GHSA-279X-MWFV-VCQV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-05 21:27 – Updated: 2026-08-05 21:27Impact
Nuxt DevTools (development mode only) exposes a bidirectional RPC channel over the Vite HMR WebSocket via the nuxt:devtools:rpc plugin. On affected versions the channel has no authentication: any client that can reach the Vite HMR endpoint (ws://<host>:<port>/, subprotocol vite-hmr) can call RPC methods, with no token, handshake, or origin check before the channel is established. The updateOptions(), clearOptions(), and openInEditor() methods do not enforce the ensureDevAuthToken check that the other mutating methods use.
openInEditor() reads the persisted behavior.openInEditor value and passes it to the launch-editor package, which spawns it as a child process. That value is settable through the equally unauthenticated updateOptions(). An attacker who can reach the HMR port can therefore chain updateOptions('behavior', { openInEditor: '<command>' }) then openInEditor('<any-existing-file>') to execute an arbitrary program on the developer's machine.
The HMR port is reachable by a process on the same host, by any peer on the LAN when the dev server is bound with nuxi dev --host, or by a malicious website the developer visits while the dev server is running (a browser can open the HMR WebSocket cross-origin). Impact is limited to development environments; production builds do not run DevTools.
Patches
Fixed in @nuxt/devtools@3.3.1. Because nuxt depends on @nuxt/devtools through a ^3.x range, updating is a lockfile refresh / reinstall; no nuxt release is required.
Workarounds
- Update
@nuxt/devtoolsto a patched version. - Do not run the dev server bound to a non-loopback interface (
nuxi dev --host) on an untrusted network. - Disable DevTools entirely with
devtools: { enabled: false }innuxt.config.
References
- GHSA-279x-mwfv-vcqv
launch-editor: https://www.npmjs.com/package/launch-editor
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@nuxt/devtools"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-71319"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-05T21:27:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nNuxt DevTools (development mode only) exposes a bidirectional RPC channel over the Vite HMR WebSocket via the `nuxt:devtools:rpc` plugin. On affected versions the channel has no authentication: any client that can reach the Vite HMR endpoint (`ws://\u003chost\u003e:\u003cport\u003e/`, subprotocol `vite-hmr`) can call RPC methods, with no token, handshake, or origin check before the channel is established. The `updateOptions()`, `clearOptions()`, and `openInEditor()` methods do not enforce the `ensureDevAuthToken` check that the other mutating methods use.\n\n`openInEditor()` reads the persisted `behavior.openInEditor` value and passes it to the `launch-editor` package, which spawns it as a child process. That value is settable through the equally unauthenticated `updateOptions()`. An attacker who can reach the HMR port can therefore chain `updateOptions(\u0027behavior\u0027, { openInEditor: \u0027\u003ccommand\u003e\u0027 })` then `openInEditor(\u0027\u003cany-existing-file\u003e\u0027)` to execute an arbitrary program on the developer\u0027s machine.\n\nThe HMR port is reachable by a process on the same host, by any peer on the LAN when the dev server is bound with `nuxi dev --host`, or by a malicious website the developer visits while the dev server is running (a browser can open the HMR WebSocket cross-origin). Impact is limited to development environments; production builds do not run DevTools.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `@nuxt/devtools@3.3.1`. Because `nuxt` depends on `@nuxt/devtools` through a `^3.x` range, updating is a lockfile refresh / reinstall; no `nuxt` release is required.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Update `@nuxt/devtools` to a patched version.\n- Do not run the dev server bound to a non-loopback interface (`nuxi dev --host`) on an untrusted network.\n- Disable DevTools entirely with `devtools: { enabled: false }` in `nuxt.config`.\n\n### References\n\n- GHSA-279x-mwfv-vcqv\n- `launch-editor`: https://www.npmjs.com/package/launch-editor",
"id": "GHSA-279x-mwfv-vcqv",
"modified": "2026-08-05T21:27:39Z",
"published": "2026-08-05T21:27:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-279x-mwfv-vcqv"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Unauthenticated Nuxt DevTools RPC allows arbitrary command execution on the developer\u0027s host"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.