GHSA-29HQ-23M2-2J47

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 14:49 – Updated: 2026-09-22 14:49
VLAI
Summary
Sync-in Server has Username/Login Enumeration via Timing Side-Channel on POST /api/auth/login (incomplete fix of the prior timing-attack advisory)
Details

Summary

validateUser() in backend/src/authentication/providers/mysql/auth-provider-mysql.service.ts returns immediately when the supplied login/email does not match any account, without ever calling comparePassword():

async validateUser(loginOrEmail: string, password: string, ip?: string, scope?: AUTH_SCOPE): Promise<UserModel> {
  let user: UserModel
  try {
    user = await this.usersManager.findUser(loginOrEmail, false)
  } catch (e) { ... }
  if (!user) {
    this.logger.warn(...)
    return null   // <-- comparePassword() is never reached here
  }
  return await this.usersManager.logUser(user, password, ip, scope)
}

comparePassword() (backend/src/common/functions.ts) already contains a dummy-hash branch that was clearly added to defend against exactly this class of attack:

export async function comparePassword(password: string, hash?: string | null): Promise<boolean> {
  if (!hash) {
    // No hash, waste time for time-based attacks
    await bcrypt.compare(password, DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH)
    return false
  }
  return await bcrypt.compare(password, hash)
}

The problem is that this protection only runs when comparePassword() is actually invoked with a falsy hash. Because validateUser() short-circuits with return null as soon as findUser() comes back empty, the "account doesn't exist" path skips all cryptographic work entirely, while the "account exists, wrong password" path always performs a real bcrypt comparison (cost factor 10, ~100ms+). The two outcomes are trivially distinguishable by response time.

There's already a published advisory in this repo for "Username Enumeration via Timing Attack" - this looks like the same underlying issue surfacing through a different call path (the early return in validateUser()) that the existing fix (the dummy-hash branch in comparePassword()) doesn't actually reach, rather than a brand new vulnerability class.

Impact

Any unauthenticated client can determine whether a given username/email is a valid account on the instance by timing POST /api/auth/login: - Non-existent login: near-instant rejection (no bcrypt call). - Existing login (regardless of password correctness): consistently slower due to a real bcrypt comparison.

This enables efficient enumeration of valid accounts, which can then be used to focus credential-stuffing, password-spraying, or phishing against confirmed-valid targets.

Proof of Concept

Verified with the actual comparePassword() logic and the real DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH constant copied verbatim from backend/src/common/functions.ts, using the project's own bcryptjs dependency (no mocking of bcrypt itself):

Avg time for "login does not exist" path (validateUser returns null, no bcrypt call): 0.00 ms
Avg time for "login exists, wrong password" path (real bcrypt.compare runs):          114.90 ms
Difference: 114.90 ms (ratio: ~58923x)

The "not found" path reproduces validateUser()'s exact early return (no call into comparePassword); the "wrong password" path reproduces logUser()'s real call into comparePassword(password, user.password). The gap is large enough to be trivially observable over a real network, even accounting for jitter.

Reachable endpoint: POST /api/auth/login, guarded only by AuthLocalGuard (Passport local strategy invoking validateUser()), no authentication required.

Suggested fix

Make validateUser() always pass through comparePassword()'s timing-equalized path, even when no user is found, e.g.:

if (!user) {
  await comparePassword(password, null) // burns the same time as a real comparison
  return null
}

so the "account not found" and "account found, wrong password" branches take statistically indistinguishable time.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.4.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@sync-in/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-58272"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-208"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T14:49:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-21T21:17:06Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nvalidateUser() in backend/src/authentication/providers/mysql/auth-provider-mysql.service.ts returns immediately when the supplied login/email does not match any account, without ever calling comparePassword():\n\n    async validateUser(loginOrEmail: string, password: string, ip?: string, scope?: AUTH_SCOPE): Promise\u003cUserModel\u003e {\n      let user: UserModel\n      try {\n        user = await this.usersManager.findUser(loginOrEmail, false)\n      } catch (e) { ... }\n      if (!user) {\n        this.logger.warn(...)\n        return null   // \u003c-- comparePassword() is never reached here\n      }\n      return await this.usersManager.logUser(user, password, ip, scope)\n    }\n\ncomparePassword() (backend/src/common/functions.ts) already contains a dummy-hash branch that was clearly added to defend against exactly this class of attack:\n\n    export async function comparePassword(password: string, hash?: string | null): Promise\u003cboolean\u003e {\n      if (!hash) {\n        // No hash, waste time for time-based attacks\n        await bcrypt.compare(password, DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH)\n        return false\n      }\n      return await bcrypt.compare(password, hash)\n    }\n\nThe problem is that this protection only runs when comparePassword() is actually invoked with a falsy hash. Because validateUser() short-circuits with return null as soon as findUser() comes back empty, the \"account doesn\u0027t exist\" path skips all cryptographic work entirely, while the \"account exists, wrong password\" path always performs a real bcrypt comparison (cost factor 10, ~100ms+). The two outcomes are trivially distinguishable by response time.\n\nThere\u0027s already a published advisory in this repo for \"Username Enumeration via Timing Attack\" - this looks like the same underlying issue surfacing through a different call path (the early return in validateUser()) that the existing fix (the dummy-hash branch in comparePassword()) doesn\u0027t actually reach, rather than a brand new vulnerability class.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny unauthenticated client can determine whether a given username/email is a valid account on the instance by timing POST /api/auth/login:\n- Non-existent login: near-instant rejection (no bcrypt call).\n- Existing login (regardless of password correctness): consistently slower due to a real bcrypt comparison.\n\nThis enables efficient enumeration of valid accounts, which can then be used to focus credential-stuffing, password-spraying, or phishing against confirmed-valid targets.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nVerified with the actual comparePassword() logic and the real DUMMY_PASSWORD_HASH constant copied verbatim from backend/src/common/functions.ts, using the project\u0027s own bcryptjs dependency (no mocking of bcrypt itself):\n\n    Avg time for \"login does not exist\" path (validateUser returns null, no bcrypt call): 0.00 ms\n    Avg time for \"login exists, wrong password\" path (real bcrypt.compare runs):          114.90 ms\n    Difference: 114.90 ms (ratio: ~58923x)\n\nThe \"not found\" path reproduces validateUser()\u0027s exact early return (no call into comparePassword); the \"wrong password\" path reproduces logUser()\u0027s real call into comparePassword(password, user.password). The gap is large enough to be trivially observable over a real network, even accounting for jitter.\n\nReachable endpoint: POST /api/auth/login, guarded only by AuthLocalGuard (Passport local strategy invoking validateUser()), no authentication required.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nMake validateUser() always pass through comparePassword()\u0027s timing-equalized path, even when no user is found, e.g.:\n\n    if (!user) {\n      await comparePassword(password, null) // burns the same time as a real comparison\n      return null\n    }\n\nso the \"account not found\" and \"account found, wrong password\" branches take statistically indistinguishable time.",
  "id": "GHSA-29hq-23m2-2j47",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T14:49:23Z",
  "published": "2026-09-22T14:49:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Sync-in/server/security/advisories/GHSA-29hq-23m2-2j47"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58272"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Sync-in/server/commit/b80efe04574039a7a302c0e1007f03a7dbe6a633"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Sync-in/server"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Sync-in/server/releases/tag/v2.4.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Sync-in Server has Username/Login Enumeration via Timing Side-Channel on POST /api/auth/login (incomplete fix of the prior timing-attack advisory)"
}



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