GHSA-3W98-RRPR-FPRR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 20:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 20:32Summary
SHCParser inflates compressed Smart Health Card JWT payloads into memory without a decompressed-size limit. An attacker who can submit SHC content for validation can craft a small compressed JWT payload that expands to a very large byte array, causing memory exhaustion or severe garbage collection pressure.
Details
The vulnerable code is in org.hl7.fhir.r5/src/main/java/org/hl7/fhir/r5/elementmodel/SHCParser.java.
decodeJWT() checks MAX_ALLOWED_SHC_LENGTH, but this only logs an error and parsing continues:
// SHCParser.java:282-284
if (jwt.length() > MAX_ALLOWED_SHC_LENGTH) {
logError(...);
}
If the header contains "zip":"DEF", the payload is inflated before JSON parsing:
// SHCParser.java:300-304
if ("DEF".equals(res.header.asString("zip"))) {
payloadJson = inflate(payloadJson);
}
res.payload = JsonParser.parseObject(FileUtilities.bytesToString(payloadJson), true);
inflate() accumulates all decompressed output in a ByteArrayOutputStream and has no maximum output size:
// SHCParser.java:455-468
while (!inflater.finished()) {
final int count = inflater.inflate(buffer);
outputStream.write(buffer, 0, count);
}
return outputStream.toByteArray();
The same unbounded decompression pattern exists in decompress() at SHCParser.java:410-423.
PoC
Create a highly compressible SHC-shaped JSON payload, compress it with raw DEFLATE (new Deflater(9, true)), Base64URL-encode it as the JWT payload, and set the JWT header to {"zip":"DEF"}.
Local verification measured the following expansion through SHCParser.inflate():
plain=1000066 compressed=1052 inflated=1000066 ratio=950
plain=16000066 compressed=15626 inflated=16000066 ratio=1023
A small compressed payload can therefore allocate many megabytes of heap. Larger payloads can trigger OutOfMemoryError or process instability.
Impact
This is a denial-of-service vulnerability. Any validator service or application that accepts attacker-supplied SHC content can be forced to allocate excessive heap memory. Impact ranges from request failure and severe GC pressure to process termination.
Credits
- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.9.11"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.r5"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.9.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.9.11"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.validation"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.9.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.validation.cli"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "5.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81875"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-400",
"CWE-409"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T20:32:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T19:17:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`SHCParser` inflates compressed Smart Health Card JWT payloads into memory without a decompressed-size limit. An attacker who can submit SHC content for validation can craft a small compressed JWT payload that expands to a very large byte array, causing memory exhaustion or severe garbage collection pressure.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerable code is in `org.hl7.fhir.r5/src/main/java/org/hl7/fhir/r5/elementmodel/SHCParser.java`.\n\n`decodeJWT()` checks `MAX_ALLOWED_SHC_LENGTH`, but this only logs an error and parsing continues:\n\n```java\n// SHCParser.java:282-284\nif (jwt.length() \u003e MAX_ALLOWED_SHC_LENGTH) {\n logError(...);\n}\n```\n\nIf the header contains `\"zip\":\"DEF\"`, the payload is inflated before JSON parsing:\n\n```java\n// SHCParser.java:300-304\nif (\"DEF\".equals(res.header.asString(\"zip\"))) {\n payloadJson = inflate(payloadJson);\n}\nres.payload = JsonParser.parseObject(FileUtilities.bytesToString(payloadJson), true);\n```\n\n`inflate()` accumulates all decompressed output in a `ByteArrayOutputStream` and has no maximum output size:\n\n```java\n// SHCParser.java:455-468\nwhile (!inflater.finished()) {\n final int count = inflater.inflate(buffer);\n outputStream.write(buffer, 0, count);\n}\nreturn outputStream.toByteArray();\n```\n\nThe same unbounded decompression pattern exists in `decompress()` at `SHCParser.java:410-423`.\n\n### PoC\nCreate a highly compressible SHC-shaped JSON payload, compress it with raw DEFLATE (`new Deflater(9, true)`), Base64URL-encode it as the JWT payload, and set the JWT header to `{\"zip\":\"DEF\"}`.\n\nLocal verification measured the following expansion through `SHCParser.inflate()`:\n\n```text\nplain=1000066 compressed=1052 inflated=1000066 ratio=950\nplain=16000066 compressed=15626 inflated=16000066 ratio=1023\n```\n\nA small compressed payload can therefore allocate many megabytes of heap. Larger payloads can trigger `OutOfMemoryError` or process instability.\n\n### Impact\nThis is a denial-of-service vulnerability. Any validator service or application that accepts attacker-supplied SHC content can be forced to allocate excessive heap memory. Impact ranges from request failure and severe GC pressure to process termination.\n\n### Credits\n- Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R\u0026D)",
"id": "GHSA-3w98-rrpr-fprr",
"modified": "2026-09-17T20:32:16Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T20:32:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hapifhir/org.hl7.fhir.core/security/advisories/GHSA-3w98-rrpr-fprr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81875"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hapifhir/org.hl7.fhir.core/pull/2493"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hapifhir/org.hl7.fhir.core/commit/fbb94216e0ad21ded75be77e5e20242ba194e83f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hapifhir/org.hl7.fhir.core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hapifhir/org.hl7.fhir.core/releases/tag/6.9.11"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hapifhir/org.hl7.fhir.core/releases/tag/6.9.12"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "HAPI FHIR: SHCParser unbounded DEFLATE decompression causes denial of service"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.