Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-375P-5QHX-8WQ4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 19:54 – Updated: 2026-10-28 19:54

Summary

Echo's middleware.Static: `%2F`-encoded path bypasses route/group middleware guarding a statically-served path

Details

Summary

When middleware.Static is mounted globally (e.Use(middleware.Static(...))) and an application relies on a route- or group-level middleware guard to restrict a path that also falls under the served static root, a %2F-encoded request bypasses that guard while the file is still served. This is the same encoding/decoding mismatch fixed for StaticFS/StaticDirectoryHandler in CVE-2026-55677 / GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq, but the fix did not cover the middleware.Static path. In addition, the StaticConfig.EnablePathUnescaping docstring states the default configuration prevents exactly this bypass, which is inaccurate for the global-mount case.

This is not path traversal: no file outside the static root is accessed. The served file lives inside the static root; the issue is that access-control expectations set by a route guard are inconsistent between the literal and %2F-encoded forms of the same path.

Details

Root cause — the router and the static handler disagree on how to interpret %2F:

The router matches routes on the raw, still-encoded path, so GET /admin%2Fsecret.txt does not match a /admin/... route or group; any middleware attached to that route/group is therefore skipped.
middleware.Static selects its path source in middleware/static.go (~L219): with a global e.Use mount there is no wildcard route, so it uses c.Request().URL.Path, which net/http has already decoded (%2F → /). It then path.Cleans (~L235) and Opens (~L259) admin/secret.txt, serving the file.

Net effect: for the literal path the guard runs; for the %2F-encoded path the guard is skipped but the same file is served.

Relevant code: - middleware/static.go ~L219 (p := c.Request().URL.Path), ~L235 (path.Clean), ~L259 (currentFS.Open) - StaticConfig.EnablePathUnescaping docstring (static.go ~L60-67) — claims the default prevents the /admin%2fprivate.txt → /admin/* guard bypass; this is not true for the global mount.

Relationship to prior advisories: - CVE-2026-55677 / GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq (patched 5.2.0): same %2F router-vs-handler mismatch, but fixed for StaticFS/StaticDirectoryHandler. The middleware.Static path was not covered — this report is that gap. - CVE-2026-25766 / GHSA-pgvm-wxw2-hrv9 (patched 5.0.3): a different issue (Windows backslash traversal outside the root). Referenced only to disambiguate; not the same as this report.

PoC

Environment: golang:1.25, module using the official release (go get github.com/labstack/echo/v5@v5.3.1, no local replace). Static root public/ contains a marker file public/admin/secret.txt = SECRET.

Minimal app (the pattern under test: static served globally + a group guard intended to protect /admin):

package main

import (
    "net/http"

    "github.com/labstack/echo/v5"
    "github.com/labstack/echo/v5/middleware"
)

func main() {
    e := echo.New()
    e.Use(middleware.Static("public")) // serves ./public globally (default filesystem)

    admin := e.Group("/admin", func(next echo.HandlerFunc) echo.HandlerFunc {
        return func(c *echo.Context) error { return c.String(http.StatusUnauthorized, "auth required") }
    })
    admin.GET("/secret.txt", func(c *echo.Context) error { return c.String(http.StatusOK, "handler") })

    e.Start(":1323")
}

Requests (unauthenticated):

# Literal: route matches -> group guard runs
curl -i http://localhost:1323/admin/secret.txt
# => 401

# %2F-encoded: route does NOT match -> guard skipped, but middleware.Static serves the file
curl -i --path-as-is http://localhost:1323/admin%2Fsecret.txt
# => 200, body: SECRET

Observed on v5.3.1: literal → 401; %2F → 200 with the file contents. For contrast, serving via the (patched) e.StaticFS("/") returns 404 for the same %2F request, showing the middleware.Static path was not covered by the CVE-2026-55677 fix.

Impact

An unauthenticated remote user can retrieve a file served by middleware.Static even when the application attached a route/group middleware guard to that path, by substituting / with %2F. The consequence is limited to files already inside the served static root (CWE-863 authorization inconsistency; CWE-436 interpretation conflict) — there is no access to files outside the static root.

Honest caveat on validity / severity: this only has security impact for applications that (a) serve a directory statically to the public and (b) place a sensitive file inside that same directory while relying on a route-level guard to protect it. That combination is arguably a misconfiguration — a statically-served directory is public by design — so maintainers may reasonably classify this as a documentation fix (correct the EnablePathUnescaping claim) or won't-fix rather than a code vulnerability. It is filed primarily because (1) the router-vs-handler %2F inconsistency is the exact class fixed in CVE-2026-55677 but left uncovered for middleware.Static, and (2) the docstring currently promises protection it does not provide.

