Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-4RJ2-GPMH-QQ5X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 21:36 – Updated: 2026-03-10 22:21

Summary

OpenClaw has an inbound allowlist policy bypass in voice-call extension (empty caller ID + suffix matching)

Details

Summary

An authentication bypass in the optional voice-call extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to allowlist or pairing.

Deployments that do not install/enable the voice-call extension are not affected.

Affected Packages / Versions

openclaw (npm): <= 2026.2.1
Fixed in: >= 2026.2.2

Details

In affected versions (for example 2026.2.1), the inbound allowlist check in extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.

This allowed two bypasses:

Missing/empty from values normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed.
Suffix-based matching meant any caller number whose digits ended with an allowlisted number would be accepted.

Proof Of Concept

Configure the voice-call extension with inboundPolicy: allowlist and allowFrom: ["+15550001234"].
Place/trigger an inbound call with missing/empty caller ID (provider-dependent; for example anonymous/restricted caller). The call is accepted.
Place a call from a number whose E.164 digits end with 15550001234 (for example +99915550001234). The call is accepted.

Impact

Only operators who install/enable the optional voice-call extension and use inboundPolicy=allowlist or pairing could have inbound access controls bypassed, potentially allowing unauthorized callers to reach auto-response and tool execution.

Fix

The fix hardens inbound policy handling:

Reject inbound calls when caller ID is missing.
Require strict equality when comparing normalized caller IDs against the allowlist (no suffix/prefix matching).
Add regression tests for missing caller ID, anonymous caller ID, and suffix-collision cases.

Fix commit(s):

f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb

Thanks @simecek for reporting.

Severity

9.4 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

9.2 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-28446"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T21:36:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:16Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nAn authentication bypass in the optional `voice-call` extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to `allowlist` or `pairing`.\n\nDeployments that do not install/enable the `voice-call` extension are not affected.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- `openclaw` (npm): `\u003c= 2026.2.1`\n- Fixed in: `\u003e= 2026.2.2`\n\n### Details\n\nIn affected versions (for example `2026.2.1`), the inbound allowlist check in `extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts` used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.\n\nThis allowed two bypasses:\n\n1. Missing/empty `from` values normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed.\n2. Suffix-based matching meant any caller number whose digits ended with an allowlisted number would be accepted.\n\n### Proof Of Concept\n\n1. Configure the voice-call extension with `inboundPolicy: allowlist` and `allowFrom: [\"+15550001234\"]`.\n2. Place/trigger an inbound call with missing/empty caller ID (provider-dependent; for example anonymous/restricted caller). The call is accepted.\n3. Place a call from a number whose E.164 digits end with `15550001234` (for example `+99915550001234`). The call is accepted.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly operators who install/enable the optional `voice-call` extension and use `inboundPolicy=allowlist` or `pairing` could have inbound access controls bypassed, potentially allowing unauthorized callers to reach auto-response and tool execution.\n\n### Fix\n\nThe fix hardens inbound policy handling:\n\n- Reject inbound calls when caller ID is missing.\n- Require strict equality when comparing normalized caller IDs against the allowlist (no suffix/prefix matching).\n- Add regression tests for missing caller ID, anonymous caller ID, and suffix-collision cases.\n\nFix commit(s):\n\n- `f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb`\n\nThanks @simecek for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T22:21:59Z",
  "published": "2026-02-17T21:36:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28446"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-inbound-allowlist-policy-bypass-in-voice-call-extension-via-empty-caller-id"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw has an inbound allowlist policy bypass in voice-call extension (empty caller ID + suffix matching)"
}

BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-4RJ2-GPMH-QQ5X)

Vulnerability from osv_homebrew – Published: 2026-08-13 17:21 – Updated: 2026-11-13 09:08 – Source website

Summary

OpenClaw has an inbound allowlist policy bypass in voice-call extension (empty caller ID + suffix matching)

Details

Summary

An authentication bypass in the optional voice-call extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to allowlist or pairing.

Deployments that do not install/enable the voice-call extension are not affected.

Affected Packages / Versions

openclaw (npm): <= 2026.2.1
Fixed in: >= 2026.2.2

Details

In affected versions (for example 2026.2.1), the inbound allowlist check in extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.

This allowed two bypasses:

Missing/empty from values normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed.
Suffix-based matching meant any caller number whose digits ended with an allowlisted number would be accepted.

Proof Of Concept

Configure the voice-call extension with inboundPolicy: allowlist and allowFrom: ["+15550001234"].
Place/trigger an inbound call with missing/empty caller ID (provider-dependent; for example anonymous/restricted caller). The call is accepted.
Place a call from a number whose E.164 digits end with 15550001234 (for example +99915550001234). The call is accepted.

Impact

Fix

The fix hardens inbound policy handling:

Reject inbound calls when caller ID is missing.
Require strict equality when comparing normalized caller IDs against the allowlist (no suffix/prefix matching).
Add regression tests for missing caller ID, anonymous caller ID, and suffix-collision cases.

Fix commit(s):

f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb

Thanks @simecek for reporting.

