GHSA-2RP4-X2J7-QMCC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-06 21:33 – Updated: 2026-08-06 21:33The control-panel helper that renders element chip/card labels writes an element's draftName into the page without HTML-encoding it, while the surrounding path segments are encoded.
A low-privilege control-panel user who can create a draft of an element (for example, an entry) controls the draft name, so they can store an XSS payload that executes in the browser of any other control-panel user who is shown that element’s chip or card (element indexes with drafts visible, relation and element-selection fields that reference the element, and the drafts list).
This allows a low-privilege author to run JavaScript in an administrator’s authenticated session and take over the control panel. It is the same output-encoding class as the recently fixed GHSA-xrqc-p465-2xvg (Structure entry title) and GHSA-3x4w-mxpf-fhqq (revision context menu), which encoded other user-controlled titles but not the draft name.
Prerequisites
- A control-panel account with permission to edit entries in at least one section and create drafts.
- A higher-privileged user (for example, an administrator) who is later shown the draft’s chip or card (an element index with drafts visible, or a relation/element-selection field referencing the element).
Limitations
- Requires the victim to be shown the affected element's chip/card in the control panel (normal day-to-day activity; element indexes and relation fields are routine).
- The payload runs in the control-panel origin in the victim’s session.
Impact
A low-privilege author can run arbitrary JavaScript in the session of any higher-privileged control-panel user who is shown the element’s chip or card, including administrators. This is a cross-privilege stored XSS, not a self-XSS: the attacker and the victim are different users, and the payload fires during routine browsing of element indexes and relation fields.
Because the script runs in the victim’s control-panel origin, it can read the CSRF token that Craft embeds in the page JavaScript (Craft.csrfTokenValue, confirmed present on control-panel pages) and issue authenticated control-panel actions as the victim. This was verified end-to-end on Craft Pro: an in-session request to the users/save-user action created a brand new account (User saved., HTTP 200), an admin-only capability that an author can never perform directly.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "craftcms/cms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0-RC1"
},
{
"fixed": "5.10.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-06T21:33:15Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The control-panel helper that renders element chip/card labels writes an element\u0027s `draftName` into the page without HTML-encoding it, while the surrounding path segments are encoded.\n\nA low-privilege control-panel user who can create a draft of an element (for example, an entry) controls the draft name, so they can store an XSS payload that executes in the browser of any other control-panel user who is shown that element\u2019s chip or card (element indexes with drafts visible, relation and element-selection fields that reference the element, and the drafts list).\n\nThis allows a low-privilege author to run JavaScript in an administrator\u2019s authenticated session and take over the control panel. It is the same output-encoding class as the recently fixed GHSA-xrqc-p465-2xvg (Structure entry title) and GHSA-3x4w-mxpf-fhqq (revision context menu), which encoded other user-controlled titles but not the draft name.\n\n### Prerequisites\n\n- A control-panel account with permission to edit entries in at least one section and create drafts.\n- A higher-privileged user (for example, an administrator) who is later shown the draft\u2019s chip or card (an element index with drafts visible, or a relation/element-selection field referencing the element).\n\n### Limitations\n\n- Requires the victim to be shown the affected element\u0027s chip/card in the control panel (normal day-to-day activity; element indexes and relation fields are routine).\n- The payload runs in the control-panel origin in the victim\u2019s session.\n\n## Impact\n\nA low-privilege author can run arbitrary JavaScript in the session of any higher-privileged control-panel user who is shown the element\u2019s chip or card, including administrators. This is a cross-privilege stored XSS, not a self-XSS: the attacker and the victim are different users, and the payload fires during routine browsing of element indexes and relation fields.\n\nBecause the script runs in the victim\u2019s control-panel origin, it can read the CSRF token that Craft embeds in the page JavaScript (`Craft.csrfTokenValue`, confirmed present on control-panel pages) and issue authenticated control-panel actions as the victim. This was verified end-to-end on Craft Pro: an in-session request to the `users/save-user` action created a brand new account (`User saved.`, HTTP 200), an admin-only capability that an author can never perform directly.",
"id": "GHSA-2rp4-x2j7-qmcc",
"modified": "2026-08-06T21:33:15Z",
"published": "2026-08-06T21:33:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-2rp4-x2j7-qmcc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/06c799148537ce960f6bc86e162b499947040eda"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/cms/releases/tag/5.10.8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Craft CMS: Stored XSS in the control panel via unescaped draft name"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.