Patches

Fixed in github.com/labstack/echo/v5 v5.4.0 and github.com/labstack/echo/v4 v4.16.0. With the default settings, the Static middleware resolves files from the same form of the path that the router matched, so percent-encoded paths such as /admin%2Fsecret.txt or /%61dmin/secret.txt no longer reach a file under a guarded route. Paths with ., .. or empty segments are no longer served.

Note: middleware registered with Echo#Use runs before route and group middleware, so route guards never protect files served by a global Static middleware. Keep protected files outside its root directory, or serve them with Echo#Static behind the guard.

Workarounds

Keep files that need protection outside the Static middleware's root directory.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/labstack/echo/v5"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.4.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/labstack/echo/v4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.16.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-118650"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-177",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-28T19:54:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWhen `middleware.Static` is mounted globally (`e.Use(middleware.Static(...))`) and an application relies on a **route- or group-level middleware guard** to restrict a path that also falls under the served static root, a `%2F`-encoded request bypasses that guard while the file is still served. This is the same encoding/decoding mismatch fixed for `StaticFS`/`StaticDirectoryHandler` in CVE-2026-55677 / GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq, but the fix did not cover the `middleware.Static` path. In addition, the `StaticConfig.EnablePathUnescaping` docstring states the default configuration prevents exactly this bypass, which is inaccurate for the global-mount case.\n\n**This is not path traversal:** no file outside the static root is accessed. The served file lives inside the static root; the issue is that access-control expectations set by a route guard are inconsistent between the literal and `%2F`-encoded forms of the same path.\n\n## Details\n\nRoot cause \u2014 the router and the static handler disagree on how to interpret `%2F`:\n\n- The router matches routes on the **raw, still-encoded** path, so `GET /admin%2Fsecret.txt` does **not** match a `/admin/...` route or group; any middleware attached to that route/group is therefore skipped.\n- `middleware.Static` selects its path source in `middleware/static.go` (~L219): with a global `e.Use` mount there is no wildcard route, so it uses `c.Request().URL.Path`, which `net/http` has already **decoded** (`%2F` \u2192 `/`). It then `path.Clean`s (~L235) and `Open`s (~L259) `admin/secret.txt`, serving the file.\n\nNet effect: for the literal path the guard runs; for the `%2F`-encoded path the guard is skipped but the same file is served.\n\nRelevant code:\n- `middleware/static.go` ~L219 (`p := c.Request().URL.Path`), ~L235 (`path.Clean`), ~L259 (`currentFS.Open`)\n- `StaticConfig.EnablePathUnescaping` docstring (`static.go` ~L60-67) \u2014 claims the default prevents the `/admin%2fprivate.txt` \u2192 `/admin/*` guard bypass; this is not true for the global mount.\n\nRelationship to prior advisories:\n- **CVE-2026-55677 / GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq** (patched 5.2.0): same `%2F` router-vs-handler mismatch, but fixed for `StaticFS`/`StaticDirectoryHandler`. The `middleware.Static` path was not covered \u2014 this report is that gap.\n- **CVE-2026-25766 / GHSA-pgvm-wxw2-hrv9** (patched 5.0.3): a *different* issue (Windows backslash traversal **outside** the root). Referenced only to disambiguate; not the same as this report.\n\n## PoC\n\nEnvironment: `golang:1.25`, module using the official release (`go get github.com/labstack/echo/v5@v5.3.1`, no local `replace`). Static root `public/` contains a marker file `public/admin/secret.txt` = `SECRET`.\n\nMinimal app (the pattern under test: static served globally + a group guard intended to protect `/admin`):\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"net/http\"\n\n\t\"github.com/labstack/echo/v5\"\n\t\"github.com/labstack/echo/v5/middleware\"\n)\n\nfunc main() {\n\te := echo.New()\n\te.Use(middleware.Static(\"public\")) // serves ./public globally (default filesystem)\n\n\tadmin := e.Group(\"/admin\", func(next echo.HandlerFunc) echo.HandlerFunc {\n\t\treturn func(c *echo.Context) error { return c.String(http.StatusUnauthorized, \"auth required\") }\n\t})\n\tadmin.GET(\"/secret.txt\", func(c *echo.Context) error { return c.String(http.StatusOK, \"handler\") })\n\n\te.Start(\":1323\")\n}\n```\n\nRequests (unauthenticated):\n\n```\n# Literal: route matches -\u003e group guard runs\ncurl -i http://localhost:1323/admin/secret.txt\n# =\u003e 401\n\n# %2F-encoded: route does NOT match -\u003e guard skipped, but middleware.Static serves the file\ncurl -i --path-as-is http://localhost:1323/admin%2Fsecret.txt\n# =\u003e 200, body: SECRET\n```\n\nObserved on `v5.3.1`: literal \u2192 `401`; `%2F` \u2192 `200` with the file contents. For contrast, serving via the (patched) `e.StaticFS(\"/\")` returns `404` for the same `%2F` request, showing the `middleware.Static` path was not covered by the CVE-2026-55677 fix.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated remote user can retrieve a file served by `middleware.Static` even when the application attached a route/group middleware guard to that path, by substituting `/` with `%2F`. The consequence is limited to files already inside the served static root (CWE-863 authorization inconsistency; CWE-436 interpretation conflict) \u2014 **there is no access to files outside the static root**.\n\n**Honest caveat on validity / severity:** this only has security impact for applications that (a) serve a directory statically to the public *and* (b) place a sensitive file inside that same directory while relying on a *route-level* guard to protect it. That combination is arguably a misconfiguration \u2014 a statically-served directory is public by design \u2014 so maintainers may reasonably classify this as a documentation fix (correct the `EnablePathUnescaping` claim) or won\u0027t-fix rather than a code vulnerability. It is filed primarily because (1) the router-vs-handler `%2F` inconsistency is the exact class fixed in CVE-2026-55677 but left uncovered for `middleware.Static`, and (2) the docstring currently promises protection it does not provide.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `github.com/labstack/echo/v5` v5.4.0 and `github.com/labstack/echo/v4` v4.16.0. With the default settings, the Static middleware resolves files from the same form of the path that the router matched, so percent-encoded paths such as `/admin%2Fsecret.txt` or `/%61dmin/secret.txt` no longer reach a file under a guarded route. Paths with `.`, `..` or empty segments are no longer served.\n\nNote: middleware registered with `Echo#Use` runs before route and group middleware, so route guards never protect files served by a global Static middleware. Keep protected files outside its root directory, or serve them with `Echo#Static` behind the guard.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nKeep files that need protection outside the Static middleware\u0027s root directory.",
  "id": "GHSA-375p-5qhx-8wq4",
  "modified": "2026-10-28T19:54:20Z",
  "published": "2026-10-28T19:54:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-375p-5qhx-8wq4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/b838391e2eade87ae7e5a09d7bb5087bec271ec1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/fc410094b2f3415cf2bf5204082137b205bfd5af"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v4.16.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Echo\u0027s middleware.Static: `%2F`-encoded path bypasses route/group middleware guarding a statically-served path"
}