Severity

9.4 (Critical)


                    
                      CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

9.2 (Critical)


                    
                      CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

References

URL

Type

	https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/adv…	WEB
	https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28446	ADVISORY
	https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/f8dfd…	WEB
	https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw	PACKAGE
	https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag…	WEB
	https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-inb…	WEB

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "fix": "bump",
        "range_state": "fixed",
        "upstream_fixed_in": "2026.2.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Homebrew",
        "name": "openclaw-cli",
        "purl": "pkg:brew/openclaw-cli"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.7.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "confidence": "high",
    "source": "matched",
    "strategy": "registry",
    "upstream_evidence": [
      {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "key": "pkg:npm/openclaw@2026.11.3",
        "name": "openclaw",
        "strategy": "registry",
        "subject_version": "2026.11.3"
      }
    ]
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nAn authentication bypass in the optional `voice-call` extension/plugin allowed unapproved or anonymous callers to reach the voice-call agent when inbound policy was set to `allowlist` or `pairing`.\n\nDeployments that do not install/enable the `voice-call` extension are not affected.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- `openclaw` (npm): `\u003c= 2026.2.1`\n- Fixed in: `\u003e= 2026.2.2`\n\n### Details\n\nIn affected versions (for example `2026.2.1`), the inbound allowlist check in `extensions/voice-call/src/manager.ts` used suffix-based matching and accepted empty caller IDs after normalization.\n\nThis allowed two bypasses:\n\n1. Missing/empty `from` values normalized to an empty string, which caused the allowlist predicate to evaluate as allowed.\n2. Suffix-based matching meant any caller number whose digits ended with an allowlisted number would be accepted.\n\n### Proof Of Concept\n\n1. Configure the voice-call extension with `inboundPolicy: allowlist` and `allowFrom: [\"+15550001234\"]`.\n2. Place/trigger an inbound call with missing/empty caller ID (provider-dependent; for example anonymous/restricted caller). The call is accepted.\n3. Place a call from a number whose E.164 digits end with `15550001234` (for example `+99915550001234`). The call is accepted.\n\n### Impact\n\nOnly operators who install/enable the optional `voice-call` extension and use `inboundPolicy=allowlist` or `pairing` could have inbound access controls bypassed, potentially allowing unauthorized callers to reach auto-response and tool execution.\n\n### Fix\n\nThe fix hardens inbound policy handling:\n\n- Reject inbound calls when caller ID is missing.\n- Require strict equality when comparing normalized caller IDs against the allowlist (no suffix/prefix matching).\n- Add regression tests for missing caller ID, anonymous caller ID, and suffix-collision cases.\n\nFix commit(s):\n\n- `f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb`\n\nThanks @simecek for reporting.",
  "id": "BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-28446",
  "modified": "2026-11-13T09:08:26Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T17:21:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28446"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/f8dfd034f5d9235c5485f492a9e4ccc114e97fdb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-inbound-allowlist-policy-bypass-in-voice-call-extension-via-empty-caller-id"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.3",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw has an inbound allowlist policy bypass in voice-call extension (empty caller ID + suffix matching)",
  "upstream": [
    "GHSA-4rj2-gpmh-qq5x",
    "CVE-2026-28446"
  ]
}

CVE-2026-28446 (GCVE-0-2026-28446)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-05 21:59 – Updated: 2026-03-11 13:41

Title

OpenClaw < 2026.2.1 - Inbound Allowlist Policy Bypass in voice-call Extension via Empty Caller ID and Suffix Matching

Summary

OpenClaw versions prior to 2026.2.1 with the voice-call extension installed and enabled contain an authentication bypass vulnerability in inbound allowlist policy validation that accepts empty caller IDs and uses suffix-based matching instead of strict equality. Remote attackers can bypass inbound access controls by placing calls with missing caller IDs or numbers ending with allowlisted digits to reach the voice-call agent and execute tools.

Severity

9.2 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

9.4 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-03-11 13:40 UTC

CWE

Incorrect Implementation of Authentication Algorithm
CWE-303 - Incorrect Implementation of Authentication Algorithm

Assigner

VulnCheck CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 84/100 over 8186 records in the last 180 days details

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/adv…	vendor-advisory
https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/f8dfd…	patch
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-inb…	third-party-advisory

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
OpenClaw	OpenClaw	Affected: 0 , < 2026.2.1 (custom) cpe:2.3:a:openclaw:openclaw::::::node.js::*

Date Public

2026-02-14 00:00

Credits

Petr Simecek (@simecek) @MegaManSec (https://joshua.hu) of AISLE Research Team Stanislav Fort, Aisle Research, www.aisle.com

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-4RJ2-GPMH-QQ5X

Summary

Affected Packages / Versions

Details

Proof Of Concept

Impact

Fix

BREW-OPENCLAW-CLI-CVE-20… (GHSA-4RJ2-GPMH-QQ5X)

Summary

Affected Packages / Versions

Details

Proof Of Concept

Impact

Fix

CVE-2026-28446 (GCVE-0-2026-28446)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Vulnerability timeline

Related by attack behaviour