GHSA-4JJ9-CGQC-X9H5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-12 19:22 – Updated: 2026-01-08 20:51Impact
NeuVector supports login authentication through OpenID Connect. However, the TLS verification (which verifies the remote server's authenticity and integrity) for OpenID Connect is not enforced by default. As a result this may expose the system to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. Starting from version 5.4.0, NeuVector supports TLS verification for following connection types:
- Registry Connections
- Auth Server Connections (SAML, LDAP and OIDC)
- Webhook Connections
By default, TLS verification remains disabled, and its configuration is located under Settings > Configuration in the NeuVector UI.
In the patched version, the new NeuVector deployment enables TLS verification by default. For rolling upgrades, NeuVector does not automatically change this setting to prevent disruptions.
Note: When "TLS verification" is enabled, it affects all connections to:
- Registry servers
- Auth servers (SAML, LDAP and OIDC)
- Webhook servers
Patches
Patched versions include release v5.4.8 and above.
Workarounds
To manually enable TLS verification:
- Open the NeuVector UI.
- Navigate to Settings > Configuration.
- In the TLS Self-Signed Certificate Configuration section, select Enable TLS verification.
- (Optional) Upload or paste the TLS self-signed certificate.
References
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
- Reach out to the SUSE Rancher Security team for security related inquiries.
- Open an issue in the NeuVector repository.
- Verify with our support matrix and product support lifecycle.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/neuvector/neuvector"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.4.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-66001"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-295"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-12T19:22:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-08T11:15:43Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nNeuVector supports login authentication through OpenID Connect. However, the TLS verification (which verifies the remote server\u0027s authenticity and integrity) for OpenID Connect is not enforced by default. As a result this may expose the system to man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks.\nStarting from version 5.4.0, NeuVector supports TLS verification for following connection types:\n\n- Registry Connections\n- Auth Server Connections (SAML, LDAP and OIDC)\n- Webhook Connections\n\nBy default, TLS verification remains disabled, and its configuration is located under **Settings \u003e Configuration in the NeuVector UI**.\n\nIn the patched version, the new NeuVector deployment enables TLS verification by default. \nFor rolling upgrades, NeuVector does not automatically change this setting to prevent disruptions.\n\n**Note:** When \"TLS verification\" is enabled, it affects all connections to:\n\n- Registry servers\n- Auth servers (SAML, LDAP and OIDC)\n- Webhook servers\n\n### Patches\n\nPatched versions include release v5.4.8 and above.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nTo manually enable TLS verification:\n\n1. Open the NeuVector UI.\n2. Navigate to **Settings \u003e Configuration**.\n3. In the **TLS Self-Signed Certificate Configuration** section, select **Enable TLS verification**.\n4. (Optional) Upload or paste the **TLS self-signed certificate**.\n\n### References\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n\n- Reach out to the [SUSE Rancher Security team](https://github.com/rancher/rancher/security/policy) for security related inquiries.\n- Open an issue in the [NeuVector](https://github.com/neuvector/neuvector/issues/new/choose) repository.\n- Verify with our [support matrix](https://www.suse.com/suse-neuvector/support-matrix/all-supported-versions/neuvector-v-all-versions/) and [product support lifecycle](https://www.suse.com/lifecycle/#suse-security).",
"id": "GHSA-4jj9-cgqc-x9h5",
"modified": "2026-01-08T20:51:32Z",
"published": "2025-12-12T19:22:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/neuvector/neuvector/security/advisories/GHSA-4jj9-cgqc-x9h5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66001"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/neuvector/neuvector/commit/955904b5762f296d209bf395a5fcc7a40a53c424"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2025-66001"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/neuvector/neuvector"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "NeuVector OpenID Connect is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MITM)"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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