review whether you have enabled this functionality for these managers, and if so, whether any dependency updates may have led to remote code execution.

Impact

If Renovate suggested an update to a malicious dependency, and that dependency is referenced as part of the bazel mod deps call - for instance as part of a ctx.execute call - this would call attacker-controlled code.

This could lead to insider attackers and outside attackers, executing code that is distributed as part of the package.

Patches

This is patched in 43.102.11.

This does not affect any versions of Mend Renovate Self-Hosted.

Workarounds

  • Upgrade your Renovate version
  • Disable lockFileMaintenance for these managers

Why did this happen?

This was missed in code review (as part of https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/pull/41507).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "renovate"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "43.65.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "43.102.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T01:34:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "When using [`lockFileMaintenance`](https://docs.renovatebot.com/configuration-options/#lockfilemaintenance) using the [bazel-module](https://docs.renovatebot.com/modules/manager/bazel-module/) or [bazelisk](https://docs.renovatebot.com/modules/manager/bazelisk/) managers between Renovate [43.65.0](https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/releases/tag/43.65.0) (2026-03-12) and [43.102.11](https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/releases/tag/43.102.11) (2026-04-02), there was the opportunity for remote code execution from a malicious dependency, _if the Bazel module executes code that relies on a dependency_.\n\nAs this is an \"unsafe\" execution path, we have disabled this by default, and self-hosted administrators must add it to the [`allowedUnsafeExecutions`](https://docs.renovatebot.com/self-hosted-configuration/#allowedunsafeexecutions) allowlist.\n\nIt is recommended to review whether you have enabled this functionality for these managers, and if so, whether any dependency updates may have led to remote code execution.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf Renovate suggested an update to a malicious dependency, _and_ that dependency is referenced as part of the `bazel mod deps` call - for instance as part of a `ctx.execute` call - this would call attacker-controlled code.\n\nThis could lead to [insider attackers](https://docs.renovatebot.com/security-and-permissions/#execution-of-code-insider-attack) and [outside attackers](https://docs.renovatebot.com/security-and-permissions/#execution-of-code-outsider-attack), executing code that is distributed as part of the package.\n \n## Patches\n\nThis is patched in [43.102.11](https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/releases/tag/43.102.11).\n\nThis does not affect any versions of [Mend Renovate Self-Hosted](https://www.mend.io/renovate/).\n\n## Workarounds\n\n- Upgrade your Renovate version\n- Disable `lockFileMaintenance` for these managers\n\n## Why did this happen?\n\nThis was missed in code review (as part of https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/pull/41507).",
  "id": "GHSA-5vjq-5jmg-39xq",
  "modified": "2026-04-16T01:34:40Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T01:34:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/security/advisories/GHSA-5vjq-5jmg-39xq"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/renovatebot/renovate/releases/tag/43.102.11"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Renovate affected by remote code execution was possible using the bazel-module or bazelisk managers, when using lockFileMaintenance"
}



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