GHSA-53FP-9JMV-227G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-01 15:44 – Updated: 2026-10-01 15:44Summary
/api/storage/getOutlineStorage is registered with CheckAuth only and performs no authorization of any kind. Given a document identifier it returns that document's stored outline state, regardless of the document's publish tier.
The two write endpoints for the same data, setOutlineStorage and removeOutlineStorage, both carry CheckAdminRole and CheckReadonly. Only the read path is unguarded.
Details
Routes. kernel/api/router.go:103 on master, :108 on the development branch:
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/storage/getOutlineStorage", model.CheckAuth, getOutlineStorage)
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/storage/setOutlineStorage", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly, setOutlineStorage)
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/storage/removeOutlineStorage", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly, removeOutlineStorage)
Handler. kernel/api/storage.go:466 on the development branch, :469 on master, identical. It binds docID and calls model.GetOutlineStorage(docID), which iterates the stored outline documents and returns the entry whose DocID matches. There is no filter function on this path at all: no *gin.Context, no publish-access check, no password check, no visibility check. The caller supplies the identifier and receives the payload.
What is stored. type OutlineDoc { DocID string; Data map[string]any }. The client writes it from app/src/layout/dock/Outline.ts:742:
fetchPost("/api/storage/setOutlineStorage", {
docID: this.blockId,
val: { expandIds: this.tree.getExpandIds() }
});
So the payload is the set of heading block identifiers the administrator has expanded in the outline pane for that document. Secondarily, an empty result versus a populated one indicates whether the administrator has ever worked with that document's outline.
Not covered by the local-storage fix. Commit 4daee87d4 addressed getLocalStorage, getLocalStorageVal, getLocalStorageVals and FilterLocalStorageByPublishAccess. The word "outline" does not appear in that diff. That filter was under-inclusive; this endpoint has no filter to be under-inclusive.
Proof of Concept
Kernel 3.7.2, publish mode on port 6808, Publish.Auth.Enable false, anonymous client with no auth header.
An administrator wrote outline state through the authenticated port:
POST /api/storage/setOutlineStorage
{"docID":"<doc id>","val":{"openIDs":["<heading id>","<heading id>"]}}
→ {"code":0,"msg":"","data":null}
The same value read back anonymously:
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/storage/getOutlineStorage
{"docID":"<doc id>"}
→ {"code":0,"msg":"","data":{"openIDs":["<heading id>","<heading id>"]}}
With that document set to the forbidden tier, on the same anonymous session:
| Endpoint | Result |
|---|---|
getDoc (control) |
protyle-password--forbidden placeholder, content withheld |
getOutlineStorage |
full payload returned |
The control establishes that the session is correctly denied the document itself.
Impact
An anonymous reader in publish mode, or any publish RoleReader, retrieves the administrator's outline state for any document whose identifier they hold, including documents in the forbidden tier that the publish filters otherwise withhold entirely. The disclosed values are heading block identifiers, usable as input to other endpoints, and the presence or absence of an entry indicates whether the administrator has worked with that document.
No document text is returned. Confidentiality only.
Suggested fix
Gate the read path as the write paths already are. Either add CheckAdminRole and CheckReadonly at the route, matching setOutlineStorage and removeOutlineStorage, or pass *gin.Context into GetOutlineStorage and apply checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess against the requested docID before returning anything.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73607"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-01T15:44:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`/api/storage/getOutlineStorage` is registered with `CheckAuth` only and performs no authorization of any kind. Given a document identifier it returns that document\u0027s stored outline state, regardless of the document\u0027s publish tier.\n\nThe two write endpoints for the same data, `setOutlineStorage` and `removeOutlineStorage`, both carry `CheckAdminRole` and `CheckReadonly`. Only the read path is unguarded.\n\n### Details\n\n**Routes.** `kernel/api/router.go:103` on master, `:108` on the development branch:\n\n```go\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/storage/getOutlineStorage\", model.CheckAuth, getOutlineStorage)\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/storage/setOutlineStorage\", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly, setOutlineStorage)\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/storage/removeOutlineStorage\", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly, removeOutlineStorage)\n```\n\n**Handler.** `kernel/api/storage.go:466` on the development branch, `:469` on master, identical. It binds `docID` and calls `model.GetOutlineStorage(docID)`, which iterates the stored outline documents and returns the entry whose `DocID` matches. There is no filter function on this path at all: no `*gin.Context`, no publish-access check, no password check, no visibility check. The caller supplies the identifier and receives the payload.\n\n**What is stored.** `type OutlineDoc { DocID string; Data map[string]any }`. The client writes it from `app/src/layout/dock/Outline.ts:742`:\n\n```js\nfetchPost(\"/api/storage/setOutlineStorage\", {\n docID: this.blockId,\n val: { expandIds: this.tree.getExpandIds() }\n});\n```\n\nSo the payload is the set of heading block identifiers the administrator has expanded in the outline pane for that document. Secondarily, an empty result versus a populated one indicates whether the administrator has ever worked with that document\u0027s outline.\n\n**Not covered by the local-storage fix.** Commit `4daee87d4` addressed `getLocalStorage`, `getLocalStorageVal`, `getLocalStorageVals` and `FilterLocalStorageByPublishAccess`. The word \"outline\" does not appear in that diff. That filter was under-inclusive; this endpoint has no filter to be under-inclusive.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nKernel 3.7.2, publish mode on port 6808, `Publish.Auth.Enable` false, anonymous client with no auth header.\n\nAn administrator wrote outline state through the authenticated port:\n\n```\nPOST /api/storage/setOutlineStorage\n{\"docID\":\"\u003cdoc id\u003e\",\"val\":{\"openIDs\":[\"\u003cheading id\u003e\",\"\u003cheading id\u003e\"]}}\n\u2192 {\"code\":0,\"msg\":\"\",\"data\":null}\n```\n\nThe same value read back anonymously:\n\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/storage/getOutlineStorage\n{\"docID\":\"\u003cdoc id\u003e\"}\n\u2192 {\"code\":0,\"msg\":\"\",\"data\":{\"openIDs\":[\"\u003cheading id\u003e\",\"\u003cheading id\u003e\"]}}\n```\n\nWith that document set to the forbidden tier, on the same anonymous session:\n\n| Endpoint | Result |\n|---|---|\n| `getDoc` (control) | `protyle-password--forbidden` placeholder, content withheld |\n| `getOutlineStorage` | full payload returned |\n\nThe control establishes that the session is correctly denied the document itself.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn anonymous reader in publish mode, or any publish `RoleReader`, retrieves the administrator\u0027s outline state for any document whose identifier they hold, including documents in the forbidden tier that the publish filters otherwise withhold entirely. The disclosed values are heading block identifiers, usable as input to other endpoints, and the presence or absence of an entry indicates whether the administrator has worked with that document.\n\nNo document text is returned. Confidentiality only.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nGate the read path as the write paths already are. Either add `CheckAdminRole` and `CheckReadonly` at the route, matching `setOutlineStorage` and `removeOutlineStorage`, or pass `*gin.Context` into `GetOutlineStorage` and apply `checkBlockTreeAccessableByPublishAccess` against the requested `docID` before returning anything.",
"id": "GHSA-53fp-9jmv-227g",
"modified": "2026-10-01T15:44:46Z",
"published": "2026-10-01T15:44:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-53fp-9jmv-227g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73607"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.8.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-information-disclosure-via-getoutlinestorage"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan: Outline state for any document, including documents forbidden to readers, is returned by /api/storage/getOutlineStorage with no access check"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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