GHSA-5H3G-6XHH-RG6P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 21:07 – Updated: 2026-05-12 13:36Summary
OpenShell FS bridge reads pin and verify the opened file before returning bytes
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package: openclaw (npm)
- Affected versions: <= 2026.4.21
- Fixed version: 2026.4.22
Impact
A time-of-check/time-of-use race around OpenShell sandbox filesystem reads could let a symlink swap cause bytes outside the intended mount root to be read.
Fix
OpenShell reads now open the file with no-follow semantics where available, validate the pinned file descriptor against the canonical mount root, reject unsafe hardlink/symlink cases, and use a strict fallback ancestor walk on platforms without fd-path readback.
Fix Commit(s)
- 95119017c847c737bd113f0bff728c4666d79c45
Verification
- The fix commit is contained in the public v2026.4.22 tag.
- openclaw@2026.4.22 is published on npm and the compiled package contains the fix.
- Focused regression coverage for this path passed before publication.
Thanks @VladimirEliTokarev for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.4.21"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.4.22"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44113"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T21:07:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\nOpenShell FS bridge reads pin and verify the opened file before returning bytes \n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: openclaw (npm)\n- Affected versions: \u003c= 2026.4.21\n- Fixed version: 2026.4.22\n\n## Impact\nA time-of-check/time-of-use race around OpenShell sandbox filesystem reads could let a symlink swap cause bytes outside the intended mount root to be read.\n\n## Fix\nOpenShell reads now open the file with no-follow semantics where available, validate the pinned file descriptor against the canonical mount root, reject unsafe hardlink/symlink cases, and use a strict fallback ancestor walk on platforms without fd-path readback.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n- 95119017c847c737bd113f0bff728c4666d79c45\n\n## Verification\n- The fix commit is contained in the public v2026.4.22 tag.\n- openclaw@2026.4.22 is published on npm and the compiled package contains the fix.\n- Focused regression coverage for this path passed before publication.\n\nThanks @VladimirEliTokarev for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-5h3g-6xhh-rg6p",
"modified": "2026-05-12T13:36:34Z",
"published": "2026-05-04T21:07:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-5h3g-6xhh-rg6p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44113"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/95119017c847c737bd113f0bff728c4666d79c45"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-time-of-check-time-of-use-race-condition-in-openshell-fs-bridge"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: OpenShell FS bridge reads pin and verify the opened file before returning bytes"
}
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