GHSA-2767-2Q9V-9326
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-17 21:57 – Updated: 2026-05-08 01:32Summary
QQBot reply media URL handling could trigger SSRF and re-upload fetched bytes.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw - Ecosystem: npm
- Affected versions:
< 2026.4.12 - Patched versions:
>= 2026.4.12
Impact
QQBot reply media URLs could be treated as trusted media sources, allowing SSRF fetches whose returned bytes were then re-uploaded through the channel.
Technical Details
The fix routes QQBot remote media fetches through SSRF-guarded media fetching and explicit URL allowlist policy.
Fix
The issue was fixed in #63495 and #65788. The first stable tag containing the fix is v2026.4.12, and openclaw@2026.4.14 includes the fix.
Fix Commit(s)
08ae021d1f4f02e0ca5fd8a3b9659291c1ecf95addb7a8dd80b8d5dd04aafa44ce7a4354b568bb2d- PR: #63495, #65788
Release Process Note
Users should upgrade to openclaw 2026.4.12 or newer. The latest npm release, 2026.4.14, already includes the fix.
Credits
Thanks to @threalwinky for reporting this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.4.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-43526"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-17T21:57:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-05T12:16:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nQQBot reply media URL handling could trigger SSRF and re-upload fetched bytes.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw`\n- Ecosystem: npm\n- Affected versions: `\u003c 2026.4.12`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.4.12`\n\n## Impact\n\nQQBot reply media URLs could be treated as trusted media sources, allowing SSRF fetches whose returned bytes were then re-uploaded through the channel.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nThe fix routes QQBot remote media fetches through SSRF-guarded media fetching and explicit URL allowlist policy.\n\n## Fix\n\nThe issue was fixed in #63495 and #65788. The first stable tag containing the fix is `v2026.4.12`, and `openclaw@2026.4.14` includes the fix.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `08ae021d1f4f02e0ca5fd8a3b9659291c1ecf95a`\n- `ddb7a8dd80b8d5dd04aafa44ce7a4354b568bb2d`\n- PR: #63495, #65788\n\n## Release Process Note\n\nUsers should upgrade to `openclaw` 2026.4.12 or newer. The latest npm release, `2026.4.14`, already includes the fix.\n\n## Credits\n\nThanks to @threalwinky for reporting this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-2767-2q9v-9326",
"modified": "2026-05-08T01:32:10Z",
"published": "2026-04-17T21:57:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-2767-2q9v-9326"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43526"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/63495"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/65788"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/08ae021d1f42905a85a550813c0d95169b171a6c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/08ae021d1f4f02e0ca5fd8a3b9659291c1ecf95a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/ddb7a8dd80b8d5dd04aafa44ce7a4354b568bb2d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-server-side-request-forgery-via-qqbot-reply-media-url-handling"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: QQBot reply media URL handling could trigger SSRF and re-upload fetched bytes"
}
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