CVE-2026-118650 (GCVE-0-2026-118650)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-28 19:25 – Updated: 2026-10-28 19:25

Title

Echo: middleware.Static: `%2F`-encoded path bypasses route/group middleware guarding a statically-served path

Summary

Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.16.0 and 5.4.0, a globally mounted middleware.Static instance can interpret an encoded request path differently from Echo's router because the router matches the still-encoded path while the static handler uses the decoded URL.Path. The advisory demonstrates an encoded slash resolving to a file under the static root through the global static middleware, but the source is internally inconsistent about whether a route or group guard protects the corresponding literal path in that global-mount configuration. This issue is fixed in 4.16.0 and 5.4.0.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

CWE

CWE-177 - Improper Handling of URL Encoding (Hex Encoding)
CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 8044 records in the last 180 days details

References

5 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisor…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/b838391e2…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/fc410094b…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v4.16.0	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.0	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
labstack	echo	Affected: >= 5.0.0, < 5.4.0 Affected: < 4.16.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "echo",
          "vendor": "labstack",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 5.0.0, \u003c 5.4.0"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 4.16.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Echo is a Go web framework. Prior to 4.16.0 and 5.4.0, a globally mounted middleware.Static instance can interpret an encoded request path differently from Echo\u0027s router because the router matches the still-encoded path while the static handler uses the decoded URL.Path. The advisory demonstrates an encoded slash resolving to a file under the static root through the global static middleware, but the source is internally inconsistent about whether a route or group guard protects the corresponding literal path in that global-mount configuration. This issue is fixed in 4.16.0 and 5.4.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 7.5,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-177",
              "description": "CWE-177: Improper Handling of URL Encoding (Hex Encoding)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-863",
              "description": "CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-10-28T19:25:02.952Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-375p-5qhx-8wq4",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-375p-5qhx-8wq4"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/b838391e2eade87ae7e5a09d7bb5087bec271ec1",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/b838391e2eade87ae7e5a09d7bb5087bec271ec1"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/fc410094b2f3415cf2bf5204082137b205bfd5af",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/fc410094b2f3415cf2bf5204082137b205bfd5af"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v4.16.0",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v4.16.0"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.0",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.4.0"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-375p-5qhx-8wq4",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Echo: middleware.Static: `%2F`-encoded path bypasses route/group middleware guarding a statically-served path"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-118650",
    "datePublished": "2026-10-28T19:25:02.952Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-10-28T17:25:37.560Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-10-28T19:25:02.952Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

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Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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GHSA-375P-5QHX-8WQ4

Summary

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CVE-2026-118650 (GCVE-0-2026-118650)

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