GHSA-246W-56M2-5899
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-03-26 19:52 – Updated: 2024-09-30 20:30Impact
The password reset endpoint served via Synapse was vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks. The impact depends on the configuration of the domain that Synapse is deployed on, but may allow access to cookies and other browser data, CSRF vulnerabilities, and access to other resources served on the same domain or parent domains.
Patches
This is fixed in #9200.
Workarounds
Depending on the needs and configuration of the homeserver a few options are available:
-
Password resets can be disabled by delegating email to a third-party service (via the
account_threepid_delegates.emailsetting) or disabling email (by not configuring theemailsetting). -
If the homeserver is not configured to use passwords (via the
password_config.enabledsetting) then the affected endpoint can be blocked at a reverse proxy:/_synapse/client/password_reset/email/submit_token
-
The
password_reset_confirmation.htmltemplate can be overridden with a custom template that manually escapes the variables using JInja2'sescapefilter. See theemail.template_dirsetting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "matrix-synapse"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.27.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-21332"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-03-26T19:52:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-03-26T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe password reset endpoint served via Synapse was vulnerable to cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks. The impact depends on the configuration of the domain that Synapse is deployed on, but may allow access to cookies and other browser data, CSRF vulnerabilities, and access to other resources served on the same domain or parent domains.\n\n### Patches\nThis is fixed in #9200.\n\n### Workarounds\nDepending on the needs and configuration of the homeserver a few options are available:\n\n1. Password resets can be disabled by delegating email to a third-party service (via the `account_threepid_delegates.email` setting) or disabling email (by not configuring the `email` setting).\n\n2. If the homeserver is not configured to use passwords (via the `password_config.enabled` setting) then the affected endpoint can be blocked at a reverse proxy:\n\n * `/_synapse/client/password_reset/email/submit_token`\n\n3. The `password_reset_confirmation.html` template can be overridden with a custom template that manually escapes the variables using [JInja2\u0027s `escape` filter](https://jinja.palletsprojects.com/en/2.11.x/templates/#escape). See the `email.template_dir` setting.",
"id": "GHSA-246w-56m2-5899",
"modified": "2024-09-30T20:30:17Z",
"published": "2021-03-26T19:52:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/security/advisories/GHSA-246w-56m2-5899"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21332"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/pull/9200"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/commit/e54746bdf7d5c831eabe4dcea76a7626f1de73df"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/matrix-org/synapse/releases/tag/v1.27.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/matrix-synapse/PYSEC-2021-133.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/TNNAJOZNMVMXM6AS7RFFKB4QLUJ4IFEY"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the password reset endpoint"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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