GHSA-2VJQ-HG5W-5GM7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-14 20:13 – Updated: 2025-03-05 19:27Impact
OctoPrint versions up until and including 1.10.0 contain a vulnerability that allows an unauthenticated attacker to completely bypass the authentication if the autologinLocal option is enabled within config.yaml, even if they come from networks that are not configured as localNetworks, by spoofing their IP via the X-Forwarded-For header.
If autologin is not enabled, this vulnerability does not have any impact.
Patches
The vulnerability has been patched in version 1.10.1.
Workaround
Until the patch has been applied, OctoPrint administrators who have autologin enabled on their instances should disable it and/or to make the instance inaccessible from potentially hostile networks like the internet.
PoC
- Enable the
autologinAsconfiguration within theaccessControlsection in the OctoPrint yaml configuration file - Set your browser to add the
X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1header to HTTP requests. For example, this can be done using proxy software like Burp Suite. Alternatively, there are browser extensions such as https://github.com/MisterPhilip/x-forwarded-for, but I haven't tried them. - Navigate to OctoPrint and note that it logs you in automatically.
Credits
This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by Jacopo Tediosi.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.10.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "OctoPrint"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.10.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-32977"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-14T20:13:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-14T16:17:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nOctoPrint versions up until and including 1.10.0 contain a vulnerability that allows an unauthenticated attacker to completely bypass the authentication **if the `autologinLocal` option is enabled** within `config.yaml`, even if they come from networks that are not configured as `localNetworks`, by spoofing their IP via the `X-Forwarded-For` header.\n\nIf autologin is not enabled, this vulnerability does not have any impact.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe vulnerability has been patched in version 1.10.1.\n\n### Workaround\n\nUntil the patch has been applied, OctoPrint administrators who have autologin enabled on their instances should disable it and/or to make the instance inaccessible from potentially hostile networks like the internet.\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Enable the `autologinAs` configuration within the `accessControl` section in the [OctoPrint yaml configuration file](https://docs.octoprint.org/en/master/configuration/config_yaml.html#access-control)\n2. Set your browser to add the `X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1` header to HTTP requests. For example, this can be done using proxy software like Burp Suite. Alternatively, there are browser extensions such as https://github.com/MisterPhilip/x-forwarded-for, but I haven\u0027t tried them.\n3. Navigate to OctoPrint and note that it logs you in automatically.\n\n### Credits\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by Jacopo Tediosi.",
"id": "GHSA-2vjq-hg5w-5gm7",
"modified": "2025-03-05T19:27:36Z",
"published": "2024-05-14T20:13:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OctoPrint/OctoPrint/security/advisories/GHSA-2vjq-hg5w-5gm7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32977"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OctoPrint/OctoPrint/commit/5afbec8d23508edc25b0f1bdef1620580136add4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/OctoPrint/OctoPrint"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/octoprint/PYSEC-2024-237.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OctoPrint has an Authentication Bypass via X-Forwarded-For Header when autologinLocal is enabled"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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