GHSA-3HCH-X692-6QJ3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 15:57 – Updated: 2026-11-10 15:57Impact
An authenticated non-administrative user could access a Kubernetes cluster they are not authorized to access through GPUStack's Kubernetes API proxy.
The cluster_apiserver_proxy handler did not perform a resource-level authorization check before forwarding requests to the selected cluster. Requests were forwarded through a worker using its Kubernetes ServiceAccount credentials.
Depending on the permissions granted to that ServiceAccount, an attacker could read sensitive Kubernetes resources, create or modify workloads, or delete resources and disrupt services. Creating attacker-controlled workloads could result in code execution in the target cluster.
Exploitation requires a Kubernetes-provider cluster with a reachable worker. The operations available to the attacker are limited by the worker's ServiceAccount permissions.
Patches
Fixed in gpustack v2.2.2.
Workarounds
Restrict access to the GPUStack instance to trusted administrator accounts until upgrading.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "gpustack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-103002"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T15:57:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-04T22:17:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nAn authenticated non-administrative user could access a Kubernetes cluster they are not authorized to access through GPUStack\u0027s Kubernetes API proxy.\n\nThe `cluster_apiserver_proxy` handler did not perform a resource-level authorization check before forwarding requests to the selected cluster. Requests were forwarded through a worker using its Kubernetes ServiceAccount credentials.\n\nDepending on the permissions granted to that ServiceAccount, an attacker could read sensitive Kubernetes resources, create or modify workloads, or delete resources and disrupt services. Creating attacker-controlled workloads could result in code execution in the target cluster.\n\nExploitation requires a Kubernetes-provider cluster with a reachable worker. The operations available to the attacker are limited by the worker\u0027s ServiceAccount permissions.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `gpustack` `v2.2.2`.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nRestrict access to the GPUStack instance to trusted administrator accounts until upgrading.",
"id": "GHSA-3hch-x692-6qj3",
"modified": "2026-11-10T15:57:20Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T15:57:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/security/advisories/GHSA-3hch-x692-6qj3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-103002"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/pull/5911"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/pull/5936"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/commit/363191fa1da7e1426c6041f78b3cf00aff2622fe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/commit/cdd67467e0f314609dc82216e142940d321abfed"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gpustack/gpustack/releases/tag/v2.2.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GPUStack: Missing authorization on several cluster and resource endpoints allows cross-user access and cluster takeover"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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