GHSA-5GC6-XHV4-2WG6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 20:25 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:54Summary
Pin/Unpin is a write operation (modifies the message's is_pinned, pinned_by, pinned_at fields), but in standard channels it only checks read permission, allowing users with read-only access to pin/unpin any message.
Details
https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/9bd84258d09eefe7bf975878fb0e31a5dadfe0f8/backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py#L1218
@router.post('/{id}/messages/{message_id}/pin', response_model=Optional[MessageUserResponse])
async def pin_channel_message(
request: Request,
id: str,
message_id: str,
form_data: PinMessageForm,
user=Depends(get_verified_user),
db: Session = Depends(get_session),
):
check_channels_access(request)
channel = Channels.get_channel_by_id(id, db=db)
if not channel:
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.NOT_FOUND)
if channel.type in ['group', 'dm']:
if not Channels.is_user_channel_member(channel.id, user.id, db=db):
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.DEFAULT())
else:
if user.role != 'admin' and not channel_has_access(user.id, channel, permission='read', db=db):
raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.DEFAULT())
The channel_has_access function https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/9bd84258d09eefe7bf975878fb0e31a5dadfe0f8/backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py#L75 checks user permissions against the AccessGrants table:
def channel_has_access(
user_id: str,
channel: ChannelModel,
permission: str = 'read', # 'read' or 'write'
strict: bool = True,
db: Optional[Session] = None,
) -> bool:
if AccessGrants.has_access(
user_id=user_id,
resource_type='channel',
resource_id=channel.id,
permission=permission,
db=db,
):
return True
# ...
The AccessGrant table distinguishes between read and write permission levels.
PoC
admin creates Standard Channel with Read-Only Access for test1 :
POST /api/v1/channels/create
Authorization:
Content-Type: application/json
{
"name": "pin-test-standard",
"access_grants": [
{
"principal_type": "user",
"principal_id": "cfc3cb19-9e92-4bf7-8b72-1b47fe4ff62c",
"permission": "read"
}
]
}
admin posts a Message in the Channel, and test1 has read permission only.
test1 attempts to Pin Message:
POST /api/v1/channels/0699b656-578f-4976-94b0-65e2b19752fd/messages/4797359b-aad5-4081-9617-e8ca58524a87/pin
Authorization: Bearer <test1_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{
"is_pinned": true
}
{
"id": "4797359b-aad5-4081-9617-e8ca58524a87",
"user_id": "28c859b7-84e2-4217-b4d7-3f0e43f7c4b9",
"is_pinned": true,
"pinned_by": "cfc3cb19-9e92-4bf7-8b72-1b47fe4ff62c",
"pinned_at": 1774716314908288719,
"content": "Admin announcement in standard channel - test1 should NOT be able to pin this"
}
Successfully pinned admin's message. pinned_by records test1's user ID.
test1 (Read-Only) can alse Unpin Message. The Pin/Unpin endpoint in standard channels only checks read permission, allowing read-only users to pin/unpin any message.
Impact
Read-only users can pin irrelevant messages, disrupting important information display in the channel .
Recommended Fix
Change the Pin endpoint's permission check from read to write .
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "open-webui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45386"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T20:25:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T21:16:37Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`Pin/Unpin` is a write operation (modifies the message\u0027s `is_pinned `, `pinned_by`, `pinned_at` fields), but in standard channels it only checks `read` permission, allowing users with read-only access to pin/unpin any message.\n\n### Details\nhttps://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/9bd84258d09eefe7bf975878fb0e31a5dadfe0f8/backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py#L1218\n\n```\n@router.post(\u0027/{id}/messages/{message_id}/pin\u0027, response_model=Optional[MessageUserResponse])\nasync def pin_channel_message(\n request: Request,\n id: str,\n message_id: str,\n form_data: PinMessageForm,\n user=Depends(get_verified_user),\n db: Session = Depends(get_session),\n):\n check_channels_access(request)\n channel = Channels.get_channel_by_id(id, db=db)\n if not channel:\n raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_404_NOT_FOUND, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.NOT_FOUND)\n\n if channel.type in [\u0027group\u0027, \u0027dm\u0027]:\n if not Channels.is_user_channel_member(channel.id, user.id, db=db):\n raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.DEFAULT())\n else:\n if user.role != \u0027admin\u0027 and not channel_has_access(user.id, channel, permission=\u0027read\u0027, db=db):\n raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail=ERROR_MESSAGES.DEFAULT())\n```\n\nThe `channel_has_access` function https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/9bd84258d09eefe7bf975878fb0e31a5dadfe0f8/backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py#L75 checks user permissions against the `AccessGrants` table:\n\n```\ndef channel_has_access(\n user_id: str,\n channel: ChannelModel,\n permission: str = \u0027read\u0027, # \u0027read\u0027 or \u0027write\u0027\n strict: bool = True,\n db: Optional[Session] = None,\n) -\u003e bool:\n if AccessGrants.has_access(\n user_id=user_id,\n resource_type=\u0027channel\u0027,\n resource_id=channel.id,\n permission=permission,\n db=db,\n ):\n return True\n # ...\n```\n\nThe `AccessGrant` table distinguishes between `read` and `write` permission levels.\n\n### PoC\n`admin` creates Standard Channel with Read-Only Access for `test1` :\n\n```\nPOST /api/v1/channels/create\nAuthorization: \nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n \"name\": \"pin-test-standard\",\n \"access_grants\": [\n {\n \"principal_type\": \"user\",\n \"principal_id\": \"cfc3cb19-9e92-4bf7-8b72-1b47fe4ff62c\",\n \"permission\": \"read\"\n }\n ]\n}\n```\n\n`admin` posts a Message in the Channel, and `test1` has `read` permission only.\n\u003cimg width=\"1024\" height=\"423\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e9912bd7-3908-44f2-8984-22d0535dc66f\" /\u003e\n\n`test1` attempts to Pin Message:\n\n```\nPOST /api/v1/channels/0699b656-578f-4976-94b0-65e2b19752fd/messages/4797359b-aad5-4081-9617-e8ca58524a87/pin\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003ctest1_token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n \"is_pinned\": true\n}\n```\n\n```\n{\n \"id\": \"4797359b-aad5-4081-9617-e8ca58524a87\",\n \"user_id\": \"28c859b7-84e2-4217-b4d7-3f0e43f7c4b9\",\n \"is_pinned\": true,\n \"pinned_by\": \"cfc3cb19-9e92-4bf7-8b72-1b47fe4ff62c\",\n \"pinned_at\": 1774716314908288719,\n \"content\": \"Admin announcement in standard channel - test1 should NOT be able to pin this\"\n}\n```\n\nSuccessfully pinned admin\u0027s message. `pinned_by` records test1\u0027s user ID.\n\u003cimg width=\"1024\" height=\"350\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/705b1f45-95a9-4e91-8a74-10bdbccde0b8\" /\u003e\n\n `test1` (Read-Only) can alse Unpin Message. The Pin/Unpin endpoint in standard channels only checks `read` permission, allowing read-only users to pin/unpin any message.\n\n### Impact\nRead-only users can pin irrelevant messages, disrupting important information display in the channel .\n\n### Recommended Fix\nChange the Pin endpoint\u0027s permission check from `read` to `write` .",
"id": "GHSA-5gc6-xhv4-2wg6",
"modified": "2026-05-15T23:54:18Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T20:25:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-5gc6-xhv4-2wg6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45386"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.9.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Open WebUI has an IDOR vulnerability in the pin_channel_message API endpoint"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.