GHSA-2GFF-2MMG-M73P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 21:20 – Updated: 2026-11-10 21:20Impact
Since Rails 8.1.0, ActionDispatch::RemoteIp derives request.remote_ip from Rack::Request#forwarded_for, which under Rack 3 reads the RFC 7239 Forwarded header in preference to X-Forwarded-For. When a reverse proxy appends the client address to X-Forwarded-For but passes a client-supplied Forwarded header through unchanged, request.remote_ip returns an address chosen by the client, and the IP spoofing check does not raise, because it compares only Client-Ip with the forwarded addresses. An unauthenticated attacker could therefore spoof request.remote_ip, possibly bypassing IP-based access controls and rate limits keyed on the client address (including the default by: of rate_limit), and falsifying the client address in logs.
Details
The 8.1.0 change (2d084af8) switched ActionDispatch::RemoteIp from reading X-Forwarded-For directly to Rack's forwarded_for, in order to reuse Rack's port handling. Rails continues to honor Forwarded, the standard header.
In the fixed releases, when config.action_dispatch.ip_spoofing_check is enabled (the default), ActionDispatch::RemoteIp also compares the first untrusted client address in Forwarded with the first untrusted client address in X-Forwarded-For, as exact strings, and raises ActionDispatch::RemoteIp::IpSpoofAttackError when both headers are present and the addresses differ. Deployments whose proxies report the client address inconsistently between the two headers will receive this error after upgrading. See the actionpack CHANGELOG.
Affected applications
An application is affected if it meets all of these requirements:
- Runs Rails 8.1.0 through 8.1.4 with Rack 3. Under Rack 2.2, forwarded_for reads only X-Forwarded-For.
- Is served behind a proxy that does not remove or overwrite a client-supplied Forwarded header.
- Relies on request.remote_ip for access control, rate limiting, or auditing.
The fix detects a spoofed Forwarded header only when the proxy also sets X-Forwarded-For. An application whose proxy passes a client-supplied Forwarded header through and sets no X-Forwarded-For remains exposed after upgrading, and should configure the proxy to remove or overwrite Forwarded, or apply the workaround below.
Mitigation
- Upgrade to a fixed version of
actionpack. - Configure reverse proxies to remove or overwrite any client-supplied
Forwardedheader.
Workarounds
Applications whose proxies set X-Forwarded-For can make Rack ignore the Forwarded header, restoring the client address resolution of Rails 8.0, by setting Rack::Request.forwarded_priority = [:x_forwarded] in an initializer. This setting is available in Rack 3.0.0 and later, and it also causes Rack to ignore Forwarded when determining the request scheme, host, and port.
Releases
The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.
Patches for those who cannot upgrade at once: - 8.1: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/2a01a5ac521184419d9a92fa2c25e102e68cd227.patch
Versions affected
- actionpack >= 8.1, < 8.1.4.1
Credit
This issue was responsibly reported by HackerOne researcher luryus.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "RubyGems",
"name": "actionpack"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.1.0.beta1"
},
{
"fixed": "8.1.4.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-126083"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-348"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T21:20:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nSince Rails 8.1.0, `ActionDispatch::RemoteIp` derives `request.remote_ip` from `Rack::Request#forwarded_for`, which under Rack 3 reads the RFC 7239 `Forwarded` header in preference to `X-Forwarded-For`. When a reverse proxy appends the client address to `X-Forwarded-For` but passes a client-supplied `Forwarded` header through unchanged, `request.remote_ip` returns an address chosen by the client, and the IP spoofing check does not raise, because it compares only `Client-Ip` with the forwarded addresses. An unauthenticated attacker could therefore spoof `request.remote_ip`, possibly bypassing IP-based access controls and rate limits keyed on the client address (including the default `by:` of `rate_limit`), and falsifying the client address in logs.\n\n### Details\nThe 8.1.0 change ([2d084af8](https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/2d084af8444a7b6b868c7cbb256172007871e78d)) switched `ActionDispatch::RemoteIp` from reading `X-Forwarded-For` directly to Rack\u0027s `forwarded_for`, in order to reuse Rack\u0027s port handling. Rails continues to honor `Forwarded`, the standard header.\n\nIn the fixed releases, when `config.action_dispatch.ip_spoofing_check` is enabled (the default), `ActionDispatch::RemoteIp` also compares the first untrusted client address in `Forwarded` with the first untrusted client address in `X-Forwarded-For`, as exact strings, and raises `ActionDispatch::RemoteIp::IpSpoofAttackError` when both headers are present and the addresses differ. Deployments whose proxies report the client address inconsistently between the two headers will receive this error after upgrading. See the `actionpack` CHANGELOG.\n\n### Affected applications\nAn application is affected if it meets all of these requirements:\n- Runs Rails 8.1.0 through 8.1.4 with Rack 3. Under Rack 2.2, `forwarded_for` reads only `X-Forwarded-For`.\n- Is served behind a proxy that does not remove or overwrite a client-supplied `Forwarded` header.\n- Relies on `request.remote_ip` for access control, rate limiting, or auditing.\n\nThe fix detects a spoofed `Forwarded` header only when the proxy also sets `X-Forwarded-For`. An application whose proxy passes a client-supplied `Forwarded` header through and sets no `X-Forwarded-For` remains exposed after upgrading, and should configure the proxy to remove or overwrite `Forwarded`, or apply the workaround below.\n\n### Mitigation\n- Upgrade to a fixed version of `actionpack`.\n- Configure reverse proxies to remove or overwrite any client-supplied `Forwarded` header.\n\n### Workarounds\nApplications whose proxies set `X-Forwarded-For` can make Rack ignore the `Forwarded` header, restoring the client address resolution of Rails 8.0, by setting `Rack::Request.forwarded_priority = [:x_forwarded]` in an initializer. This setting is available in Rack 3.0.0 and later, and it also causes Rack to ignore `Forwarded` when determining the request scheme, host, and port.\n\n### Releases\nThe fixed releases are available at the normal locations.\n\nPatches for those who cannot upgrade at once:\n- 8.1: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/2a01a5ac521184419d9a92fa2c25e102e68cd227.patch\n\n### Versions affected\n- actionpack \u003e= 8.1, \u003c 8.1.4.1\n\n### Credit\nThis issue was responsibly reported by HackerOne researcher [luryus](https://hackerone.com/luryus).",
"id": "GHSA-2gff-2mmg-m73p",
"modified": "2026-11-10T21:20:06Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T21:20:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rails/rails/security/advisories/GHSA-2gff-2mmg-m73p"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/2a01a5ac521184419d9a92fa2c25e102e68cd227"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rails/rails"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rails/rails/releases/tag/v8.1.4.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/actionpack/GHSA-2gff-2mmg-m73p.yml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Action Pack: Possible IP spoofing in Action Dispatch RemoteIp"
}
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